

# THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF DIPLOMACY

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## INTRODUCTION

This topic tries to evaluate the relations and interactions of international actors in the light of the need for respect to *diplomacy*, initial *international norms* and *multilaterally coordinated use of force*. It elaborates, in a nutshell, the political and economic behaviour of nations, as spelt out through their actors, and emphasises the desperate need for effective management of this behaviour in international arena.

‘Diplomacy’ as stated in the Oxford English Dictionary ‘is the management of international relations by negotiation, the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys, the business or art of the diplomats’ (Nicholson, 1963). The emphasis on negotiation is viewed by most people as the essence of diplomacy – negotiating a *treaty*, reaching an *executive agreement*, or bargaining with another state over the terms of proposed agreement. The emphasis on the states as key diplomatic actor is, of course, consistent with a realist perspective on diplomacy.

In the history of international relations, from its dawn to Kofi Annan, the *realist scholars* from Thucydides to Morgenthau Hans, together with their neorealist successors, insist that solely states are key actors in the international arena. This notion is conflicting with the perspectives of *liberalism* and *globalism*, which assume respectively the existence of other equally important, non-state, actors.

Diplomacy in its present form is largely ineffectual; it, thus, needs to be re-strengthened. Developments in science, religion, psychology, international law and various educational branches support the need for diplomacy and effective diplomatic approaches to a whole range of political and social problems. These developments need to be assimilated into diplomacy. Together with this, avoiding impious behaviour of strong actors towards universally recognized international norms, and firm belief in multilaterally coordinated use of force appear to be indispensable stabilising factors in contemporary international relations.

Post-Cold War evolution of international relations shows that bipolarism had crumbled. Nevertheless, the world has faced a rash of new difficulties. Religious, ethnic and national antagonisms have flared concurrently with the emergence of transnational problems such as the world health crises of AIDS, the spread of drug use, environmental degradation, the deepening gap between very few rich and a large number of poors, and burgeoning refugee issues to mention some. Since the emergence of the United Nations with the increase in number of nations the importance of diplomacy substantially increased. Where as, currently, in the post-

Cold War environment the importance of diplomacy has been unbelievably decreasing.

As the so-called ‘sole remaining superpower’ in a period when superpower hood has lost most of its meaning, the United States (US) and others face a world in which diplomacy is both less important for direct survival as draconian security threats recede, but even more vital to national well-being and long range prosperity than at any times since the American War of Independence. There is an urgent need to put the post-Cold War period in historical perspective and deepened American understanding of its current historical situation.<sup>1</sup> The American view of diplomacy is believed to be a mixture of ignorance of its details, suspicion of its objectives, contempt for its importance and fascination with its romance.<sup>2</sup> This can, likely, limit the capacity to generate multilateral activities.

Effective diplomacy, however, depends on the context of our knowledge of current international relations. We, thus, need to understand the present through assessing the past. In the ancient world, hegemony held the top place in human history. Order meant empire. Those within the empire were believed to have order, culture and civilisation. Outside it lay barbarians, chaos and disorder. The image of peace and order through a single hegemonic power centre has remained strong ever since. Empires, however, were ill-designed for promoting change. Holding the empire together usually required an authoritarian political style. The balance-of-power, a system of counter-balancing alliances which was seen as the condition of liberty in Europe emerged as the solution to hegemony. It was successfully used to thwart the hegemonic ambitions of some European entities like Spain, France and Germany. But the balance-of-power system too had an inherent instability, the ever-present risk of war, and it eventually collapsed. Diplomacy and initial international norms were not capable enough to avoid the use of force among international actors of that period.

The modern period displays a *highly interdependent* world. Contemporary diplomacy, thus, requires a much more sophisticated face for the use of raw power, thereby allocating a wider role to diplomacy and international cooperation. At the same time power, in all its dimensions, remains a fundamental aspect of international and global politics. The attempt to create an empire and vassal states around it, as a means of spreading democracy, or imposing the culture of a dominant actor upon others, is nothing less than a slap into the face of *pluralistic democracy*. This chapter will focus on some major aspects of international relations and diplomacy. Also, it will try to outline some alternatives, which are extra perspectives to the traditional realist or the late neorealist viewpoint about international relations and diplomacy.

The thesis of the chapter, however, is that respect to diplomacy, sticking to universally accepted international norms and implementation of multilaterally coordinated use of force alone could lead the conditions of current anarchic international environment to wards a world of law, peace and harmony; reducing this dictum would cause the vicious circle of imperial experience, which could even

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<sup>1</sup> See also John D. Stempel, “Recasting Diplomacy” Rev. Nov. 1995, <http://www.uky.edu/stempel/diplomacy.html>

<sup>2</sup> See Stempel, Rev. Nov. 1995, <http://www.uky.edu/stempel/diplomacy.html>

worsen the whole range of problems that are faced by mankind at this particular period in history.

## BALANCE-OF-POWER AND THE LATE IMPERIAL URGE

The last decade of the twentieth Century has shown the end of the balance-of-power system on one hand and the waning of the imperial urge on the other. These two aspects fairly, seem, to go together. A world of empires in Europe has culminated with all or most of them gone: the Ottoman, German, Austrian, French, British and finally Soviet Empires are now no more than a memory. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee to stop another imperial power from emerging, given the anarchic environment of today's international relations.

In relation to this problem, Robert Cooper (2002) in his article 'The New Liberal Imperialism' indicates that currently, three types of states interact in international relations: first of all there are the remains of the traditional '*modern*' nation states who are assumed to behave as states always have, following Machiavellian principles and *raison d'état* (for example India, China) – middle developed states. Second there are newly emerged states – often former colonies – where in some sense the state has almost ceased to exist a "*pre-modern*" zone where the state has failed and exposed to a Hobbesian war of all against all – civil war (for example Somalia, Afghanistan) – developing states. Third, there are newly emerged post imperial, *post-modern* states that no longer think of security primarily in terms of conquest among each other (European states) – developed states. According to Cooper, the third group of states will not have a threat of imperial conquest among each other but would unite against the possible threats of the other group of states in the form of *defensive imperialism*. He asserts that all the conditions for imperialism are there, but both the supply and demand for imperialism have dried up. And yet the weak still need the strong and the strong still need an orderly world. A world in which the efficient and well-governed export stability and liberty, and which is open for investment and growth – all of this seems eminently desirable.

What is needed then, according to him, is a new kind of imperialism, one acceptable to a world of human rights and cosmopolitan values. We can already discern its outline: an imperialism which, like all imperialism, aims to bring order and organisation but which rests today on the voluntary principle. The idea of creating new liberal imperialism by all means including force on the expense of all the other majority of nations, that exist outside of the developed few nations ignore the innate aspiration of all mankind for justice, democratic principles and rule of law. It is arguable because it impiously sees as though nations out of the developed world are genetically unfit for democracy that they are barbarian and that values of the post-modern states which are the only ones to represent the whole human civilisation – 'end of history' – should be imposed on them<sup>3</sup>. Thus it does not fit to international norms, to efforts of multilateral diplomacy. It doesn't suggest appropriate solutions that tackle range of problems that have encountered all mankind today, and it rather tries to implement one-sided non pluralistic approach to democracy, thus unproductive in international relations of complex interdependence of contemporary

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<sup>3</sup> See also Fukuyama (1992).

time. The approach, however, incredibly represents the urge towards imperialism in international relations today.

