

## Comparisons of Civic Engagement in Europe: Evidence from European Values Study

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**Comparisons of Civic Engagement in Europe: Evidence from European Values Study.** The research is focused on the nature of civic engagement across European countries and its prediction, based on European Values Study data (2008). A model of civic engagement which includes scales of civic concern, civic confidence, non-violent elite-changing actions and organizational activities, which has been tested both on cross-country level and in pooled data, implies two factors, corresponding to "cognition" and "activity" parts of civic engagement. An attempt is made to envisage and conceptualize the predictors of civic engagement in different parts of Europe with the help of classical OLS regression and multilevel regression modelling, in such a way testing research hypotheses. It is shown that differences in civic engagement may be conceptualized within the framework of Laurent Thevenot's three regimes of engagement.

**Key words:** civic engagement, European Values study, comparative framework, regimes of engagement

**Porovnanie občianskej angažovanosti v Európe: Európsky komparatívny výskum.** Výskum sa zameriava na povahu občianskej angažovanosti, ktorá zahŕňa rôzne škály občianskej angažovanosti, občianskej dôvery, nenásilné opatrenia elít a organizačné činnosti, ktoré boli testované na úrovni cross-country v kontexte s faktormi opisujúcimi "poznanie" a "činnosť" občianskej angažovanosti. Hlavným cieľom bolo prezentovať snahu o predikciu a konceptualizáciu občianskej angažovanosti v rôznych častiach Európy pomocou klasickej regresie (OLS) a modelu viacúrovňovej regresie s cieľom testovania výskumných hypotéz. Ukazuje sa, že rozdiely v občianskej angažovanosti možno ponímať v rámci troch špecifických úrovní angažovanosti (Laurent Thevenot).

**Klíčové slová:** občianska angažovanosť, European Values study, porovnávací rámec, úrovni zapájania sa

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## INTRODUCTION

The topic of civic engagement belongs to those which can hardly be imagined besides the internal context and, at the same time, which is widely discussed on the level of country comparisons. Rise of civic engagement across the world and in Europe (to mention just Ukraine's case in the end of 2013) has provoked a lot of debates upon the factors which play a role in facilitation of engagement in its different forms: from local affiliations to civic protests. There are a lot of recent studies focusing on the quantity and forms of civic engagement (e.g. Oorshot et al., 2006; Theiss-Morse&Hibbing, 2005) which show that there is no generally established definition of the concept "civic engagement". It is used along with or substituted by the concepts of "social capital", "political activities", "social participation" etc. We intentionally use the term "civic engagement" in order to emphasize its embeddedness in the context, or "dependency between the human being and his or her environment" (Thevenot, 2007: 413).

The topic is relevant to contemporary society for several reasons. First, European context is suitable for observing and re-thinking new forms of communalities and divisions across the countries. Second, civic engagement has been mostly analyzed as a type of activities. This paper, though, is an attempt to present several aspects of civic engagement, each of which may be grasped within three modalities of engagement in Laurent Thevenot's scheme (Thevenot 2007) which introduces more complex vision of engagement and its role in different societies. Though, we envisage civic engagement as both prerequisite and element of civil society as an ideal type (Tocqueville 2000).

The key question of the research concerns the possibilities to envisage civic engagement in Europe referring to the concept "post-socialism" in the meaning of multifaceted transition (Hann – Humphrey – Verdery 2002)<sup>3</sup> in contrast to the established tradition of civicity in the European democracies. A trick is that civic engagement reflects different traditions of civicity from one society to another which are not reflected in cross-countries surveys, though they may be implicitly grasped grounding on their data. Civicity here is presented as a communitarian phenomenon (Acik-Toprak 2009), being different from political or social engagement, at the same time aiming to foster the community. Generally, this paper puts emphasis on a vision of civic engagement as a part of social capital (Guillen et al. 2011) In the first, theoretical, section it is written about the background of civic engagement research. The second section deals with data and methods, linking suggested theory to empirical evidence based

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<sup>3</sup> Post-socialist countries in the scope of the research include former USSR countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, countries of former Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary and Romania.

on the results of European Values Study 4<sup>th</sup> wave<sup>4</sup>. The third section enlightens empirical findings, starting with the general picture of civic engagement in comparative perspective across Europe and proceeding to factors of civic engagement within the individual level of analysis. Thereby, the aim of the paper is to discuss the variability of civic engagement in Europe and its determining factors – are they divided by the "line of post-socialism"?

## 1. THEORY

### 1.1. Literature

Conceptualization of civic engagement, despite the existence of quite a lot of research in the field, needs clarification due to its embeddedness in some research into the social capital, as a part of it (e.g. Ferragina 2012; Halman 2006; Kaasa – Parts 2008; Glanville – Bienenstock 2009) or political participation (e.g. Civic Engagement in OECD Better Life Index<sup>5</sup>). Hereby, the concept "civic" means "being connected with civicity" which is different both from the "communication" (micro-level) and "state" (macro-level). Civicity can be seen as a social part of citizenship (inclusion as helping others, socializing, in general) and a political part (concerning political actions and attitudes to them) meaning belonging and acting in a voluntary organizations, as well as being concerned by the problems of a community (on the differentiation of political, civic and social dimensions of citizenship see Marshall 1950). At the same time, some data on Russia prove that people generally do not differentiate between political, civic and social activities (Differentiation 2013: 57).

On the other hand, some research differentiate between formal and informal social participation – while formal participation covers affiliation and work in different organization, informal one is about general social contacts (meeting colleagues, friends, etc.) which creates a kind of conceptual mixture of civic and social. In such a way, civic engagement covers formal aspects of social participation, but not limited to them. It extends as well to such aspects of political participation as non-violent protest actions (Welzel et al. 2005), at the same time it does not take into account conventional political participation (Newton – Montero 2007).

