The New Chinese Strategy towards Taiwan

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Abstract

The objective of this article is to analyze the new Chinese Strategy towards Taiwan, which is a part of Chinese Grand Strategy. I am also going to argue that PRC strategy toward Taiwan has long-term objectives, which aren’t a subject of a change; however, its tactics and middle term policies especially under current administration are flexible and highly adaptable. I am also going to argue that the “extra-military emphasis” concept, which transcends without excluding the pure military instrument, is the core of Beijing approach in its Strategy towards Taiwan and Grand Strategy. It doesn’t mean that current administration would refrain from the using of the Hard Power alternative. In contrary, The People's Liberation Army (PLA) continues its preparations to seize Taiwan by force if necessary. Therefore, the article argues that extra-military and military means in PRC strategy are complementary not contradictory. They are both are elements of synergic strategy. However, under the contemporary balance of power in Taiwanese Strait the peaceful unification is for PRC a preferable option. The change in PRC strategy towards Taiwan is that it became a multi-dimensional strategy targeting various groups of Taiwanese society. The PRC strategy of carrot and stick is very visible since year 2005, in which is the carrot getting much sweeter. With the new more favorable Taiwanese administration for Beijing, even more sweet carrot policies are expected.

Keywords: The Chinese Grand Strategy, Taiwan, extra-military emphasis concept, PLA, Hard Power, peaceful unification, multi-dimensional strategy, strategy of carrot and stick

Introduction

The article analyzes Chinese Strategy towards Taiwan, which is a part of Chinese Grand Strategy. Its analysis is based on two premises: that in Chinese strategic thinking war is the worst alternative. \(^1\) Secondly, that all warfare in Chinese thinking is based on deception and it is always desirable to outthink rather than outfight the enemy. In this article I am also going to argue that PRC strategy toward Taiwan has a long-term objectives and its tactics especially under current administration are flexible and highly adaptable. I am also going to argue that the “extra-military

\(^1\) I came to this conclusion by studying Sun Tzu’s Art of War and various academic papers; it was also stated by various PRC representatives and it was also repeated by the first councilor PRC Mr. Cai Ge to Czech Republic during meeting with students of “Taiwan Strait: Possible Scenarios of Conflict “ class on May 6, 2008.
emphasis” concept, which transcends without excluding the pure military instrument, is the core of Beijing approach in its Strategy towards Taiwan and Grand Strategy.

The New Chinese Strategy towards Taiwan

"Entice away the enemy's best and wisest men, so that he may be left without counselors. Introduce traitors into his country that the government policy may be rendered futile. Foment intrigue and deceit, and thus sow dissension between the ruler and his ministers. By means of every artful contrivance, cause deterioration amongst his men and waste of his treasure. Corrupt his morals by insidious gifts leading him into excess. Disturb and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely women." Sun Tzu Art of War.²

PRC applies this ancient and cunning strategy in modern terms. Its interpretation could be following: Use all means available to weaken national security of the enemy. Bribe its representatives, support election campaigns of corrupt politicians and with their help eliminate the opponent of your regime. Corrupt its citizens by gifts and opportunities. Woo its best minds away and use them against it. Buy the loyalty of your own and opponents media to spread disinformation and propaganda of own regime.

It is a general observation that in Chinese strategic thinking is prevalent tendency to use extra-military means³ before pure military instruments to reach the strategic objectives. It has several advantages. The acquired territory is no destroyed by a military conflict; therefore there is no need to rebuild it. There are no casualties and no warfare expenditure. In Chinese strategic thinking peace is a desirable outcome. War is the least favorable solution. Sun Tzu considers war as the worst solution, because the most desirable is to win without fighting. In case that a war is inevitable, then the war efforts should be prudent. The war should be finished as soon as possible and fighting should be as less intense as possible.⁴ By applying present-day modern technologies