## POST BALANCE OF POWER MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The fall of the bipolar system was a good one regardless who won the battle. Powers in his article 'Who won the war' points out that the winner of this battle is unclear because all the countries involved in the Cold War are losers. They had to spend a huge amount of money to build up arms instead of investing it into their society. He thus fairly objects the theory that US is the winner.<sup>4</sup> In fact, the demise of the bipolar system has created a different world with great opportunities for actors to co-operate and move forward together in search of a new world order rather than confronting each other. The new world order is not in place still in a definable way. The progress of avoiding the bipolar system is, of course, a great achievement<sup>5</sup>. In this regard, President George Bush, 41<sup>st</sup> US president had to say: "Nobody is going to put the Soviet Union back together again. Russia is not seeking hegemony and they are certainly not seeking hegemony over the United Kingdom or the United States. So we are better off at the end of the Cold War."<sup>6</sup> Others see the future world as a multipolar one. Castro for instance in an interview talks of a multipolar world, in which there will be various poles including: first US then Europe, Russia, China, and Japan together with South Asia.<sup>7</sup> Contrary to aforementioned opinions Kissinger thinks that the new world is unipolar with US as the only one super power on the top.<sup>8</sup>

Even though today's international relations is believed to be beyond the balance-of-power system, a slight influence of the balance-of-power is still, here, with us. Basically, balance-of-power is a commonly applicable image of international relations, which could be invoked, according to Ralph Pittman, in three main areas: first, it is applicable as *extra-legal factor*, this is a non-legal means that was applied in the past as a traditional European effort to balance in the interests of several great powers to ensure that no single state gained dominance. This attempt was partially successful in stopping one state dominating the rest (e.g. France in the Napoleonic period, Germany in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century), but of course it did not stop wars or conflict. Balance-of-power and the dynamics of alliance systems have been repeatedly used with real but limited success to probe the history of conflict among states (Christensen, 1997). It exists no longer in this sense. Second, it was applied to show the *superpower contest* between the Soviets and U.S., which tried to ensure that one side could not militarily dominate the other. With two major coalitions or blocs (and the Non-Aligned Movement largely sidelined), it was possible to try to calculate relative gains and losses in this strategic landscape. However, with three more players, e.g. a PRC tilting; between Soviet Union and United States alignment or new rising powers such as India, it becomes increasingly difficult to predict outcomes and relative gains. Also, it is not longer existing in this sense. Third, it exists and applies to some extent even today, with only one genuine military superpower remaining (a

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<sup>4</sup> See Powers, Thomas 1996, <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/powers.htm>

<sup>5</sup> See Gorbachev, M., <http://www.cnn/SPECIAL/cold.war/episodes/24/interviews/gorbachev/>

<sup>6</sup> See Bush, G., <http://www.cnn/SPECIAL/cold.war/episodes/24/interviews/bush/>

<sup>7</sup> See Castro, F., <http://www.cnn/SPECIAL/cold.war/episodes/24/interviews/castro/>

<sup>8</sup> See Kissinger, H., <http://www.cnn/SPECIAL/cold.war/episodes/24/interviews/castro/>

unipolar system), balance-of-power concepts are often used in a regional setting, and often to try to prevent or balance the rise of new great powers which might upset the status quo, for instance both Iraq and China have been viewed in this way by some analysts (Segal, 1995).<sup>9</sup> China's growing strength has caused fear. Likewise, smaller or external powers will sometimes intervene to stop a great power dominating a regional system, e.g. Pakistan and China put efforts to contain or balance Indian 'hegemonic' power in South Asia (see Garver, 2001). In such a setting, medium or great powers will sometimes rise to challenge 'hegemony' in a particular region, or on a particular issue. This amounts to mean balance of power beyond balance of power.

Pettman argues, however, that with the contemporary emphasis of economics and international diplomacy and institutional cooperation, two other key concepts are needed to help understand world affairs. The first is *balance of productivity*: this refers to the distribution of productive capacity, or capital in the world. It is the struggle for the world product, a struggle that potentially results in an even or uneven balance. From this point of view, productive ability remains a real basis of power and competition. Much of world politics could then be explained by the way productive power developed in key centres for instance Europe, America, East Asia, or other emerging economies such as Brazil, by competition among these centres, the way other nations position themselves in the world economy, and how wealth is accumulated (see Pittman, 1991).

Alongside balance of conventional power and balance of productivity, Pattman would also argue that there is a *global contest of ideas*, a kind of battle for the 'world mind', in which different ideologies try both to explain world history and prescribe the best path towards the future. At the time of writing, Pettman saw the main ideological approaches that competed as being the liberal capitalism approach, the Marxist approach, and a feminist reconceptualisation of world affairs which argues for a '*balance of competence*', rather than just patterns of dominance/subordination.

Today, we can use this notion of a balance of ideology approach, though the main players might be different. Some of the main way of 'thinking' about the global system seems to include traditional liberal democratic conceptions, traditional approaches still concerned with state-building and government in the nation-state, approaches which emphasise international financial capitalism (working in a global economy), an emerging internationalist position which argues that the most effective arena for action is at the level of transnational institutions (a view shared by executives in transnational corporations and UN officials), approaches driven by feminist, environmental and developmental concerns which try to represent those without adequate influence in the global system for instance the poor, women, children (see Gresh, 1998), world-views informed by religion, and a reborn socialism which accepts market economies but seeks to moderate outcomes through progress social policies for instance one may mention Social Democrats in the European context, the attempt to redefine a 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' in China, and socialist theory derived from dependency-theory in Latin and South America as examples.

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<sup>9</sup> See Shambaugh (1994).

The key point, is that though capitalism may have won a kind of victory over communism, that alone does not spell the end of fiercely contested debates about the world system, nor does it spell any 'end of history' contrary to the liberalists' dream that has been presented by Fukuyama (1992).<sup>10</sup>

Liberalism seems a dominant and triumphant world image at present. While elaborating liberalism, in his book, Fukuyama writes "...the twin crises of authoritarianism and socialist centre planning have left only one competitor standing in the ring as an ideology of potentially universal validity: liberal democracy, the doctrine of individual freedom and popular sovereignty...if we are now at a point where we cannot imagine a world substantially different from our own, in which there is no apparent or obvious way in which the future will represent a fundamental improvement over our current order, then we must also take into consideration the possibility that History itself might be at an end' (pp.39-51).

Fukuyama's attempt is an approach to generate a new model of international relations that is based on liberalism alone. But the problem with Fukuyama's approach is that, on one hand, he vigorously criticizes *realism* (one of the world images, which was predominant during the bipolar or balance of power system) for confining the pattern of history solely to bipolar system but, on the other hand, he repeats similar mistake himself for confining the pace of history solely to liberalism. With liberalism in place he declares, 'It is the end of history'.

According to Fukuyama no other world images can exist any longer in international relations. No room has been left for them since liberalism took over. To him liberalism is the only predestined ideology, a paradigm un-triumphant for eternity. His work, thus, provides a theoretical frame for a particular group that aspires to dominate mankind, by way of imposing liberal democracy else where on the globe. One can easily discern the work, as an underpinning material for 'liberal imperialism'.<sup>11</sup>

Philosophy should not reduce its task, just, to approving the political manipulation of a particular group, as a universal history of mankind, but should better stick to its job - love of wisdom- that would bring us closer to creating universal philosophy based on relative differences and most general commensurable aspects that are found in all images.