Civic engagement is sometimes limited to the description of number of affiliations (e.g. Meulen 2012: 556; van Ingen 2008: 104-105) which narrows

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<sup>4</sup> European Values Study is a large-scale, cross-national and longitudinal survey research program which is repeated every nine years in an increasing number of counties. The fourth wave in 2008 covered 47 European countries and about 70,000 people interviewed. The data is representative both at a country and individual level. All the data and details of project are available at [www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu](http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu)

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics/civic-engagement/>

the core concept and makes it too formalized. Moreover, the complexity of civic engagement may be seen in a typical attitude triad: affective component-behavioural component-cognitive component (Rosenberg – Hovland 1960). Such an approach is supported by the definition of civic engagement (see Doolittle – Faul 2013) as possessing the knowledge, skills, and values needed to enhance the community and their expression through attitudes and behaviour. Other authors offer "status" component on the place of affective perception (Savelyev 2013) which, though, was not validated in our case. Regarding civic engagement, it seems not possible to avoid the component of affiliation to (formal) communities and organizations (emphasized in mentioned "status" component), but we relate it to the dimension of behaviour using cumulative scale (see Guillen et al. 2011: 337<sup>6</sup>).

Cognitive dimension of civic engagement is connected to concern about other people and confidence in different social institutions both of which reflect the capacity of a person to influence their community (Kaasa – Parts 2008: 146). Civic trust is a manifestation of a widened "radius of trust" (Realo et al. 2008) which signifies increase in social capital. For instance, Guillen, Coromina and Saris (Guillen et al. 2011) regard trust and participation as two formative components of social capital, while others (Voicu 2005) add social engagement, or "bridging connections", and social trust as well. In case of civic engagement, distrust towards main social institutions creates prerequisites for social tensions, radicalization of moods and protest actions. For instance, according to European Social Survey data in 2008<sup>7</sup>, Ukraine's score of trust towards the main institutions of authority was the smallest across European countries in the scope of research which has become one of prerequisites for the rise of civic protests in Ukraine in the end of 2013.

Affective component of civic engagement is grounded on the perceiving of civic activities on the poles of "good" and "bad" and is usually operationalized in particular topics (e.g. during continuous actions of civic protest). Such a component seems interesting in understanding of the changes in emotional acceptance or denial of certain actions, actors, events. Actually, this component is relevant in particular topics but seems rather speculative in more general issue. In this paper, the affective component will be skipped due to the general framework of comparisons in which it could be more abstract and more corresponding to the sphere of mind than to emotions.

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<sup>6</sup> Though a scale offered by the authors is elaborated on variables of membership, participation and voluntary work, in this research it is possible to use only two items: membership and voluntary work.

<sup>7</sup> European Social Survey is a cross-country bi-annual research. Detailed information about it is available at [www.europeansocialsurvey.org](http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org).

The manifestation of behaviour is the most vivid part of civic engagement, though interpreted on a wide range from giving and volunteering as “acting” forms of social engagement (Jones 2006), or helping others<sup>8</sup> to having talks on political matters (Carpini et al. 2004). As it was outlined before, civic engagement activities include both organizational activities and non-violent protest actions. Conventional usage of indicators that reveal people's connection to organizations seems rather vague in covering the issue of civic activities (Welzel et al. 2005), while it still remains important as its part.

As civic engagement in the predefined dimensions addresses the issues of public concern, major part of existing literature is focused upon the role of civic engagement (or some of its parts, considered as a whole as we stated above) in the development of democracy and civil society (Tocqueville 2000; Putnam 1995) stated that civic engagement is necessary in the processes of community and democracy creation. Taking into account civic engagement as a part of social capital (Bourdieu 1985: 249 Coleman and followers), its development is as well interpreted as efficient for the economy by helping decrease levels of unemployment, contribute to economic resiliency, and help communities weather economic recessions (Scott – Zukin 2002). Another dimension of social research is about the associations' role in civic sphere which is seen in implicit influence on politics (e.g. Cohen – Arato 1992).

At the same time, such a division of social world into "black" and "white" ("civically engaged" and "civically non-engaged") seems too superficial. First of all, communities may be classified as bonding and bridging (Coffe – Geys 2008) depending on their size and aims, namely those that segregate its members from non-community members and, on the contrary, those promoting intra-communities cooperation (Paxton 2002; Oorshot et al. 2006; Geys – Murdock 2010). Moreover, voluntary associations connected to the larger community "should be more beneficial for the promotion of generalized trust than associations that remain isolated" (Paxton, 2007: 51). Secondly, Iglie pays attention to the “dark side” of affiliations which means that members of voluntary associations may be less socially and politically tolerant, especially in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe (Iglie 2010: 720-721). This idea is also extended to the possibility of low economic performance caused by affiliations to "bonding" organizations (van Deth – Zmerli 2010: 638). Thirdly, it is obvious that not all associations are equally important in different societies, so diverse and multiple active membership may be probably more important (Halpern 2005; Frane 2008). Thus, involvement in protest actions may be interpreted as a more important tool for understanding how active

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<sup>8</sup> E.g., there are several dimensions in Civic Engagement Index (Gallup studies): money donation, time volunteering and helping a stranger.

civiness is shaped, reflecting "commitment to a set of values and translating it into their actual behaviour, into a way of life" (Perez-Diaz 2011) and is specific rather to "older" than to "new" democracies (Voicu 2005).

Here it is necessary to differentiate "violent forms of collective action, such as rebellions, riots and plunder - just as terrorist, criminal and extremist associations are uncivic. But civilian forms of collective action, including peaceful demonstrations, boycotts and petitions, cannot be disqualified as uncivic right from the start" (Welzel et al. 2005). Thus, in this text, civic engagement includes the latter, meaning the hidden possibility to turn from being bridging to bonding in its essence, as well as from being constructive to destructive towards the existing social system.

Laurent Thevenot differentiates among three regimes of engagement: the regime of familiar engagement, the regime of engagement in a plan, and the justifiable action engagement regime (Thevenot 2007: 415-420). The regime of familiar engagement is associated with the personal environment and attachments, while the latter are connected to what Thevenot called "normal format" of action and rational behaviour in its frame. We offer the application of this scheme to different positions of a civic actor in a system: from being concerned about others and social institutions (the regime of familiar engagement) to affiliations in different organizations (the regime of engagement in a plan) and to a bit more forceful form of critique by signing a petition and participation in demonstrations (the justifiable action engagement regime). Moreover, in some countries a certain regime can be more typical (for instance, the post-Soviet is characterized by the regime of familiar engagement (Kharkhordin 2011). Thus, Thevenot's theoretical framework seems the most suitable in our case as it shows various angles on the forms of civic engagement in comparative perspective (in this way, regimes of engagement imply the rooted schemes of thinking and behaviour on cross-cultural level).