³ By using the term extra-military instruments I have in mind: the economic power of the state, culture, media, legal and diplomatic means. This terminology originates Professor Chong-pin Lin terminology as methodological equivalent to Professor J. Ney Soft Power. Professor Ney accepts that the Soft and Hard Power (non-peaceful means) could be in a contradiction; in general they are in a complementary relationship. Lin, C.P., (2006): China’s emerging grand strategy, University of west Bohemia, Pilsen, (p. 1), Ney, J., S, U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq, American Foreign Policy July/ August 2003 (p. 298 – 299).
⁴ It is the European experience that the WW I. had disastrous consequences on participating European powers. Long-lasting conflicts have negative effects on national economy and on loss of lives. They have negative influence on national moral and grey economy is growing due to shortages on normally common goods. Lin, C.P., China’s emerging grand strategy, University of west Bohemia, Pilsen, 2006 (Apéndix 6).
it is possible to employ surgical swift military operations, which leads to defeat of the enemy in matter of hours.\(^5\) In year 2004 the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force major general major Zhang Zhiping stated: „Military capabilities in air and space are enabling to obtain a victory without fighting.”\(^6\) This statement became a reality in January 2007. PRC shot down its obsolete weather forecast satellite. This power presentation caused stir in academic circles and it alarmed the analysts in Pentagon and Taipei. PRC has shown its ability to shoot down satellites in its airspace. In a near future PRC doesn’t have to limit itself to shoot down its obsolete weather satellites in its own airspace.\(^7\)

According to Professor McDougal there can be three main periods identified in PLA overall strategy development:

1. Mao’s period – “Peoples’ War’‘ - “luring into deep defense”, which means that in case that PRC is under attack by outside aggressor, PLA should unite with people and should fighting impaling guerilla tactics.

2. Deng’s period – “Peoples’ War’‘ waged by modern means – this doctrine reflects Deng’s overall modernization and PLA adaptation to PRC’ contemporary needs.

3. Contemporary period since 1990 – waging limited warfare using high-tech means.\(^8\)

There is ongoing modernization of the PLA. PLA does not possess blue water navy yet.\(^9\) This situation is being changed.\(^10\) The PRC short-range missiles represent the most eminent threat for Taiwanese security. There were approximately 200 CSS-6 and CSS-7 in year 2000. Their number increased to 500 in year 2004.\(^11\) Nowadays their number is estimated to 1300.\(^12\) There can be

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\(^6\) Lin, C.P., *China’s emerging grand strategy*, University of west Bohemia, Pilsen, 2006 (Appendix 6)

\(^7\) Harrington, C., *Chinese ASAT test rekindles weapons debate*, Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 24. 2007, (p. 4) For more information please see: Appendix 1.


\(^12\) Ko, S., *Chinese Missile Threat growing: Chen*, at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2008/01/02/-2003395258 (02.01.2008).
used for psychological warfare. They can be shot over enemies cities and cause a feeling of eminent danger.\(^\text{13}\)

In general China does not want to be involved in a conflict with Taiwan. There are several reasons for that. First of all as I’ve already mentioned it is highly illogical to use military force to devastate a territory, which could be acquired by using extra-military means. Secondly China wishes to avoid a confrontation with USA (at least for now). Because in such a conflict, in a long term; it couldn’t prevail against American navy. Therefore, to conquer Taiwan would be for PRC a bad alternative. The USA applies position of a ‘strategic ambiguity’ towards Taiwan. USA doesn’t wish to enter into a conflict with PRC. Especially in a North Korea issue PRC is a partner for USA. USA promised in TRA to supply Taiwan with defensive weapons. For USA there is no obligation to help Taiwan when it is attacked. In terms of international security there can be two situations considered: PRC will attack Taiwan without a provocation, alternatively PRC applies non-peaceful means toward Taiwan after it formally declares independence.

According to Professor June Teufel Dreyer USA could help defend Taiwan in case that PRC would be an aggressor. However, if Taiwan pushes China into a confrontation the USA will not help.\(^\text{14}\) It could be interpreted as the USA supports the status quo. Therefore, if Taiwan doesn’t declare de jure independence USA will protect it against a PRC attack. If Taiwan does declare impedance its fate is sealed.