Realism was dominant for long period of time in history, but now it has almost gone giving turn to liberalism, which is, of course, dominant at present. Presumably, globalism is next on the row. No scholar, who advocates for functional pluralistic democracy would be quite sure to insist that no change will occur beyond liberalism nor would it be impossible to discern other models of international relations.

There are several models of international relations that are capable to reflect the degree of growing harmony or deepening conflict among international actors. The most significant models include: the new liberal imperialist model, the anarchic model, the co-operative model and the unifying world model.

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<sup>10</sup> See also Ralston (1997).

<sup>11</sup> See Cooper 2002, his essay elaborates "the post-modern state" here he is calling for a new liberal imperialism and admission of the need for double standards in foreign policy – an insight which outraged the left.

### *The New Liberal Imperialist Model*

This is apparently a new model; neo-conservative analysts have upheld it recently. This type of model assumes the formation of empire of solely developed nations – so called post-modern states to control over other states – pre-modern and modern, which are believed to be chaotic by nature. It considers other states as barbarians chaotic who incubate threat and must be dominated. The fact it relies on domination is an original and cyclical approach, it will lead to the vicious circle of generation of another domination sooner or later. It is an extension of the remains of realism and balance of power system manifested in its most extremist form. It relies on double standard and monopoly of use of raw power. According to this notion, all other nations out of the empire remain in a position of vassals. It never considers international norms; diplomacy and all-actors-based multilaterally orchestrated use of power as an effective tool that would change the world for good, but sticks to the use of the law of the jungle, double standard, and to the use of force individually. The supporters of a model of this type for instance Cooper and Barnett seem to divide the model into two varieties: multilateral imperialism and unilateral imperialism. The model itself is a cause of conflict as it attempts to resolve range of human problem largely based on use of force. They circumvent universal norms and other international governmental and non-governmental organisations including even the prominent ones such as UN when these organisations refuse to serve a one-sided approach exerted on them – criticising this *ultra vires* behaviour.

In the words of one of its proponents, Robert Cooper, the challenge to the post-modern world is to get used to the idea of double standards. Members of post-modern world, among themselves, operate on the basis of laws and open co-operative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of states outside the post-modern continent of Europe, they need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era – force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary to deal with those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself. ‘Among ourselves’ he stresses “we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle. In the prolonged period of peace in Europe, there has been a temptation to neglect our defences, both physical and psychological. This represents one of the great dangers of the post-modern state” (Cooper, 2002).

This model enormously affect the chances of producing substantive democratic process, the hope that a balk majority of developing countries are aspiring for, and encourages the spread of formal democracy designed to function as a theology of domination by liberal imperialists. This approach encompasses double standard because: the empire would likely permit to exercise democracy internally, and deprive it externally to the barbarians who dwell out of the empire, they are believed to be threat to the empire and should be kept out by all means including war. Likewise, Barnett advocates for unilateral model of imperialism by dividing international relations into the *Core*, the *Seam*, and the *Gap*, where he tells us that in the age of globalisation, to assure real ownership of strategic security the West spearheaded by US should militarily engage with the *Gap* – part of the world where globalisation is thinning or Non-Integrating Gap, where liberal democracy is lacking, poverty and

disease widespread, and most importantly, where the next generation of global terrorists are incubated; to Barnett Iraq is the right place to start shaping the globe.<sup>12</sup>

According to Norman Mailer, 'Flag conservatives' such as the US President George W. Bush and the neo-conservatives in his administration thus run a policy of striving for World Empire. Behind the whole push to go to war with Iraq is the desire to have a huge military presence in the Middle East as a stepping-stone to taking over the rest of the world. Flag conservatives, who pay lip service to some conservative values, use the flag; they love using such words like 'evil' in order to avoid narrowing their political base. They truly believe America is not only fit to run the world but that it must. For going to bomb Iraq, regime change, weapons of mass destruction or oil may be the motives. The underlying motive, however, still remains George W. Bush's underlying dream – Empire. This is in effect moving away from democracy. To assume blithely that one can export democracy by force into any country of his choice can serve paradoxically to encourage more fascism at home and abroad (Mailer, 2003).

The US is not just the world's only superpower; it is a hyper power, whose military expenditures will soon equal that of the next fifteen most powerful states combined. This military and economic strength is deepening an urge towards empire. Back in 1992, a year after the final fall of the Soviet Union, there were many on the right in America, early flag conservatives, who felt that an extraordinary opportunity was now present for America to take over the world. The Defence Department drafted a document, which Jay Bookman of *The Atlanta Journal-Constitution* on September 29, 2002 described as follows: the document envisioned the US as a colossus astride the world, imposing its will and keeping world peace through military and economic power. When leaked in its final draft form, however, the proposal drew so much criticism that it was hastily withdrawn and repudiated by the first president Bush. The document was drafted by Paul Wolfowitz who was defence undersecretary for policy in 1992 and deputy defence secretary under Rumsfeld now. This dream of world domination was not picked up by the Clinton administration between 1992 and 2000. This caused such comments like, if it weren't for Clinton, America could be ruling the world. That document, "Project for the New American Century," projected prematurely in 1992, had now after September 11, become the policy of the second President Bush administration. They could seek to take over the world. Iraq could be the first step. Beyond, but very much on the historical horizon, were not only Iran, Syria, Pakistan, and North Korea but also China. Writing about the war with Iraq Bookman clearly states that the war is intended to mark the official emergence of US as a full-fledged global empire, seizing sole responsibility and authority as planetary policeman. It would be the culmination of a plan 10 years or more in the making, carried out by those who believe the US must seize the opportunity for global domination, even if it means becoming the "American imperialists" that enemies always claimed to say (Mailer, 2003).

Of course, the post-modern state system in which Europeans live does not rely on balance; nor does it emphasise sovereignty or the separation of domestic and foreign affairs. The European Union (EU) has become an example of a highly developed post

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<sup>12</sup> See Barnett (2003) as he analysis problem areas requiring American attention is, called the Gap. Shrinking the Gap is vital and would be possible only by stopping the ability of terrorist networks to access the Core via the "Seam states" that lie along the Gap's bloody boundaries.

modern system it facilitates mechanism for mutual interference in each other's domestic affairs. The CFE Treaty, under which parties to the treaty have to notify the location of their heavy weapons and allow inspections, subjects areas close to the core of sovereignty to international constraints. The shared interest of European countries in avoiding a nuclear catastrophe has proved enough to overcome the normal strategic logic of distrust and concealment. Indeed, mutual vulnerability seems to have been mutual transparency.

They have common interest in terms of spreading liberal values, economic, cultural, ideological and military conquest largely based on the spread of capitalism also known as globalisation, liberalism and even military intervention against threats that may arise from the other group of states for instance coalition against international terrorism.

But some signs of trade and military domination of few or one of the members of these post modern states for example the domination of American model of capitalism, trade, unilateralism have shown that even post modern states, among themselves, are prone to new imperial urge and to potential conflicts, as it could be observed from the relations of both sides of the Atlantic.

There are changes, of course, in the behaviour of the states of post-modern (developed) world. For instance distinction between domestic and foreign affairs, mutual interference in domestic affairs and mutual surveillance, the rejection of force for resolving disputes and the codification of additional rules, the growing irrelevance of borders are some but changes that have come about both through the changing role of the state, and also through technological products such as the missiles, motor cars and satellites. Security seems to be based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability these show some positive changes in the post modern states. But it is not appropriate to deny that these changes also refer, to some extent, to the states that exist beyond the post-modern world. Insisting on a model of segregation and barbarisation of these states instead of a better model which would embrace them, encourage mutual relation, and help them to foster the changes that they have underway on their own pace appears to be unacceptable to history and to the logic of the right of self-determination.