Various literature on factors of civic engagement can be summarized by dividing into two groups (see Table 1). For instance, Oorshot emphasized that social capital (along with its civic engagement part) is higher "among Europeans who are older, who have higher educational level, who live in households with higher incomes, and who have jobs compared to those who do not" (Oorshot et al. 2006: 164-165). Furthermore, other research showed that generally people tend to demographically similar communities and people (Levine – Moreland 1998); group membership is determined by class more than ever (Skocpol 2002); most active members of organizations come from a higher socioeconomic status (Theiss-Morse – Hibbing 2005). Religious issue has been touched in the works of Arts, Halman and Oorshot (2003) as the one having negative connection to the level of civic engagement. Ukrainian scholar Iryna Bekeshkina shaped social portraits of civic activists in Ukraine and paid

attention that they generally had higher education, interest in politics, and tend to conflicts (Bekeshkina 2008: 383-384).

The former (literature concerning country level factors) may be illustrated by the works of Mondak and Gearing who outlined five most likely impediments to social interaction in the post-Soviet space: a widespread lack of practice in civil space, the presence of large numbers of citizens without strong roots in the community, housing patterns that impede social communication, the poor quality of local media, and pervasive ethnic tension (Mondak – Gearing 1998). All these impediments may be conceptualized by country division into several groups and adding GDP per capita as a country-level predictor of civic engagement.

Table 1. **Theoretical framework of social engagement factors**

Contextual factors (country level)	Individual factors (individual level)
Freedom of speech – Index of Freedom House	Age (Oorshot et al. 2006)
Ethnic diversity – Ethnic Fractionalization Index (Fearon 2003), substantiated as a negatively influencing predictor in (Costa – Kahn 2002)	Being religious, attending religious services (Meulen, 2012)
Access to the Internet (Norris 2001) – Internet coverage by country	Education (Rothwell – Turcotte 2006; Bekeshkina 2008)
Socioeconomic environment – GDP per capita	Feeling of control under circumstances (Nishishiba et al. 2005)
	Socioeconomic status (Theiss-Morse – Hibbing 2005)
	Interest in politics (Bekeshkina 2008)

In this research, the focus will be made on testing the mentioned factors, grounding on the proposed scheme of civic engagement conceptualization and the possibilities provided by European Values Study, as well as testing the factor interactions on one level and two-level regression modeling.

## 1.2. Hypotheses

This research is aimed to check two main and several subordinate hypotheses. The first hypothesis is grounded on the existing research of civic engagement in Europe which signify that the post-Soviet part of Europe is characterized by the lower level of civic engagement, while Northern Europe (especially, Scandinavian countries) belongs to the most civically engaged space in Europe (e.g. Frane 2008; Newton – Montero 2007; Oorshot et al. 2006). Thus, this research will check if **regimes of civic engagement in Europe vary significantly (including activities and cognition elements) across the line of post-socialism**. The first sub-hypothesis (1.1.) is that in post-socialist Europe the pattern of civic engagement is corresponding to the regime of familiar engagement while in countries of developed democracies three regimes of

engagement are simultaneously present. The second sub-hypothesis (1.2) is that there are no significant differences in the regime of civic engagement in the post-Soviet and non-post-Soviet parts of post-socialist Europe.

The second main hypothesis is to verify whether **factors of civic engagement differ across the line of post-socialism as well**. Its first sub-hypothesis (2.1) is that in the countries of "developed democracies" democracy itself is not a predictor of civic engagement per se, whereas in the countries of post-socialist Europe dominate factors connected to personal feeling of lack of democracy. The second sub-hypothesis (2.2) is that there are no meaningful differences among the prediction of civic engagement in the post-Soviet and post-socialist parts of Europe interpreted as transitive countries. This could add to the findings of Mondak and Gearing who focused on the additional obstacles for civic engagement in the post-Soviet space, thus paying extra attention to individual reasons of civic mobilization. Previous research of Kaasa and Parts has provided support for the argument that the sources of social capital are remarkably different between transition and non-transition countries (Kaasa – Parts 2008).

Such hypotheses derive from the assumption that Europe is being unified in the vein of globalization, though, post-socialist transition still remarks the major differences of engagement regimes and shape determinants of being "civically engaged".

## 2. DATA and METHODS

### 2.1 Data

European Values Study data of the latest wave (2008) has been selected as a main data source, taking into account 44 countries belonging to different parts of Europe (see Appendix 1)<sup>9</sup>. Furthermore, data of several databases has been incorporated in the research:

- 1) Ethnic Fractionalization Index (Fearon 2003)<sup>10</sup> to check the relationship between ethnic diversity and civic engagement;
- 2) World Bank data concerning gross domestic product (GDP) per capita<sup>11</sup> in order to check the relationship of socioeconomic environment of a country and its civic engagement;
- 3) Index of Polity IV aiming to differentiate the countries on the axe "autocracy-democracy"<sup>12</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup> Envisaging Cyprus and Northern Cyprus as two countries, as well as East Germany and West Germany, according to the methodology of European Values Study.

<sup>10</sup> In the Fearon list, countries have the score from 0 to 1 where 0 means absence of ethnic fractionalization, 1 – its presence in variability of ethnic groups.

<sup>11</sup> Here we use data obtained by the World Bank

<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD>

Civic engagement is operationalized within its action and cognition parts, both composing the dependent variable of the research.

**The action part** is an aggregate measure of "*organizational activity*" consisting of membership and voluntary work in different types of organizations (excluding politics, trade unions, religious organizations, social welfare services for deprived people, cultural issues and informal networks) and, separately, "*non-violent elite-challenging actions*" (Welzel et al. 2005). Exclusion of some types of organizations has been made according to their mandatory status, at least, in some countries which decreases their potential as civic engagement indicators (Voicu 2005). Besides, membership in religious organizations frequently impedes being concerned about politics and is interpreted as a "dark" side of social capital (van Deth – Zmerli 2010).

Membership is operationalized in a way given below. The question: *Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities and say which, if any, do you belong to?* includes 8 categories: local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality (v15); third world development or human rights (v16); conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights (v17); professional associations (v18); youth work (v19); women's groups (v21); peace movement (v22); voluntary organizations concerned with health (v23) and has dummy coding for each category. Membership is, thus, calculated as a total number of memberships reported.