According to Professor Michael Tkacik “The USA would respond more forcefully to a “without provocation” seizure. America would work hard to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence, possibly to the point of withdrawing whatever security guarantees exist. A lot depends on the particular president and the world situation (are we still bogged down in Iraq, etc.). In the second scenario America would probably re-supply Taiwan and help in many ways, but I’m not sure if we’d risk carrier battle groups. Then again, perhaps by providing real time intelligence and preventing Chinese forces from crossing the Straits, America might provide meaningful support, but not support that starts a war outside the immediate region. But of course, I don’t know and that’s part of the purpose of US policy – designed ambiguity.”\(^\text{15}\)

\(^{13}\) Lin, C.P., *China’s emerging grand strategy*, University of west Bohemia, Pilsen, 2006 (Appendix 4).

\(^{14}\) Profesor Dreyer expressed this during a personal conversation after the Civic Institute conference: “Taiwan and East Asia security on October 22, 2007 in Prague.

\(^{15}\) The answer of Professor Tkacik (Michael Tkacik is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stephen F. Austin State University) to an e-mail from 06.02. 2008.
The analysis of Dr. Denny Roy leads to similar conclusion. According to his opinion the USA and PRC do prefer avoiding a conflict in Taiwanese Strait. Under certain circumstances PRC is ready to attack Taiwan and USA is ready to defend Taiwan under certain circumstances.

PRC applies strategy of waiting and improving its quality and quantity of its armed forces. For Taiwan it means that in long term the balance in absolute military capabilities is shifting towards PRC. If the current trends are going to continue Chinese economy will continue to grow and as well as PRC role in a region. It is as question how long the USA would keep a superior position in North-East Asia and how long they will be interested to protect Taiwan. PRC prefers to be ready for a war. It however, favors to use extra-military means. It could be concluded the first would not happen. The second scenario is especially under coming Ma Ying-jeou’s administration highly unlikely. If that would happen, the main ally of Taiwan, the USA would strongly discourage the Taiwanese government from declaring formal independence. The USA allies in region Japan and Australia have the same attitudes. Especially for Japan due to its own national interests is continuation of status quo as long as possible favorable.

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16 According to retired ROCA admiral Lan, Hu Jintao does not intend use force Taiwan. Only in case if Taiwan would alter the status quo in such way that Hu would lose his face. Lan, L., How Much Is Enough?, Taiwan Development Perspectives 2007, (p.136).


18 The PRC doesn’t only put the USA under pressure asking not to supply USA with weapons it also employs this policy towards other countries. If we consider countries producing modern high-tech weaponry: USA, Russia, France, Germany, UK, SAR these all have diplomatic relations with PRC and with the US exception none of them is providing Taiwan with weapons. Therefore, Taiwan is depended on US supplies and own capacities.


20 Australian FM calls Taiwan Referendum 'Inappropriate', at: http://www.chinapost.com.tw/news/2008/02/05/142058/Australian%2DFM.htm (05.02.08).