The conception of an International Criminal Court is a striking example of the post-modern breakdown of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs. When it comes to the implementation of this norm, like many other international norms, as many evidences show, the so called members of pre-modern or modern states are not the first on the list to breach it. In the post-modern world, *raison d'état* and the amorality of Machiavelli's theories of statecraft, which defined international relations in the modern era, have been merely replaced by a moral consciousness that applies to international relations as well as to domestic affairs: hence the renewed interest in what constitutes a just war. Here again as recent evidences show the fake reasons for running to war on the part of the so-called post-modern world was not quite different from the traditional amoral justification – interest, which is not similar to all actors.

While an international system based on such a model, according its proponents,<sup>13</sup> does deal with the problems that made the balance-of-power unworkable, it does not entail the demise of the nation state. While economy, law making and defence may be increasingly embedded in international frameworks, and the borders of territory may be less important, identity and democratic institutions remain primarily national. Thus traditional states will remain the fundamental unit of international relations for the foreseeable future, even though some of them may have ceased to behave in traditional ways. Within the post-modern world, there are no security threats in the traditional sense; that is to say, its members do not consider invading each other. Whereas in the modern world, following Clausewitz dictum war is an instrument of policy in the post-modern world it is a sign of policy failure. But while the members of the post-modern world may not represent a danger to one another, both the modern and pre-modern zones pose threats.

For Cooper, the origin of aforementioned basic changes in the state system is fundamentally the source of ‘the world’s growing honest’. A large number of most powerful states no longer want to fight or conquer. It is this that gives rise to both the pre-modern and post-modern worlds. Imperialism in the traditional sense is dead, at least among the Western powers. He anticipates a new kind of imperialism – new liberal imperialism, as a model, that could fit the post-modern world of today that has followed the changes in the state system. He argues that European states are predominantly post-modern and must be taken as examples that others imitate and follow. Elsewhere, what in Europe has become a reality is in many other parts of the world an aspiration. ASEAN, NAFTA, MERCOSUR even AU suggest at least the desire for a post-modern environment, and though this wish is unlikely to be realised quickly, imitation is undoubtedly easier than invention. He sees only few states outside Europe that need to be included in the post-modern frame work.<sup>14</sup>

The other variety of liberal imperialist model is spelt out by Barnett in his article “The Pentagon’s New Map” in which he writes of a different variety of imperial urge, “since the end of the Cold War” he says “the United States has been trying to come up with an operating theory [model] of the world – and a military strategy to accompany it. Now there is a leading contender. It involves identifying the problem parts of the world and aggressively shrinking them.” He says that the new world must be defined by where globalisation has truly taken root and where it has not. He argues that the pattern that has emerged since the end of the Cold War, and particularly after September 11, 2001, suggests that the US military’s next target should be at the part of the world where globalisation is thin. He calls this part of the world *Non-Integrating Gap*. This Gap, as he explains is globalisation’s ‘ozone hole’ contrary to the Core where globalisation is well functioning, the Gap reproduces poverty, disease and the chronic conflicts that incubate the next generation of global terrorists. Explaining the content of US led attack against Afghanistan and Iraq he stresses the reason of going to war in these parts is not just because the leaders were evil, the real

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<sup>13</sup> See both Cooper (2002) and Barnett (2003).

<sup>14</sup> According to Cooper (2002), outside Europe, the post-modern world includes Canada; Japan - by inclination a post-modern state, but its location – geographical position -- prevents it developing more fully in this direction. The USA is the more doubtful case since it is not clear that the US government or Congress accepts either the necessity or desirability of interdependence, or its corollaries of openness, mutual surveillance and mutual interference, to the same extent as most European governments now do. This evaluation of the author raises different varieties of imperial urge of both sides of the atlantic.

reason of such a war is that the US is redrawing the map of the regions by shrinking the Gap. The resulting long-term military commitment will finally force America to deal with the entire Gap as a strategic threat environment. According to Barnett, thus solely unilateral use of force is an effective approach to shape a better world rather than the use of diplomacy and international norms and multilaterally coordinated use of force.<sup>15</sup>

The new liberal imperialism and its varieties as two of its proponents have insisted, see both the *modern* and the *pre-modern* states as challenge and significant threat to its security. This zone is where drug barons threaten the state's monopoly on force. All over the so called developing and middle developed countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America and even some parts of Europe it self, which is undergoing crises and instability. No area of the world is without its dangerous cases. In such areas chaos is the norm and war is a way of life. In so far as there is a government it operates in a way similar to an organised crime syndicate.

The challenge posed particularly by pre-modern state is considered as a new one. The pre-modern state may be too weak even to secure its home territory, let alone pose a threat internationally, but it can provide a base for non-state actors who may represent a danger to the post-modern world. If non-state actors, notably drug, crime, or terrorist syndicates take to using pre-modern bases for attacks on the more orderly parts of the world, then the organised post-modern states may eventually have to respond in the frame of coalition or unilateral pre-emptive attacks. If they tend too dangerous for established states to tolerate, according both authors Cooper and Barnett it is possible to imagine a *defensive imperialism*. They see the West's response to Afghanistan, or the other attacks to follow suet in the future, in this light.

The new liberal imperialism [model] perceives the threat from the modern world as the most familiar one. Here, the classical state system, from which the post-modern world has only recently emerged, remains intact, and continues to operate by the principles of *empire* and the supremacy of *national interest*. If there is to be stability it will come from a balance among the aggressive forces. It is notable, however, how few are the areas of the world where such a balance exists today. In some areas, there seem to emerge a sharp risk of nuclear element that may cause imbalance in the equation.

In order to deal with both modern and pre-modern chaos, according to this largely radical neo-conservative model, the West's – the post-modern states' intervention is inevitable. As to the form of this intervention, one of the ways may be colonisation which was employed in the past, since Berlin Conference in 1884 in which great powers had scrambled the globe, to impose imperial domination upon the so called third world countries. Even though the need for colonisation is as great as it ever was in the nineteenth century, to day, according to the proponents of the new liberal imperialism model, there are no colonial powers willing to scramble the globe in the old fashion.

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<sup>15</sup> See Barnett (2003), also he states that diplomacy cannot work in such regions like Middle East because there lies big insecurity within states. In order to build a better world the Middle East is the perfect place where the fight must start.

The right form of intervention, to get rid of the challenges of pre-modern and modern worlds, which are dangerous to the post-modern world, according to Cooper is to get used to the idea of double standards. Members of the post-modern world, among themselves, operate on the basis of laws and open co-operative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of states outside the post-modern continent of Europe, they need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era – force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary to deal with those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself. Among ourselves he stresses we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, “we must also use the laws of the jungle. In the prolonged period of peace in Europe, there has been a temptation to neglect our defences, both physical and psychological. This represents one of the great dangers of the post-modern state”.<sup>16</sup> No any mention about the use of diplomacy or international norms to which all international actors consent.

According to the proponents of this model, the post-modern model of imperialism takes two forms. First there is the voluntary imperialism of the global economy. This is usually operated by an international consortium through International Financial Institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank – it presents one of the characteristics of the new imperialism that it is multilateral.