Voluntary work is grasped by the question about working in voluntary organizations followed by the same list of organizations (*Do you work there without payment?*). Aggregate measure is calculated as a mean of two mentioned items (each of which has a dichotomous scale 0-1). This part of our research covers the same eight items mentioned above, and calculations also cover the total number of voluntary work.

Engagement in non-violent elite-challenging actions is operationalized as "signing petitions", "joining boycotts" and "attending lawful demonstrations"<sup>13</sup> while answering the question: *"I'm going to read out some different forms of political actions that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done some of these things, whether you might do or would never, under any circumstances, do it."* Three answers were possible for each of them: 'have done', 'might do', and 'would never do'. There are lots of ways to deal with these measures – separately and on the aggregate level (e.g.

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<sup>12</sup> The Polity score captures the regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). Its scheme consists of six component measures that are available at <http://www.systemicpeace.org>

<sup>13</sup> Joining unofficial strikes, occupying buildings or factories are not taken into account as these actions are more radical and not much connected to civicness (Welzel et al. 2005; Voicu 2005).

Voicu 2005), though here only the first variant "have done" is considered as correspondent to the action dimension of civic engagement, other variants as well show country average "capacity to mobilize" (and would be further treated as continuous variables in factor analysis). Principal Components Analysis has shown the possibilities to use the mentioned measure as one factor as they are highly correlated (the cumulative percent of total variance explained is about 69 %, components correlations are more than 0.8).

**The cognition part** demonstrates the attitudes towards civicity and is operationalized in two ways: 1) as *civic concern scale*, which implies caring about others, being concerned about the living conditions of people (*To what extent do you feel concerned about the living conditions of: people in your neighbourhood, the people of the region you live in, your fellow countrymen* on a scale from 1 – "not at all" to 5 – "very much")<sup>14</sup>; 2) as *civic confidence scale* (implying trust) towards different social institutions (estimated on a four points scale answer to a question: "*How much confidence do you have in*"? from 1 – "not at all" to 4 – "a great deal") which includes different institutions among which we take the press, trade unions, environmental organizations, major companies, education system, justice system, health care system, civil service, social security system, and the police<sup>15</sup>. Following Bogdan Voicu, trust in Parliament (and to government and political parties, as well) is sensitive to the distance to the elections in the country, while armed forces and church are considered as rather traditional comparing to others (Voicu 2005). As well, NATO, the EU and EU organizations are the subject of political speculations, more external than internal in many countries, so we avoid them in order to keep measurement equivalence. Therefore, Principal Components Analysis proved the possibility to use aggregate measure for each of the scales (due to cumulative percent of total variance higher than 60 % and component correlations which are more than 0.6 in each case).

Naturally, we keep in mind the usage of demography variables as control variables both for descriptive and explanatory purposes: gender, education,

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<sup>14</sup> While constructing concern scale and confidence scale answer categories were intentionally recoded so that higher values corresponded to higher concern or confidence. We analyzed such types of concern: with people neighbourhood, fellow countrymen and people own region. These three types were selected as accessed in the communities of respondents, though, not touching such personal issues as family ties (intentionally left beyond the analysis, as well as being concerned with the Europeans and humankind as macro-categories).

<sup>15</sup> This indicator, though, has dubious interpretations. For instance, Zmerli suggests that stronger emphasis of respecting the state's authority is a result of general distrust towards people, "a compensation for societal deficiency" (Zmerli 2010: 662).

employment and income. The variables in the scope of our interest are listed below.

Variables of religion including attending religious services and personal considering as religious: *Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?* with answer categories: 1 – more than once a week, 2 – once a week, 3 – once a month, 4 – only on specific holy days, 5 – once a year, 6 – less often, 7 – never, practically never) and *Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are ...: 1 – a religious person, 2 – not a religious person, 3 – a convinced atheist).*

Variable of locus-control (feeling of control over life): *Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, and other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use the scale to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out?* with a scale from 1 (none at all) to 10 (a great deal).

Variable of personal feeling that democracy is developing as it should be: *On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country?* with answer categories: 1 – very satisfied, 2 – rather satisfied, 3 – not very satisfied.

Variable of general interest in politics: *How interested would you say you are in politics? With answer categories: 1 – very interested, 2 – somewhat interested, 3 – not very interested, 4 – not at all interested.*

Variable of citizenship (*Are you a citizen of (country)?*) with a dichotomously scaled answer “yes-no”<sup>16</sup>.

All in all, we can divide predictors into internal (internal locus-control, being religious and attending religious services) and external (satisfaction with democracy, interest in politics, external locus control) – such division would be used to classify the countries after the regression results.

## 2.2 Methods

In order to outline a general picture of civic engagement, European Values Study data distributions have been examined on a country level and in aggregate data. All the data was collected via personal interviews and following the same procedure in each country. In order to check the first hypotheses, analysis of variances and factor analysis have been implemented. Such methods were selected as appropriate due to preliminary calculations of substantial correlations of defined measures of civic engagement (both in its action and cognition parts) which enabled usage of the cumulative scale (for each country and individual in a data set).

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<sup>16</sup> Though, this variable should be used with caution due to its rather low representation of those who are not citizens of any given country.

The second hypothesis has been checked in regression modeling – in ordinary least square regression procedure and in two-level regression modeling with a random intercept (country) and fixed slopes (implying that each possible predictor could vary due to the country specificity). Such procedures were chosen as the most suitable for the data and selected hypotheses due to the scales of both dependent and independent variables.

In the theoretical part of the paper, possible predictors of civic engagement have been grouped into individual and country level (return to Table 1). These predictors have been included into the regression analysis in three stages:

- 1) one-level OLS regression analysis country-by-country,
- 2) one-level OLS regression in three selected groups of countries, checking for possibility of multilevel approach in the pooled data,
- 3) two-level regression modeling with the consequent inclusion of all the predictors and their interactions, while selecting the most fitted model.