21 Japan doesn’t wish that Taiwan falls to PLA, because of at least two reasons. PLA would control important Japanese sea links – see appendix 2. Secondly, PRC would get closer to Japanese territory - see appendix 3. See also: Lin, C.P., China’s Emerging Grand Strategy, University of west Bohemia, Pilsen, 2006, (p. 22) and Yoshihide, S., Taiwan in Japan’s Security Considerations, The China Quarterly, vol. 165, May 2001 (pp. 130 – 145). Japan does not favor instability in a region, nor does Japan wish to harm its interest in PRC. Hsu, J., Presidential election: 26 days to go: KMT victory would make PRC attack likelier: academic, at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/02/25/2003402752 (25.02.08), see also: Japan PM urges China co-operation, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7167420.stm (30.02.07) and , Lin, C.P., Sino-Japan ties: An optimist’s viewpoint, The Strait Times, July 5, 2006. Under recent visit of the PRC president Hu Jintao in May in Japan, he and the Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda agreed that leaders of the two states will develop ways for regular exchanges, with one leader visiting the other in principle every year. Landmark China-Japan deal agreed, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7387027.stm (07.05.08). Further progress was achieved in June, when Japan and China agreed to jointly develop Shirakaba and Asunaro fields in the East China Sea. Ito, S., Japan, PRC deal won't slake thirst for energy, at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/-
Many analysts point out the rapprochement of the PRC and the USA since year 2000.\textsuperscript{22} In year 2001 vice premier Qian Qichen said that the cooperation with Washington is for PRC more reasonable than confrontation.\textsuperscript{23} He explained his position in in more detail in October 2002, when he stated that the PRC and USA are not going to change their fundamental positions. However, despite of the differences it doesn’t change the fact that PRC prefers to cooperate with the USA.\textsuperscript{24} The Zhongnanhai analysts assume that the time is on their side. Therefore, it is pointless to provoke the USA at this time. It is more reasonable to prepare and seek out the right strategic opportunity when the USA will behind their zenith.\textsuperscript{25} If the contemporary trends will continue, the PRC’s economy will overtake Japan by year 2015 and USA by year 2040. The contemporary cooperative PRC strategy towards USA\textsuperscript{26} could be interpreted by Chinese Lao Zi, who said: “Do not take the lead under the heaven. “ Mao extended this idea: “Do not seek the hegemony”. Deng added: “We shall dim the light and thrive in a shadow”.\textsuperscript{27} PRC implemented the strategy of allying itself with secondary enemy in order to defeat the primary enemy in its history several times. The Cold War relations triangle between USA, USSR and PRC could be


\textsuperscript{24} Qian Qichen in: The post-September 11 International Situation and Sino-U.S. Relations, Beijing: The Central Party School, October 2000.

\textsuperscript{25} Lin, C.P., \textit{China’s emerging grand strategy}, University of west Bohemia, Pilsen, 2006, (p. 7).

\textsuperscript{26} There were some tensions in year 2007 between USA and PRC, because PRC did not allow berthing US Warships in Hong Kong. This situation was resolved swiftly and harm in log term Sino-US relations was done. U.S. warship docks in Hong Kong, at: http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/01/27/china.fleet.ap/index.html (28.01.08) PRC and USA agreed on establishing on military hotline to prevent possible misunderstandings and conflicts. US and China agree hotline plan, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7271389.stm (29.02.08).

\textsuperscript{27} Another Deng’s statement could be added that the PRC will always be a Third World country. This statement can be link to Sun Tzu that all warfare is based on deception. This statement tries to manipulate the competition to downplay Chinese capacities. The adversary could react only on information he has not on that what remains hidden. PRC endeavors that the advisory makes a mistake and underestimate it. PRC hopes that the advisory recognizes PRC’s true potential when it is too late. In general Chinese strategies could be compared more to these employed by players of Go rather than of the chess. Go is more subtle and it is difficult to calculate the advisory true motives. It is not uncommon that the advisory slowly takes key positions without the other player even recognizing it until it is too late. The idea of PRC keeping low profile could be understood from regional contest as well. For better understanding I would like to name three China’s neighbors Russia, India and Vietnam. Their military capacities aren’t for sure negligible and it is favorable for China that its neighbors in general are feeling safe.
interpreted as an example of this strategy. It seems that for PRC is the USA secondary enemy and a temporary ally. The USA can become the primary enemy; however, contemporarily it is favorable for PRC to have good relations with the USA.\(^{28}\) In spirit of this policy General Zhang Shiping made in May 2006 a statement even though the USA has hegemonic tendencies, China should avoid the confrontation with the USA. It is bad to let USA to carry some more burdens and let the US do some more good for this world.\(^ {29}\)