The second form of the post-modern model of imperialism might be called the imperialism of neighbours. Instability in your neighbourhood poses threats, which no state can ignore. Misgovernment, ethnic violence and crime in the Balkans pose a threat to Europe. The response has been to create something like a voluntary UN protectorate in Bosnia and Kosovo. It is no surprise that in both cases the High Representative is European. Europe provides most of the aid that keeps Bosnia and Kosovo running and most of the soldiers (though the US presence is an indispensable stabilising factor). As auxiliaries to this effort – in many areas indispensable to it – are over a hundred NGOs.

The post-modern EU for instance according to this model offers a vision of co-operative empire, a common liberty and a common security without the ethnic domination and centralised absolutism to which past empires have been subject, but also without the ethnic exclusiveness that is the hallmark of the nation state – inappropriate in an era without borders and unworkable in regions such as the Balkans. A co-operative empire might be the domestic political framework that best matches the altered substance of the post-modern state: a framework in which each has a share in the government, in which no single country dominates and in which the governing principles are not ethnic but legal. The lightest of touches will be required from the centre; the imperial bureaucracy must be under control, accountable, and the servant, not the master, of the commonwealth. Such an institution must be as dedicated to liberty and democracy as its constituent parts. Like Rome, this commonwealth would provide its citizens with some of its laws, some coins and the occasional road.

This perhaps is, in sum, the vision of the new liberal imperialism’s model of international relations. Can it be realised? Does this model ever work for all? Who

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<sup>16</sup> Cooper (2002). Both Cooper (2002) and Barnett (2003) speak of the same topic but in slightly different approaches. Cooper supports multilateral imperialism, which solely post-modern states should enjoy, based on double standards while Barnett supports unilateral imperialism of the US.

does this kind of model work for if at all it could? In the modern world the secret race to acquire nuclear weapons goes on. In the pre-modern world the interests of organised crime – including international terrorism – grow greater and faster than the state. In the post-modern world there is a large appetite to dominate all the other part of the world out of the empire. The sense for humanism dies out, greed and globalisation grows. Deepening poverty, disease and social insecurities that hit large part of mankind are partially caused by the so-called post-modern world itself, who now tries to build a sort of ivory tower to secure itself by all means including any sort of use of force to silence everything it considers threat referring regions that are situated out of the empire.

The other, two significant, models of international system include: the one that envisages the emergence of a gradually more *co-operative society of nations*, and the second that outlines a *uniting world-system* driven by the expanding capitalist economy.

### *The Anarchic International System Model*

This model relies on the realist vision of international system. The realist position on this issue is obvious they argue for a basically *anarchic international system* in which each state competes for power, without any higher arbiter or rule to judge such behaviour. This view is based on a long tradition going back to the time of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, and postulated by modern thinkers such as Morgenthau Hans and Kenneth Waltz (Henderson, 1998). Hedley Bull also accepts this ‘anarchical society’, but sees it as moderated by serious efforts at international co-operation and limited by the construction of multilateral organisations. One example of the application of this thinking refers to the Asia-Pacific region (see Huisken, 2002).

Realism displayed visible deficiencies. For instance with the Cold War, which was based on the balance-of-power system already gone away, the classical realist approach of defining international relations that is base on this model would give no sense. Since Morgenthau, there has been a re-working of the realist theory to account for these criticisms, called *neo-realism* (see Hendersen, 1998; Keohane, 1986). The latter is a part and parcel of the prior, but it differs in that it tries to correct the deficiencies of the prior. Neo-realism seeks to explain the importance of super-powers and great powers in the international system. Neo-realism also known as *structural realism* abandoned reliance on the nature of human beings to account for discord and co-operation in world politics, but focused instead on the competitive, anarchic nature of world politics as a whole. A proponent of this theory is Kenneth E. Waltz, who wrote the *Theory of International Politics*. Waltz initiated a new line of theoretical inquiry in his attempt to systematise political realism into a rigorous, deductive systemic theory of international politics. Neorealists criticise theorists of *interdependence* in that they exaggerate the extent to which great powers, including the U.S., are dependent on others. Although the U.S. places great emphasis on aliens such as found in NATO, or intelligences linkages with Britain, Canada, and Australia, it is also able to act in a *unilateral* fashion in imposing economic sanctions, or use considerable pressure and a *preponderance of power* to bring allies together to form ad hoc coalitions to defend its national interest. The latest intervention in Iraq (early 2003) demonstrated that U.S., even if accompanied with a limited number of active

allies, was still able, alone, to reshape the politics of the Middle East once again (Slocombe, 2003). By the same token, one can also flash back to assert the reason why many say that international relations have changed since September 11, 2001; US plays dominant role in the war against international terrorism, this motivates its interest to reshaping world politics along this line. Neo-realists argue that international organisations often serve the interests of, or are constrained, by these powerful states. Likewise, strategic realists have also tried to build a rational case for military pre-emption on the basis of 'anticipatory self-defence'.

Classical realism, for its origin, goes back to the time of Peloponnesian War 5<sup>th</sup> century BC and associates with the ancient Greek historian Thucydides it has influenced international relations up until 20<sup>th</sup> century at this stage it has associated with Professor Hans Morgenthau. According to realism, fundamental causes for human aspects like war and imperialism, in international relations, were no different today than in the time of Thucydides. While all other aspects of the human social environment – religion, the family, economic organisation, concepts of political legitimacy – are subject to historical evolution, international relations is regarded as forever identical to itself: "war is eternal" (Fukuyama, 1992).

This pessimistic view of international relations has been given a systematic formulation that goes variously under the titles of 'realism', *realpolitik*, or 'power politics'. Realism, whether consciously called by that name, is the dominant framework for understanding international relations, and shapes the thinking of virtually every foreign policy professional today in the US and much of the rest of the world. In order to understand the impact of spreading democracy on international politics, we need to analyze the weakness of this dominant realist school of interpretation.

One of the true progenitors of classical realism was Machiavelli, who believed that men should take their bearings not by how philosophers have imagined they ought to live, but by how they actually live, and who taught that the best states would have to emulate the policies of the worst states if they were to survive. As a doctrine meant to apply to problems of contemporary politics, however, realism did not arrive on the scene until after World War II. Since then, it has taken several forms. The original formulation was that of pre and early post-war writers like the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, the diplomat George Kennan, and Professor Hans Morgenthau, whose textbook on international relations was perhaps the single greatest influence on the way Americans thought about foreign policy during the Cold War. Since then, there have been a variety of academic versions of this theory, such as 'neorealism' or 'structural realism', but the single most articulate advocate of realism in the past generation has been Henry Kissinger.

Classical realists such as Hobbes and Machiavelli who upheld this type of tradition in the West were heavily criticised by more idealist views in thinkers such as Immanuel Kant, Voltaire, J. S. Mill and Hugo Grotius. The realist tradition was only partly undermined by the evolution of co-operative democratic form of governments in France, the US and then other parts of Europe. Likewise, ideal visions of a community of nations within Europe, and a co-operative peace among democratic states would not remain dominant as major states competed for empire, relative power, and engaged in arms-races through the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries.

A challenge to the realist tradition was seen in the post-World War I endeavour of creating a more representative form of government, a model of peaceful international order, where president Woodrow Wilson's efforts cherish with regard to self-determination by national groups in Europe, and the attempt to create a genuinely co-operative international organisation, the League of Nations. It was in this period of the 1920s, that *idealism* held out the strongest hope for a model of new international order based on law, humanism and co-operation (see Küng, 1997).