### 3. FINDINGS

#### **3.1. Types and patterns of civic engagement in Europe**

It was previously defined that eight types of voluntary organizations would be taken into account when we deal with "organizational activities". In fact, aggregate data gives us information that about a tenth part of population belongs to voluntary religious organizations (10 %) and trade unions (10.3 %), both of which have been skipped afterwards in order to avoid the potential biases. Is it, for instance, the share and legacy of post-Soviet countries' population to be formal members of trade unions, on the contrary to religious dedication of Northern Europe? Indeed, Belarus with its 41.9 % belonging to trade unions (as well as 12.5 % of respondents in Ukraine and nearly 10 % of the Russian Federation and Azerbaijan sample) are the significant examples of post-Soviet countries, as well as in Denmark (55.6 %), Iceland (48.6 %), Norway and Finland (around 40 %) show that such belonging is an essential part of a state policy. Religious voluntary belonging is the most characteristic feature of Northern Ireland, Great Britain, Denmark and Switzerland.

Our general results show that voluntary civic affiliation is accumulated not very proportionally in Europe. About 40 % of such affiliation is distributed between the environment, ecology, animal rights organization and professional associations, as well as the least popular organizations belong to peace movements – only about 4 % of all civic "affiliates" deal with them (indeed, the problem of war seemed not actual in Europe). Moreover, such countries as the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland add the most part to all-Europe civic affiliation. The situation with volunteer activities within the mentioned organizations is even vaguer – the quantity of people involved in such activities is about twice less in comparison to the amount of those

affiliated. Volunteering is the most characteristic in the environment, ecology, animal rights organization (about 15 %) and youth work (19 % of all civic voluntary activities) and seems most vivid in Italy and Denmark<sup>17</sup>. Summing up, the average percentage of both these processes – affiliation and volunteer activity (named as "organizational activities") shows a rather impressive tendency of the absence of public interest in Europe towards this. In Georgia, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, located on the "negative" pole, no more than 0.5 % of population deals with civic engagement as it is without trade unions, while in Luxembourg, Albania, Kosovo and the Netherlands it is typical for no less than 5 % of inhabitants. Such empirical evidence does not give ground for testing the organizations as "bonding" or "bridging"; the choice of a certain type of organization seems to be more individually rather than structurally determined. Moreover, such results demonstrate that the regime of "engagement in a plan" in a way it was outlined before can be found in the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland. It deserves attention that all of them were previously classified as the countries of "developed democracies", which shows that the regime of "engagement in a plan" is not typical for the post-socialist countries.

Non-violent elite-changing actions (Welzel et al. 2005), on the contrary, are popular in almost all the countries in the scope of the research. Signing petitions plays here the leading role, as more than 50 % of population in Belgium, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway have already signed them, moreover, it is typical for Sweden where more than 80 % of population did such civic action. More than half of the population in Poland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo suppose they might sign them in future, while strong disagreement with such action is characteristic mostly for the post-socialist space (e.g. Belarus as the most typical example, Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, Romania and the Russian Federation are additive illustrations). The explanations for such distributions are rather evident: signing petitions is the least time-consuming action (among the mentioned) which is not demanding the personal presence of a person in a definite space, in such a way creating "imagined communities", once defined by Benedict Anderson. In the post-socialist space, such a form of civic action is not a tool of influence that can be transformed into "double imaginary".

Attending lawful demonstrations is an option with generally less support in comparison with the previous one, less people actually did it, but, at the same time, the quantity of people who suppose that they might do it has increased

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<sup>17</sup> Denmark and Italy, though, were excluded from the further analysis due to the lack of indicators for civic engagement, namely "organizational activities" component of civic engagement.

(nevertheless, the quantity of those who declare that they would never take part in such actions also increased). About one third of population in Luxembourg, East Germany and Spain (in France about 45 %) already had the experience of protesting in lawful demonstrations. The situation with boycotts is somewhat rejected by more than a half of European population (56.6 %); at the same time, the European leader of boycotts is Iceland (about a third of its population boycotted), one fifth of people in Finland, Sweden and Macedonia boycotted as well. About 70 % of Kosovo inhabitants consider that they might boycott in future. Such tendencies show, on the one hand, the intentions of European population to maintain the social order, although, which is the opposite for the countries marked by civic protests by the time of a poll. On the other hand, tendencies with boycotts (the most rigorous actions of civic engagement, according to predefined scales) presented in such countries as Kosovo and Macedonia (actually, post-socialist) show the potential instabilities in any part of the region. Signing petitions, attending lawful demonstrations and boycotting signify the “justifiable action engagement regime” which is more typical for the countries of “developed democracies” more involved in petitions, though, can be found in the post-socialist Europe countries in more strict forms (demonstrations and boycotts) which involve personal presence and take more time.

The regime of familiar engagement covers, as it has been stated, concern and civic confidence scales. The results show us that the most concerned with people neighbourhood, regional and country level respondents are in Georgia, Northern Cyprus and Armenia; the least concerned – in the Czech Republic, Latvia, and Finland. The least confident in social institutions are Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia, Ukraine, and Greece, the most confident – Luxembourg, Azerbaijan, and Kosovo. Appearance of the post-Soviet countries in the list of the “most confident” (especially, Azerbaijan) or “concerned” (Georgia, Armenia) may be explained by sociocultural peculiarities, such as hospitality and caring for others. Belarus has appeared to be in top-10 European countries for the level of civic confidence which enabled her difference from Ukraine and Russia (countries with typically low civic confidence). General results of civic engagement distribution along the mentioned axes are given below in Diagram 1 – as we see, the whole picture is rather heterogeneous, though consolidating many post-socialist countries in the left corner (thus, showing the low participation in actions connected to the regimes of the “justifiable action engagement” and the regime of “engagement in a plan”).

The offered model of civic engagement has been tested via exploratory factor analysis which showed that the scales of “civic concern” and “civic confidence” could be classified into one factor (apparently, dimension of cognition), while the scales of “non-violent elite-challenges actions” and the

scale of "organizational activities" are classified into another factor (obviously, dimension of action – see Table 2). Such a two-factor model has explained more than 56 % of total variance of components.