The PRC strategy is part of a larger synergetic domestic and foreign political Grand Strategy. Professor Chong-Pin Lin identifies six main objectives of this strategy:

1. To defuse the domestic “time bombs” – i.e. mainly social-economic problems, which are threatening the regime stability and to keep stability at all costs.\(^ {30}\)
2. To strengthen institutionalization of official communication links with Washington.\(^ {31}\) To rise a bilateral cooperation above a contradiction with the USA.
3. To reunify with Taiwan without using military as best option. To prepare coercive strategy as second best alternative. To be ready to conquer Taiwan and to aggravate the Sino-USA relations as worst option.
4. To actively pursue a “good neighborhood policy” – so the neighbors are feeling: friendly, safe and wealthy.\(^ {32}\)
5. To improve PRCs’ relation to EU to counterbalance USA
6. Broaden PRCs’ influence in Africa and Latin America to gain various resources\(^ {33}\)

The PRC policy towards Taiwan could be defined by statement of American President Theodore Roosevelt: „Speak softly and carry a big stick.“ The best way for Beijing is to get

\(^{30}\) China Unveils Government Restructuring and Calls for Battling Inflation, at: http://www.chinapost.com.tw/news/2008/03/05/145805/p2/China%2DDunveils.htm (05.03.08).
\(^{33}\) The Chinese “Resources Diplomacy” could be observed in many countries from Angola to Brazil. Lin, C.P., *China’s emerging grand strategy*, University of west Bohemia, Pilsen, 2006, (pp. 4 - 5)
Taiwan without fighting. Beijing attacks Taiwan rather rhetorically and diplomatically.\textsuperscript{34} PRC focuses its criticism toward President Chen Shui-bian and sends positive signals toward Taiwanese public.\textsuperscript{35} It could be made a parallel between the Beijing position in relation to Chen Shui-bian and former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.\textsuperscript{36} After Koizumi left the Prime Minister office and was replaced by Shinzo Abe,\textsuperscript{37} the Sino-Japanese relations improved. Similar improvement of Cross-Strait relations occurred after the change of Taiwanese administrative. The meeting between Hu Jintao and Vicent Siew at BFA conference in Boao could be seen as a herald of this change.\textsuperscript{38} In a similar friendly atmosphere was meeting between President Hu Jinato and Honorary Kuomintang chairman Lien Chan in Beijing.\textsuperscript{39} After ten years the talks between Taiwan and China were reopened in June 2008\textsuperscript{40} and direct flights between Taiwan and China were established.\textsuperscript{41} The warming up between in Cross-Strait Relations leads also to suspicions in Tokyo after recent Taiwanese fishing boat collision with Japanese patrol ship at Senkaku islands. President Ma, who pledged in November 2007 during his visit in Japan, to be a peacemaker not “a troublemaker” endeavors to mend the relationship with Japan.\textsuperscript{42}

PRC moved its missiles simulation from Taiwanese Strait since year 2003 and softened its approach towards Taiwan.\textsuperscript{43} PLA has changed its tactic from pure military concept to „Three

\textsuperscript{34} China Warns of 'Heavy Cost' for New U.N. Vote, at: http://www.chinapost.com.tw/news/2008/02/04/141807/-China%2Dwarns.htm (04.02.08).


\textsuperscript{36} During the recent visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao in Japan: “Hu had breakfast with former Japanese prime ministers on Thursday (May 8\textsuperscript{th} 2008), but in a sign that not all bygones are forgotten one very important name was dropped from the guest list - Junichiro Koizumi. Koizumi strained ties repeatedly with Beijing by visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, which many see as a symbol of Japan's militarist past, during his tenure in office from 2001-2006.” Chinese Presidents Meeting with Former Japanese Prime Ministers Excludes Koizumi, at http://www.chinapost.com.tw/asia/japan/2008/05/08/155557/Chinese%2Dpresidents.htm (08.05.08).

\textsuperscript{37} China PM Wraps up Visit to Japan, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/6551029.stm (13.04.07).