However, these idealist aspirations had to collapse as a result of several historical trends such as the break down of the model known as the League of Nation's system, the lack of permanent solution to avoid warfare and/or establish stable international order in the European state system, the collapse of democratic processes in Germany, Italy and Japan, the emergence of ideologically driven warfare and conflict, i.e. conflict driven by democratic, authoritarian, communist, neo-colonialist and anti-colonial ideas, World War II attacks against civil population and use of genocide.

War, conflict and the development of power emerged as the main considerations of states in the post-World War II period. This is clearly shown in the text, *Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace*, by Hans Morgenthau. This classic text was republished many times, and became a standard text in many Western universities teaching International Relations, International Politics or Foreign Affairs during the 1960s and 1980s. It also came to have a strong influence on practitioners such as Henry Kissinger, and indirectly on US Presidents such as Nixon.

Neo-realists, in turn, have been criticized on a number of issues. A key argument has been that neorealists overlook the dynamics of change and the quantity, velocity, and diversity of transactions in the global system today. Ethane, himself a critic of neorealism, accepts Waltz's emphasis on system-level theory and the rationality assumption, about act of states, as starting-points for theory in international relations (see Keohane, 1986). However, he argues that neorealism does not explain change well. More attention needs to be paid to connections between the internal attributes of states on the one hand, and the international system on the other. As we have empirically seen, sudden, unexpected change becomes one of the key features that characterize international system since 1989, this trend has continued through 2001-2003.

However, in the main the *realist* and *neo-realist* viewpoints about international relations have been locked in battle with *idealists*, who argue for laws and norms of human conduct as the basis of a civilized model of international system, and with *neo-Marxists*, who search for a model of some kind of social justice in the international system or 'new left' alternatives (see Wallerstein, 2002). Hans Küng has suggested that we need to move beyond the *fruitless deadlock* between the '*old real politics*' and an overly optimistic '*moralizing ideal politics*' towards a new model of internationally responsible politics which pragmatically identifies the interests and needs at play in the international system (see Küng, 1997). Thus, Instead of going over the old debates of this outdated realist model of the 'might verses right', as outlined by Thucydides, in the 5<sup>th</sup> century B.C., it would rather be better now to turn to other options, which apparently help, as a better model, to move forward the international system, into more productive relations and future perspectives.

### *The Co-operative International Society's Model*

Many would like to see a model of more *co-operative system of international society of nations* emerging. Regimes and institutions whether domestic or international are the outcome of human design efforts intended to provide an authoritative basis for regulating or at least influencing the behaviour of both states and non-state actors. So understood, the foundation of *international regimes*, or the development of *global society* is a constructivist enterprise.<sup>17</sup>

In the seventeenth century Hugo Grotius had first postulated a *community of states*, basically European states at that time, which developed shared patterns of trade, diplomacy and provided a basis for international law. In the twentieth century, in particular, growing patterns of interdependence, as also traced by thinkers such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye Jr., suggested that nations around the world were beginning to form pattern of co-operation in which mutual needs and rights were at least partially recognized (see Henderson, 1998). For Henderson, 'people and governments are, simply, establishing networks of co-operation that meet needs that are, in turn, helping to create an international society' (1998, p. 17). Generally, these allow patterns of world governance to emerge based on 'a broad set of rules and norms' but without any world government.

This third model is more idealistic one. The main notion of this model is that a true international community could emerge, based on the extensive development of human rights and democracy, and the development of strong supranational institutions. Most scholars would argue that such a community does not exist today. Rather, the question is whether such a community could develop in the future, especially if current co-operative trends are deepened. A true community may be a kind of utopia, but it also might impose serious restraints on diversity and place constraints on national actors.

Technology has enabled diverse peoples around the globe into ever greater and more frequent contact in economic or commercial, cultural, and social matters. As these peoples increasingly interact with each other on diverse issues, we can identify the gradual development over time of some common norms or understandings. These facts, within and across state boundaries throughout the world, has led to consensus on at least some common values or preferences has emerged over time. This again constitutes a culture within a global civil society that serves as a basis for constructing and maintaining international law and international organisations. The rule of law in a global civil society focuses not just on the more traditional, state-centric sectors – security, diplomacy, war and peace, and economic or commercial matters – but also on newer “growth areas” such as human rights, the environment, and individual standing and accountability before international courts. The idea of global civil society, however, has a long way to go, taking into consideration what has been achieved within the domestic civil societies of most states, and enormous achievements that has been done since World War II still the work on this project continues well into the twenty-first century.

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<sup>17</sup> See Viotti, Paul R. & Kauppi, Mark V., (eds.), 2001.

In the early twenty-first century, it seems that a fragile *international society* has evolved, but its nature and future is highly contested. This society, moreover, has not replaced the use of force as one main method of conflict resolution, or the central role of power in international relations. Rather, traditional patterns of power are now being modified by the international system. As an example of how international society of states has given something of a new face to the use of power, the activities of UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan appears indispensable. The failure of intrusive inspections on Iraq's weapons' programmes in 1998 is most probably, one of the key steps that led to the 2003 war between the UN unapproved coalition, spearheaded by US on one hand and Iraq on the other (see Ferguson, 2003).

The case of Iraq can best illustrate the strength and weakness of this model. In 1998, another round of potential conflict between Iraq and the great powers of the Security Council emerged. President Saddam Hussein resisted the inspection of presidential palaces in particular to US inspectors in the UN teams monitoring weapons of mass destruction. This led to a tense stand off, in which the US seriously considered a new round of air strikes against Iraq. Three carrier fleets, 350 fighters and some 40,000 personnel were mobilized to reinforce this demand (see Phillips, 1998). Kofi Annan, as the head of the UN, proposed a peace mission to Baghdad whereby some kind of deal to avoid war could be negotiated. This proposal was strongly supported by Russia and France, which hoped for some kind of diplomatic solution. The US leadership was at first cynical, of this solution, doubting that any real deal could be done. However, once it emerged that the peace mission would proceed, President Clinton laid out his minimum requirements for Annan, and in fact any 'deal' offered by Annan had to operate within these guidelines to be effective.

In an intense round of negotiation, with Saddam Hussein, Annan managed to return from Baghdad with a deal which met the demands of the Security Council, and to some extent that of Iraq. In spite of criticisms made of this process, especially by some Republicans in the US Congress that for instance US was subcontracting out foreign policy to the UN; that 'business' had been done with tyrant etc. (see Liu, 1998). Annan met the basic needs of US policy, while a face-saving solution was invented for the Iraqis and in this way the process did manage to avoid another round of destructive air strikes. This system would eventually collapse under the pressure of both Iraq's resistance to inspections, and claims that data from the UNSCOM inspection teams and surveillance equipment was being routed back to US and Western intelligence agencies (see Ritter et al., 2002).

The significance of this episode, in terms of evaluating international relations, is that effort has been put to blend the use of power, diplomacy and international norms but it didn't result in such a way it would reinforce the co-operative international society's model due to plenty drawbacks: the process was conducted on the basis of co-operation; it tried to meet some of the interests of several players such as US, France, Russia, Iraq, and the UN itself but some members, namely the US and the UK remained vividly impious circumventing the rules of the game of the co-operative international society's model. Annan emphasized that he could offer his 'good services' but that it was not his (UN's) role to coerce, threaten, or lecture neither Saddam Hussein nor any leader for that matter. In effect, the main aim of the weapon inspections was achieved by the use of a creative diplomatic solution, i.e. diplomats plus inspectors. The success of mission rested largely on the dynamics between

Annan (UN) and Hussein not between US or any individual state and Hussein. The success of the mission in short term magnified the need for UN and enhanced its prestige, that it is desperately vital after the lessons of more problematic missions, where UN was not put to play significant role, in for instance Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia. Institutional interests, later, became vital. The US, thus, decided to play the international card of persuasion backed by the threat of very real force, in spite of some 'hawks' that may have preferred the high political drama of immediate strikes. The co-operative international society's model had led to co-operative end here by producing a fruitful result of avoiding war. It remained fragile though.