Diagram 1. **Distribution of civic engagement among European countries**




Table 2. **Rotated Component Matrix of Exploratory Factor Analysis**

Rotated Component Matrix <sup>a</sup>		
	Component	
	1	2
Scale_CivicConcern	-,150	,774
Scale_Organiz_Act	,725	,090
NonViolentEliteChanging_Scale	,755	-,050
Scale_Confidence	,192	,695
Rotation converged in 3 iterations		
Method of Rotation: Varimax		

Such results have substantiated our theoretical vision of civic engagement as a two-faceted phenomenon and, consequently, could be used in further regression analysis. Returning to the first hypothesis about the regimes of civic engagement, we have checked the variances across the groups in weighted pooled data and analyzed multiple comparisons (Bonferroni test). Obtained results according to the scale of "civic concern" show the only absence of significant differences in the post-Soviet Europe and its "developed democracy" part, which, though, can be explained by the existence of countries with traditional culturally embedded high concern about others (see the countries in the left upper corner of Diagram 1). Other scales seem more sensitive towards differences among all the groups. According to the average

on the scale of civic confidence, people in the post-Soviet part of Europe feel themselves more confident in organizations than people in other countries of post-socialism, although the other scale demonstrate rather coherent gradual growth of mean values from the post-Soviet to post-socialist to the countries of "developed democracy". All in all, such results demonstrate that the post-Soviet part of the post-socialist bloc is distinguished from the latter which gives us ground for rejecting the second sub-hypothesis formulated above. Accordingly with all empirical evidence, our first hypothesis is rejected: though regimes of civic engagement seem rather strictly differentiated in the post-Soviet states (with the regime of "familiar engagement"), such differences are not visible for the whole group of the post-socialist countries. Therefore, grounding on the results, the post-Soviet part of the post-socialist countries needs to be examined separately as well, due to its peculiarities.

### **3.2. What pulls the strings of civic engagement?**

Country-by-country analysis involved the same set of predictors and, as well, their interaction effects (see Appendix 3). Therefore, in Albania there are such predictors of civic engagement as satisfaction with democracy (positive relationship) and a group of religious predictors (namely, church attendance and being religious, both with the negative relationship). Interest in politics and less church attendance reinforce each other. The latter is suitable for the cases of Azerbaijan, Hungary and Austria, as well. Moreover, in Austria we see positive relationships of civic engagement with locus-control and feeling of democracy (interacting with each other). The case of Armenia is characterized by the only main effect of satisfaction with democracy on civic engagement which is similar to Serbia. In Belgium, the interest in politics positively influences civic engagement; the same can be said about satisfaction with democracy and lower church attendance (latter is true for Finland, Iceland, France, Greece, Ireland, Malta, Moldova, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Germany and the Czech Republic, as well). Bosnia's case shows interrelations of civic engagement of satisfaction with democracy enforced by lower church attendance. Bulgaria's civic engagement is related to the interest in politics along with satisfaction with democracy (in Greece, too), and locus-control. In Belarus, two strongest predictors are satisfaction with democracy and interest in politics – as main and interaction effects. In Georgia, we have mere relationship with satisfaction with democracy, in Russia – interest in democracy slightly enforced by less church attendance. These three cases deserve special attention as a "politically oriented" case.

In Croatia, we have church attendance as an effect mediating satisfaction with democracy and locus-control (as in Moldova), in Cyprus – satisfaction with democracy and interest in politics along with less church attendance.

Latvia and Estonia's engagement is characterized with satisfaction with democracy and, as well, by the relationship of interest in politics and less church attendance. The case of France, besides, shows the importance of satisfaction with democracy along with interest in politics. Civic engagement in Greece and Montenegro is negatively related to being religious. In Iceland, locus-control, associated with interest in politics, is also positively associated with civic engagement. Lithuania's case shows the interrelationships of satisfaction with democracy with lower church attendance, as well as interest in politics interacting with satisfaction with democracy (the latter also suits Great Britain's case). In Luxembourg, there are main effects of satisfaction with democracy and less church attendance upon the engagement, in Malta, West Germany and Moldova – positive influence of locus-control, in Montenegro, Switzerland, Northern Ireland and the Netherlands – satisfaction with democracy. The Netherlands is also characterized by the relationship of civic engagement with main effects of less church attendance and more interest in politics. The case of Norway shows as well the interaction of interest in politics and locus-control, positively related to civic engagement – these predictors are also significant for Sweden as main effects.

It is interesting to admit the positive impact of religious predictors (both church attendance and being religious) upon civic engagement in Poland, which is different from the majority of cases and may be explained by the high level of religiosity in Polish society, though the most related predictor here is also satisfaction with democracy. A rather similar situation is in Spain, Northern Ireland and Germany (West and East) where being religious is positively related to civic engagement. For Slovak people, both interest in politics and its interaction with satisfaction with democracy are related to civic engagement. The factor of satisfaction is meaningful in Slovenia, interacting with less church attendance, interest in politics and locus-control. In Ukraine, there are slight interaction effects of satisfaction with democracy and interest in politics, as well as satisfaction with democracy and less church attendance. Macedonia's case shows importance of less church attendance and its interaction with satisfaction with democracy for civic engagement there. The case of Kosovo is untypical due to the largest negative relationship of civic engagement with having citizenship which may be explained by ethnic tensions there. In Kosovo, as well, we can observe a negative effect of attending religious services upon the engagement. Furthermore, the case of Kosovo seems rather special due to its place in Diagram 1.

Thus, satisfaction with democracy is found to be significant in the most countries, meaning positive relation to civic engagement – the more people are satisfied with democracy, the more they tend to be civically engaged. Such a conclusion may explain the low level of engagement in the majority of the

post-Soviet countries: low satisfaction with democracy and low confidence in social institutions do not work for the civil society in the regime of “familiar engagement”, while other regimes are not typical in this space. Furthermore, interest to politics is also a significant positive trigger of civic engagement. It is worth admitting that both mentioned variables have stronger relationship with civic engagement under the condition of absent or low attending religious services in most cases. As participation in religious organizations has been omitted from the analysis, such a relationship signifies a general secular trend of being civic. Several cases, though, show that being religious helps being civically engaged – but these cases relate to the countries considered rather religious (Poland, Germany, Spain, Northern Ireland). The results of regression analysis by three country types (see Appendix 2) show these issues, as well.