\textsuperscript{38} Historic China-Taiwan Talks Held, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7343945.stm (12.04.08).


\textsuperscript{40} China and Taiwan reopen talks at: http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/06/11/taiwan.china.ap/index.html#cnnSTCText (11.06.08).

\textsuperscript{41} Direct China-Taiwan travel agreed, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7452097.stm (13.06.08). The objective to establish direct flights were endeavored by President Chen’s administrative, however the PRC wasn’t willing to negotiate about direct flights with his administrative.

\textsuperscript{42} As world focuses on Beijing, Wang heads for Tokyo at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/-08/08/2003419754 (08.08.08).

\textsuperscript{43} Professor Chong-Pin Lin points out that the tests were held elsewhere. Lin, C.P., China’s emerging grand strategy, University of west Bohemia, Pilsen, 2006, (p. 10).
Wars concept**: psychological, legal – diplomatic and by using media against Taiwan. It implies that the PLA took its lesson from 1996, when PLA tested its missiles in Taiwan Strait and as outcome Lee Teng-hui, was elected, which wasn’t favorable for Zhongnanhai. Beijing tries to gain favor of Taiwanese public by various means: from granting scholarships for Taiwanese students, granting advantages to Taiwanese farmers, approving loans for Taiwanese businessmen, abolishing visa for Taiwanese entering Hong Kong, to offering pandas to Taiwan.

There can be six changes in PRC policies towards Taiwan identified since full power transfer form Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao in year 2005. Professor Chong-Pin Lin defines six major changes:

1. Hu Jintao didn’t set up any timetable for reunification with Taiwan, in September 2004 Central Military Commission adopted new doctrine towards Taiwan: „To endeavor for negotiation, to prepare for war and not to fear of postponing tactics of Taiwan. In this point there is continuity between Hu and his mentor Deng Xiaoping. Deng stated in year 1984: Reunification of the motherland is the aspiration of the whole nation. If it cannot be accomplished in 100 years, it will be in 1,000 years.

2. Puts emphasis on extra-military means as mentioned in “Three Wars concept, the economic and agricultural, civic, cultural diplomatic dimensions are also added.

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46 It entails elimination of duty tariffs on groceries, to possibility to settle businesses in Special Economic Zones.
48 This could be understood as Kuomintang’s return to Hong Kong 1992 compromise, Rickards, J., Ma claims that the 1992 consensus was his idea, at: http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/2006/04/29/81298/Ma-claims.htm (29.4.06). This means for PRC as first councilor PRC Mr. Cai Ge to Czech Republic said during meeting with students of “Taiwan Strait: Possible Scenarios of Conflict” class on May 6. 2008 that “under One China principle anything goes”. As I asked him, if he refers to 1992 compromise, he answered: “Yes, I understand it under 1992 compromise”. I would like to add the position of Lien Chan to 1992 compromise as it is definition:

“What is commonly referred to as the consensus of 1992 is the basis on which to build a new framework of peace and development for Taiwan and China, Lien went on. Under that tacit agreement, both Taipei and Beijing acknowledge there is but one China, whose definition can be orally and individually expressed. Su Chi, a former chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council and chairman-designate of the National Security Council, calls it an “agreement on one China with a different interpretation.” For more information of Lien Chan Positions see: Hung, J., *'Common Market' to usher in cross-strait peace, development*, at: http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/-national/national%20news/2008/05/13/156122/p3/Common%2DMarket.htm (13.05.08).
&title=One+Country+Two+Systems&cm_id=3 (08.02.08).
50 PRC ties to woo Taiwanese farmers traditional DPP voters. Oon, C., *China Woos Taiwan’s Farmers with Incentives*, Straits Times, 18. 10. 2006.
3. Combines carrot and stick approach. On one side the Anti-Secession Law from 2005 is much harder than Jiang Zemin’s policies toward Taiwan. However, Hu’s “carrot policies” towards Taiwanese public as Professor Chong-Pin Lin states on gestures are also much sweeter than Jiang’s were.