There were short-term benefits and long-term problems with the outcome of this process. Annan was heard saying: "I think I can do business with him [Saddam], and I think he is serious", this led some conservative commentators to argue that Annan had been 'duped'. Annan was also widely misquoted as saying that some of the UN inspectors acted like 'cowboys' while on the other hand he seemed to give a rather positive appraisal of the wisdom and calmness of Saddam Hussein, a view which clashed with the widespread demonisation of Hussein in the West.

Annan's mission, however, secured all the points of agreement demanded by the Security Council, and therefore it was a temporary diplomatic success. This is a striking example where, though for a short period of time, the model of co-operative international society's system approaches met the pragmatic needs of states, even when the possibilities of other options such as the use of power and military force were out there.

Moreover, the use of power and military option was financially very costly. In this particular case, air-strikes against Iraq, more importantly, would have resulted in more Iraqi deaths, gained Saddam Hussein some sympathy internationally, and would have ended the on going UN arms inspections entirely. In settling this dispute, diplomacy proved though temporarily more efficiency, and less complicated in terms of world opinion. Polls in the US also indicated that 55 per cent supported the compromise deal, which has avoided war.

The former Clinton administration reserved the right to reconsider air strikes, this time not so much in support of UN resolutions as in support of US 'national interest'. However, unilaterally launched strikes were opposed by Russia, annoyed France, and alienated large segments of the Arab world which in the past were willing to oppose Saddam Hussein. Here we observe a certain limited accommodation of even a predominant power such as the US to the workings of a fragile but real international society that wished to see arms inspections continue rather than unilateral use of force. More might like to compare these trends with events in Iraq of 2003.

The diplomatic method, however, could not maintain a peaceful status quo in Iraqi-Western relations. Would it work for others in the future? Regarding the Iraqi-West relations, it failed, in part, due to the discovery the UNSCOM data was being leaked back to US military intelligence, perhaps to provide future targeting for air and missile strikes (see Anderson, 1999) the inspection schedule, thus, soon collapsed. This case displays a situation in which both co-operative and power factors interacted dynamically. Iraq remained as a possible target for further intervention, both over concerns for its possession of weapons of mass destruction and support for some

terrorist groups. Its possession of weapons of mass destruction was unproved and neither was found an evidence to confirm its direct connection with terrorist groups. Many insisted that Iraq is, rather, a sectarian state and that it is opposed to fundamentalism. These problems left open the possibility of direct intervention on the basis of unresolved claims concerning Iraq's place in the international system.

This bias formed the background, and one main pretext for the move towards military intervention by the US and its allies through 2002-2003. The European edition of *Time* magazine had been conducting a poll on its website: "Which country poses a greater danger to world peace in 2003?" With 318,000 votes cast, the responses were: North Korea, 7 percent; Iraq, 8 percent; the United States, 84 percent...John le Carré wrote in *The Time* of London: "America has entered one of its periods of historic madness, but this is the worst I can remember." Harold Pinter was also among those who strongly wrote on this theme: ...The American administration is now a bloodthirsty wild animal. Bombs are its only vocabulary. Many Americans, we know, are horrified by the posture of their government, but seem to be helpless. Unless Europe finds the solidarity, intelligence, courage and will, to change and resist American power, Europe itself will deserve Alexander Herzen's declaration "we are not the doctors. We are the disease."

The reason for waging war in these contemporary international relations thus appears, to be very vague to many. Most great and small nations in the international society together with millions of citizens over the planet opposed the US lead intervention in Iraq, however, the run to war kept on; underplaying the endeavours of the co-operative international society's model.

The issue of finding Weapons of Mass Destruction and whether UN inspectors should be involved to confirm them, as supported by Russia, remained very controversial. The UN role of avoiding the use of unapproved force to secure world peace has been heavily belittled for the first time in history; a unilateral behaviour kept stepping up.

It was only latter on after this unapproved war had taken place, that some gradual consensus was negotiated in the Security Council, to assign a special UN representative, Sergio Viera de Mello a Brazilian, who was chosen to liaise between the UN and the Coalition, mainly US and British, administration in Iraq. His representation doesn't specify any dominant role of UN:

The special representative post was created in the resolution to lift sanctions on Iraq and establish the authority of the United States and Britain to run the country  
The Security Council adopted that. ... (see Barringer, 2003).

The Coalition committed an illegal act that defied the Charter under which all member states abide it is a breach of International Law in the face of peremptory norms of general international law—known also as *ius cogens*, which states are not allowed to contract out of (see Malanczuk, 1997). When they unilaterally intervened implementing unapproved use of force, on one hand, the coalition didn't care about the importance of UN approval; and later when they found that it is necessary to indorse the UN approval to mitigate their illegal occupation of Iraq, they needed UN's approval, on the other. This outlines the significance of the co-operative international society's model approach and how serious problems that could affect international

system arise when this model of complex co-operative approach is suppressed or circumvented.

The other case, to consider is the May 2000 UN intervention in Sierra Leone. In this case the intervention required a complex mix of diplomatic co-operation, bargaining, and military muscle - largely based on the presence of 9,000 U.N. peacekeepers backed up by 700 British paratroops and a strong British Navy task force. This multilaterally approved move was quite successful. This again indicates that the co-operative international society's model welcomes multilaterally coordinated use of force, accompanied with diplomacy and international legal norms. Any attempt that undermines this approach or unilateralism, as seen in the face of this model seems to be the main source of insecurity and instability that has ever seen in the international relations of mankind.

The case of East Timor, likewise presented a successful outcome. In this case, the intervention required military, economic and diplomatic capabilities orchestrated under multilateral operation of the UN. Of course, one can recall the way traditional power and self-images that are usually derived from culture, history and ideology, have shaped key policies in major powers such as the US, Russia or France where they have intervened internationally. Multilaterally orchestrated UN operation in this case again confirmed success by insisting on realistic and humanist calculations of the Timorese and Indonesians need for rapid UN intervention rather than an intervention based on a single state's national interest or security claim.

Different visions of international system shape the use of power, the way decisions are made, and the way societies commit themselves to various obligation. For instance, constructing UN and abiding by its Charter and the like. Today's international system is still viewed as anarchic, i.e. with out central authority or without a final moral arbiter, but this anarchy should not amount to chaos (Pietrzyk, 2001). The current partly anarchic system of international relations can be conditioned through partial implementation of norms, the creation of institutions, and a deeper understanding of the way conflicts can be regulated. These constructions are at once mental, cultural, symbolic, and institutional. They channel wealth, power and human invention in the international system. The judicious use of power, economic and military aspects, needs to be balanced by a long term view of the costs of humanitarian and military intervention.

### *The Unifying International Society's Model*

Another approach towards the perception of international relations today has been the one that envisages global process based on the world-system theory. The unifying international society's model seeks a world-system whose unity is driven by the expanding capitalist economy. This approach turns away from aspects like classes, ideals, and balances in order to look at the world-system as a whole. It is related with the latest world image – *globalism/socialism*. One of the key proponents of this idea has been Immanuel Wallerstein.<sup>18</sup> Wallerstein, contrary to some people who think that the world system has emerged since 20<sup>th</sup> century, makes important distinction by stressing that it has been evolving over the last four centuries:

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<sup>18</sup> See Axford, 1995; Robertson, 1992; Viotti and Kuappi, 1999.