All in all, we could classify the countries into two types of variable interrelations according to the outlined scheme: countries with the external predictors of civic engagement and those with mixed internal-external relationship. There were no countries with only internal prediction of civic engagement, implying the significance of political context in each case. A majority of countries were classified as those with mixed relationship, so the most interesting are exceptional cases (those where external, mainly political, predictors are significant, while non-political are not): Armenia, Belarus, Cyprus, Georgia, Luxembourg, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine. Five of them belong to the post-Soviet countries and emphasize the extreme importance of political agenda for the civic engagement, while Serbia is a former Yugoslavia’s state with low civic engagement, Cyprus and Luxembourg are developed democracies with a relatively low action score. So, it is possible to reach a tentative conclusion that political issues (democracy satisfaction and being interested in politics) are related mainly to the regime of “familiar engagement”, while the regimes of “engagement in a plan” and the “justifiable action engagement” regime (Thevenot 2007) are enforced and supported by a set of “mixed” predictors.

As the number of cases (44) let the implementation of multilevel regression analysis, multilevel approach was tested for its necessity. The zero model has shown us that 13 % of dispersion of civic engagement factor loadings are explained on the country level ( $VPC = 0.133 / (0.133 + 0.875) = 0.1319$ ). The selected model with random intercept and all fixed effects is shown in Table 3. So, here we can see a list of predictors of civic engagement across Europe (more precisely, a list of variables, distribution of which is related to the distribution of civic engagement in the pooled data), among which three variables are defined as especially meaningful in certain types of countries.

**Table 3. Two-Level Regression Model of Civic Engagement in Europe (two-level regression analysis with random intercept and fixed slope)<sup>18</sup>**

AIC BIC logLik  
 85445.19 85630.29 -42700.6  
 Random effects: Formula: ~1 | country1  
 (Intercept) Residual  
 StdDev: 0.24 0.87

Intercept	1.17
<b>Predictors</b>	
Interest in Politics	-0.03*
Locus Control	0.02*
Attending religious services	-0.05*
Being religious	0.03
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.38*
Post-Soviet	0.74*
Citizenship	0.32*
Developed Democracies	0.12
GDP	0.01
<b>Interaction Effects</b>	
Interest in Politics*Being Religious	0.03*
Citizenship*Satisfaction with Democracy	0.10*
Satisfaction with Democracy*Post-Soviet	0.09*
Attending religious service*Developed Democracies	0.03*
Post-Soviet*GDP	-0.03*

GDP as an indicator of economic development of a country shows the positive relation of economic growth to civic engagement, but in the post-Soviet countries this relation is more intensive and (!) negative. As income was one of the control variables of the research, which also showed negative relation to civic engagement only in the post-Soviet countries, the results could demonstrate that the post-Soviet countries are really special in civic engagement – and the explanatory variable here is the index of autocracy which is highly correlated with the offered differentiation of countries (“economic involution”, according to Michael Burawoy’s term). The more autocratic a state is, the more negative is the relation of its economic development to civic engagement – such an unexpected outcome, though, is in line with the recent

<sup>18</sup> Dependent variable: cumulative scale of civic engagement, random effect: country, fixed effects: interest in politics, locus control, attending religious services, being religious, satisfaction with democracy, citizenship, GDP, type of country: post-Soviet, post-socialist, developed democracies, interaction effects of predictors)

research (Welzel 2013). Attending religious service could be a benefit in the countries of developed democracies, taking into account all the other variables, but it prevents being civically engaged in the majority of other countries. Such a conclusion is, though, debatable, as it seems too case-sensitive, as it was shown country by country. Satisfaction with democracy adds more to understanding civic engagement in the post-Soviet countries, though this variable, as it was stated before, is the most popular one in the majority of cases. Such specificity of the post-Soviet space could be explained by the lack of democracy and related lack of civic engagement in any of three regimes.

## CONCLUSIONS

Thus, the research results show that civic engagement is a multi-faceted phenomenon which could be analyzed from three regimes of engagement, offered by Laurent Thevenot: the regime of familiar engagement, the regime of engagement in a plan, and the justifiable action engagement regime. The post-Soviet part of the post-socialist Europe corresponds to the regime of familiar engagement which means prevalence personal attitudes and care over the activities. This part of Europe is much more different in the patterns of civic engagement from other parts of Europe than it could be expected due to more than twenty years after the collapse of the USSR. Two other regimes of engagement, reflecting the functional activities in the frame of rational choice, inclusion into civic organizations and conventional elite-changing actions, are envisaged on action dimension of civic engagement.

It is proved that the post-Soviet part of the post-socialist bloc should be analyzed separately, while defined scales of civic engagement show differences and similarities connected not merely by the line of post-socialism. Factors of civic engagement differ, but this difference imply various combinations of individual and contextual factors which gives ground for rethinking of the role of political context for civic engagement. Satisfaction with democracy remains a meaningful variable in interpretations of civic engagement in all the defined groups of countries, pointing to the necessity of democracy for all the regimes of civic engagement (not its lack, as it was assumed in the beginning). Moreover, this relation is strengthened by the attitude to religious issues. In most cases, civic engagement is positively influenced by the positive estimation of democracy and low church attendance, but there are exceptions (Poland, Spain, etc.). All in all, both interest in politics and satisfaction with democracy seem to be the most common predictors of civic engagement across Europe; while religious issues are too case-sensitive to make generalizations.

GDP per capita characterizes the relation of being involved in civic engagement and the economic growth of a country, at the same time signifying the internally autocratic nature of the post-Soviet regimes where GDP is

negatively associated with civic engagement. Actually, all above-mentioned facts give us ground to reject both hypotheses: civic engagement is distributed in different ways, but the significant differences are found in the post-Soviet part of Europe, not in the post-socialist one. This is true both for general distribution and regimes of civic engagement, and for its determining factors. Thus, civic engagement may be regarded there as a form of social solidarity touched by cultural trauma and post-totalitarian pathology (Alexander et al. 2004).