4. Pursues active cooperation with KMT. The turning point was the invitations of KMT representatives to PRC.

5. Endeavors to cooperate with DPP as well. Hu opposes the “Deep Green” faction (hard-line supporters of Taiwanese independence) within DPP and wishes get the moderate segments of DPP electorate on his side.

6. Hu offers alternative concepts of sovereignty. These concepts includes various possibilities how to reunify Taiwan with Mainland China.

According to Professor Chong-Pin Lin Hu inherited four Jiang’s policies:

1. To prepare for a military conquest of Taiwan.

2. To face Taiwanese independence and to support reunification.

3. To strangle Taiwanese intendance via foreign capitals. (Professor Chong-Pin Lin means by that that PRC uses diplomatic pressure (economic leverage and other means) on USA,


54 Invited were not only the KMT representatives, PFP represented by James Soong. For more information on KMT-CCP cooperation: Kao, K.; Teng, T. and Lee, C.; Cross-Strait Relations in Perspective: The DPP playing with Fire, the KMT Opening Opportunities, Taiwan Development Perspectives 2007, (pp. 43 - 45).

55 The beginning of this policy starts with Jiang Zemin’s invitation of on third Legislative Yuan ROC to PRC in October 2000. Invited were not only KMT and NP members but also Chen Shui-bian opponents within DPP. Roy, D. (2003): Taiwan: A Political History, Cornell University Press (p. 237).

56 Lin, C.P., China’s emerging grand strategy, University of west Bohemia, Pilsen, 2006, (pp. 16 - 17). For PRC position see: China Offers ROC Talks on Equal Footing, at: http://www.chinapost.com.tw/news/2008/03/05/-145652/China%2Doffers.htm (05.03.08). For KMT’s Lien Chan position: Hung, J., ‘Common Market’ to usher in cross-strait peace, development, at: http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national%20news/2008/05/13/156122/p3/Common%2DMarket.htm (13.05.08). There is a difference between his idea of Common Market and Vincent Siew’s Cross-Strait Market. For idea of Vincent Siew see: Mo, Y., PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 2008: Siew Defends Term ‘one China market’ at: http://www.tarpeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/03/06/2003404222 (06.03.08). To put it simple Siew’s idea is to create a Common Market as pure economic tool, for Chan it is not just an economic community. As he said: it is “It's social and cultural as well.” Hung, J., ‘Common Market’ to usher in cross-strait peace, development, at: http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national%20news/2008/05/13/156122/p3/Common%2DMarket.htm (13.05.08).

57 The PLA objective is to be ready conquer Taiwan before the USA and other countries are able to help Taiwan Lan, L., How Much Is Enough?, Taiwan Development Perspectives 2007. (p.139).
Japan, Australia, France, Germany and others in the name of maintaining regional stability to strangle Taiwanese independence.)

4. To reduce Taiwanese international participation and recognition.

Fourth inherited policy can be interpreted that PRC endeavors that ROC is not allowed to enter any international organizations, especially those, which require statehood. PRC also gains African countries recognition at the expense of Taiwan.

The same policy PRC applies for Latin America as well. The only important player of the World Diplomacy who recognizes ROC is Vatican. PRC gains recognition of these states by investment, by “sending of rich tourists”, generally speaking by Dollar Diplomacy.

The goal of the PRC strategy toward Taiwan is a gradual reunification. For this objective Zhongnanhai uses multi-level strategy in which the extra-military means are prevailing. Hu Jintao defined during 17th CCP Congress “one-China principle” as policy based on single Chinese nation as framework for dialog in Taiwanese Strait. Despite of Hu peaceful rhetoric (with exception towards Chen Shui-bian who rejects PRCs’ “one-China principle”), PRC does not refrain (as stated for example in the Anti-Secession Law) of using non-peaceful measures towards Taiwan in case of proclamation of de jure independence. Hu reached an olive branch of peace toward Taiwan and offered to open a Peace Treaty negotiation.

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59 Lin, C.P., China’s emerging grand strategy, University of west Bohemia, Pilsen, 2006, (p. 18).

60 In January 2008 Malawi switched its diplomatic recognition from ROC to PRC, Malawi, Taiwan End 42-Year Relations, at: <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2008/01/15/2003397305> (15.01.08) For more information of on Taiwan’s broken relations see Appendix 4.

61 In June 2007 Costa Rica switched its diplomatic recognition from ROC to PRC, China Talks up Costa Rica Tourism, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7029627.stm (05. 10.07).

62 It is a question whether Joseph A. Ratzinger will not switch its diplomatic recognition from ROC to PRC as well. Willey, D., Chinese Orchestra Plays for Pope, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7389128.stm (07.05.08). Vatican has its objections towards PRCs’ One Child Policy. Vatican is also concerned about the religious rights protection in PRC. There is also struggle between Beijing and Vatican for investiture, which has the right to name bishops in PRC. For more information see: No Change in Vatican Ties, at: http://www.chinapost.com.tw/editorial-/2008/02/19/143452/No-change.htm (19.02.08).


65 This conclusion confirmed me in a personal discussion first secretary of PRC to CR Mr. Peng Bin at IIR conference on Czech EU Chairmanship EU which was held at MOFA in Prague on 5th December 2007.

Conclusion

It is a finding of this research paper that the long-term PRC objective toward Taiwan hasn’t changed. A new approach can be identified since completed power transition to Hu Jintao. Hu’s approach toward Taiwan emphasizes extra-military means to reach unification. It doesn’t mean that Hu’s administration would refrain from Hard Power alternative. In contrary, PLA continues its preparations to seize Taiwan by force if necessary. Therefore, it is necessary to understand extra-military and military means in PRC strategy as complementary not contradictory. They are both elements of synergic strategy. The peaceful unification is preferable option as stated by Hu and many others PRC representatives. PRC does not seek war with the USA over Taiwan. It would strongly jeopardize Sino-American relations and even worse, PLA cannot outfight the US Navy. Such a situation is the worst alternative, which is very improbable in next four years.

The change in PRC strategy towards Taiwan is that it became a multi-dimensional strategy targeting various groups of Taiwanese society. The PRC strategy of carrot and stick is very visible since year 2005 in which is the carrot getting much sweeter. With the new more favorable Taiwanese administration for Beijing even more sweet carrot policies are expected.

The PRC short and middle-term tactics toward Taiwan may have changed and its alteration is possible. Since Deng Xiaoping period and onwards PRC was always pragmatic and flexible in its policies. The long-term policies are not a subject of change. For PRC Salience of Taiwan is vital not only as a question of territorial integrity but also of possible deeper penetration into Western-Pacific.

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Abstrakt


Appendix

Appendix 1: A. Missile projection capabilities for SRBM’s
(Source 2006 US DOD-report on Chinese Military Power)
B. Medium and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile range (Source 2006 US DOD-report on Chinese Military Power)

Appendix 2. Strategic Importance: straddling the sea-lanes between NE Asia (Japan and Korea) and SE Asia (Source 2006 US DOD-report on Chinese Military Power)


Appendix I: Taiwan’s Broken Relations (1998 - 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Jan. 29</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Apr. 24</td>
<td>Republic of Guinea-Bissau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Oct. 31</td>
<td>Kingdom of Tonga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>June 18</td>
<td>Republic of Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>July 23</td>
<td>Republic of Nauru (resumed relations on May 14, 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Oct. 12</td>
<td>Republic of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mar. 30</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Dominica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Jan. 27</td>
<td>Grenada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Oct. 23</td>
<td>Republic of Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Aug. 3</td>
<td>Republic of Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>June 7</td>
<td>Republic of Costa Rica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Jan. 14</td>
<td>Republic of Malawi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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