The obtained results, though, leave space for further research. The scheme of regimes of engagement by Laurent Thevenot may as well be conceptualized relative to various social groups within one country – is there any evidence of the change of prevalent regime of engagement among the youth and elderly people, urban and rural dwellers, etc? Are there any other areas of Europe which can be interpreted as integral in their civic engagement profile, if we get rid of dichotomies "post-socialist", or "post-Soviet" vs "non-post..."? Could we also use the affective component of civic engagement (as it was stated, it had to be relevant to certain events) into the index, and how will our results change? Such questions require further research and, probably, a qualitative approach.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX 1. GROUPS OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (EVS-2008)

#### Post-Socialist countries (15 + 10 post-Soviet)

- |                          |                   |
|--------------------------|-------------------|
| ■ Albania                | ■ Macedonia       |
| ■ Bulgaria               | ■ Montenegro      |
| ■ Bosnia and Herzegovina | ■ Poland          |
| ■ Czech Republic         | ■ Romania         |
| ■ Croatia                | ■ Serbia          |
| ■ East Germany           | ■ Slovenia        |
| ■ Hungary                | ■ Slovak Republic |
| ■ Kosovo                 |                   |

#### Post-Soviet countries

- |               |                      |
|---------------|----------------------|
| ■ Azerbaijan, | ■ Latvia             |
| ■ Armenia     | ■ Lithuania          |
| ■ Belarus     | ■ Moldova            |
| ■ Estonia     | ■ Russian Federation |
| ■ Georgia     | ■ Ukraine            |

#### European countries of "developed democracy" (20)

- Austria
- Belgium
- Cyprus
- Great Britain
- Finland
- France
- Germany West
- Greece
- Iceland
- Ireland
- Luxembourg
- Malta
- Netherlands
- Northern Cyprus
- Northern Ireland
- Norway
- Portugal
- Spain
- Sweden
- Switzerland

**APPENDIX 2. OLS REGRESSION OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT PREDICTORS BY THREE GROUPS OF COUNTRIES (DEPENDENT VARIABLE – CUMULATIVE SCALE OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT)**

Set of predictors	Standardized Coefficients (Beta)		
	Developed Democracies	Post-socialist	Post-Soviet
<b>Predictors</b>			
ief_fearon	<b>.061</b>	<b>-.048</b>	<b>.041</b>
Citizenship	<b>-.103</b>	-.010	.050
Locus control	-.009	-.006	.039
how often attend religious services	<b>-.136</b>	-.007	<b>-.122</b>
are you a religious person	<b>.041</b>	<b>.060</b>	.018
how interested are you in politics	-.010	-.027	<b>-.142</b>
are you satisfied with democracy	<b>-.237</b>	<b>-.257</b>	<b>-.356</b>
<b>Interaction effects</b>			
Democracy_sat*Interest to politics	-.009	.007	-.133
Democracy_sat*Citizenship	.050	-.012	-.123
Relattend*Locus-control	-.011	-.033	.025
Politics*Locus-control	.008	-.026	-.039
Politics*Relattend	.010	-.004	<b>-.081</b>
Democracy_sat*Relattend	.004	<b>-.130</b>	-.047
Being religious*Interest to politics	<b>-.115</b>	<b>-.111</b>	-.033
Locus Control*Democracy_sat	-.016	<b>.029</b>	-.019
<b>R Square</b>	0,117	0,14	0,183

### APPENDIX 3. PREDICTORS OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT ACROSS COUNTRIES

Country	Democracy Feel	Being Religious	Interest to Politics	Locus Control	Attending religious services	Interest to Politics* Being Religious	Democracy Feel* Citizenship	Democracy Feel* Interest to Politics*	Democracy Feel* Attending rel. serv.	Citizenship* Satisfaction with Democracy	Attending religious services* Being Religious	Interest to Politics* Attending rel. serv.	Attending rel.. serv * locus Control	Income	Employment	Age
Albania	-,281	,262	-	-	-	-				-	-	-,019		-	-	
Azerbaijan							-,354					,014		-,058		
Austria				-,013		-,076		-,038								
Armenia	-,420													-,083	-,235	
Belgium			-,108				-,057	-,037								,006
Bosnia	-,171							-,036							-,159	,008
Bulgaria				,034				-,068								
Belarus	-,303		-,344		,141			,108	-,086					,061		,014
Croatia									-,045				,009		-,253	
Cyprus	-,315											-,033		-,088		
Czech Republic								-,029						-,075		
Estonia	-,261			,038								-,017				,005
Finland							,131	-,044						-,045		

Country	Democracy Feel	Being Religious	Interest to Politics	Locus Control	Attending religious services	Interest to Politics* Being Religious	Democracy Feel* Citizenship	Democracy Feel* Interest to Politics*	Democracy Feel* Attending rel. serv.	Citizenship* Satisfaction with Democracy	Attending religious services* Being Religious	Interest to Politics* Attending rel. serv.	Attending rel.. serv * Locus Control	Income	Employment	Age
France								-,050	-,013							,006
Georgia	-,582															
Greece		-,192						-,044	-,023						-,131	,010
Hungary	-,345											-,019		,070		,005
Iceland									-,034							,006
Ireland									-,046							
Latvia	-,379											-,026		,128	-,170	
Lithuania								-,031	-,038							
Luxembour'	-,349				-,089					-,067						
Malta				,042				-,098	-,043					-,064		
Moldova				,099					-,021							
Montenegro	-,199	-,329					-,191							-,117		
Netherlands	-,366		-,078		-,053											,006
Norway									-,035					-,049		-,006
Poland	-,343				-,127	-,050										,004
Portugal									-,022				-,006	,078		

Country	Democracy Feel	Being Religious	Interest to Politics	Locus Control	Attending religious services	Interest to Politics* Being Religious	Democracy Feel* Citizenship	Democracy Feel* Interest to Politics*	Democracy Feel* Attending rel. serv.	Citizenship* Satisfaction with Democracy	Attending religious services* Being Religious	Interest to Politics* Attending rel. serv.	Attending rel.. serv * Locus Control	Income	Employment	Age
Romania						-,109			-,034						,224	
Russia	-,723						,481		-,027							,007
Serbia	-,253														-,130	,006
Slovak Republic			,164	,071				-,090	-,025							,006
Slovenia								-,033	-,025							
Spain	-,250	-,136							-,016							,006
Sweden			-,102	,069					-,040					-,034		
Switzerland	-,287											-,011		,041	-,134	
Ukraine								-,050	-,019						-,208	
Macedonia					,163				-,085							
Great Britain								-,090	-,019					-,068		
Germany West		-,219		,058					-,053							,006
Germany East		-,116						-,079	-,020				,005			,008
Nort Ireland	-,269	-,962													-,682	-,014
Kosovo				,250	,553				-,124	,227			-,048			