“...A world-economy, capitalist in form, has been in existence in at least part of the globe since the sixteenth century. Today, the entire globe is operating within the framework of this singular social division of labour we are called the capitalist world-economy” (Wallerstein 1984, p. 13).

World-system theory based model classifies the world into three main parts: the leading core - the first or developed world, the peripheral areas - the third or underdeveloped world, and the semi-periphery - industrialising but having lower wage structures and being less technologically developed. He argues that the leading core includes industrialized nations that are prone to exploit resources in the peripheral areas due to the dominant main stream position they occupy in international politics; thus prone and capable to exploit resources in peripheral areas from those which are pushed away from main stream international political system to the position of resource suppliers. They are so designed in order that the capitalist system could perpetuate. In effect, the structure of the world-economy permits ‘unequal exchange of goods and services, such that much of the surplus-value extracted in the peripheral zones of the world-economy is transferred to the core-zone’s. The world is now linked by ‘commodity-chains’ that usually cross national boundaries, and on which most business activities and people are now directly and indirectly dependent. From this point of view, states and the inter state systems remain largely the political expression of the world-economic system. He so defines and characterizes the *unifying international society’s model*, which is based on the expansion of capital and how it is not working for all mankind.

He goes on to argue that there are long-term cycles in the world economy, in which growth, boosted by expansion in supply of goods and products, is followed by periods of stagnation or bottlenecks. In these periods of stagnation, there are pressures on the social system and productive system, which would include reduction of production costs – followed with mechanisation and finding cheaper labour in periphery; creation of new ‘core-like’ activities based on innovation, leading to new areas of investment and high profit; intensified class and political struggle among and within core states, with strengthened demands by workers in core states, and elites in periphery zones; expansion of the outer boundaries of the world-economy, largely based on rapid development in the core, and underdevelopment in the periphery nations. Ironically, even in mixed aid-and – trade regimes between rich and poor countries, net monetary flows can still flow from the poor to the rich nations, largely based on payment on extended debt (see Dowrick, 1989).

In such a system, only exceptionally can core states establish a hegemonic control of the world-economy for brief periods, for instance the UK, 1815-73, and the US 1945-67. These processes have also lead to the emergence of a worldwide middle class reliant on the capitalist system and supporting a modernised culture into which other cultures tended to have been assimilated through market forces.

In so far as this system tends to dominate production, trade is boundary crossing and has dominant access to communications and technology; it also tends to create ‘a cognitive global order’ (Axford, 1995). It then seems ‘natural’ that science should progress, that technology should always be better, faster and natural, that liberal capitalism, based on privatisation, will create more wealth for ‘most’ of the core community. Opposition to this schema, whether based on religious, cultural, socialist

or political resistance therefore is readily seen as either utopian or retrograde. The new 'geoculture' in turn is usually represented as progressive, humane in a realistic way, and able to deliver increased prosperity. Failures of the system, either in turns of ecology, continued poverty, market instability or limited patterns of democratisation are either ignored, consigned to 'future development', or labelled as due to national mismanagement. Hence, Asian economic failures through 1997-1999 have sometimes been dismissed as entirely based on 'crony-connections', and not as at least partly based on instabilities in the global financial system. Likewise, there has been a tendency to dismiss Latin American financial crises, for instance in Mexico and Argentina, as simply based on corruption, poor political leadership, and some vague Latin American 'cultural traits'. Although these factors have been involved in crises over the last decade, they were also compounded by vulnerabilities in the flow of global capital, portfolio investment, and instabilities as countries tried to peg or unpeg currencies.

However, according to Wallerstein the current world-economy has expanded almost to its outer boundaries, incorporating most of the planet. He therefore argues that this world-system is now undergoing a stage of slow systemic crisis. Today we might see this view as dated, but it has become clear through the 1990s that capitalism has had to diversify and change its methodologies to remain viable, and that there may be no inherent, automatic stability in the international financial system (Soros, 2002).

Trends in the global economy do suggest that a unifying international society's model has emerged, as world-system, based on economic forces that have been developing since the 16<sup>th</sup> century in Europe. These forces were in the past channelled through major trading cities such as Venice, Amsterdam, London, and in part through emerging mercantilist European empires such as Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, French, and British companies and interests (Braudel, 1986). The process, however, is far from complete since segments of the world population remain outside the 'global culture', while others suffer from uneven globalisation. It is this very incompleteness that allows for continued civilisational dialogue and negotiation over rules and power sharing in the international system.

One may raise legitimate questions like whether the system is really in crisis, and whether it can, in fact, expand further more. Would there be a 'balance of civilisation' or would economy arrive at balance or equilibrium? Can the proposed new global geoculture meet human needs beyond consumerism and the need for information and entertainment? If not, will new institutions and cultures have chance to emerge? Is it possible for the global system to expand while disintegrating a substantial population –the poor? Would there be an increased resistance against the world system by local groups, individuals and institutions who are negatively affected? Would diplomacy effectively resolve conflicts that arise within the existing world-system? Is the core's rushing to war an attempt to secure the world capitalist system or effective method to advance, elsewhere, liberal democracy, modernisation, and freedom? Isn't it imposing the American model of capitalism on the rest of the world? Are we doomed to it?

Several critics of this model and many other thinkers like Varellastein perceive that international system today is in crises. That there are, for instance crisis of violence, misery, repression, environment. As to the root cause of these crises the supporters of this model may see various different reasons like primarily problem of resource, price,

culture (Huntington, 1996), population as the root cause. The critics of this model, including Wallerstein, however, insist that the root cause of these crises is primarily the improper world system – the capitalist model itself with its uneven structure (see Galtung, 1984).

According to the critics of this model, for the problem of violence arms control and proliferation policy at macro and micro levels have been tried. For misery, transfer of technology, capital and social structure known first as “aid” later as “cooperation” has been applied. For the problem of price, international conferences to “stabilize prices” have been tried. For the problem of repression there is the whole national and international system of legal norms, adjudication, possibly administration of sanctions. For the twin problems of depletion and pollution, recycling constitutes a typical solution, and for the population explosion problem, there is, of course, family planning and birth control. “All of these have been tried” they say, “we don’t want to belittle those solutions but in reality what has been changed?” They see aforementioned solutions as symptom curing and that the root problem is still there, even mounting; they argue that the system itself is the root cause; hence that it seeks a political solution.<sup>19</sup> Harrington for instance asks himself: “Am I, then, saying that the capitalist North is imperialist? As a matter of American political rhetoric, the answer seems to be, no. As a matter of serious theoretical analysis, the answer is yes. America is the key nation in a planetary economic system that, in good times and bad, reproduces the relation of domination and inferiority that are so dramatically visible in the North-South gap. The system was founded between sixteenth and eighteenth century based on bloody process of capital accumulation including slave trades and pillages, later on in less dramatic development the capitalist economies deepened and institutionalized their original advantage by means of the world market of the nineteenth century. The content of that structure [capital driven unifying model] persists to this day, even though there have been many changes in form” (Harrington 1984, p.72).

## EVALUATING THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Various scholars have attempted to evaluate the behaviour of nations at an international arena with regard to relations such as political, economic, cultural and the like. This process of evaluating the behaviour of different nations does not take place in a single uniform way. One of the major reasons to this is the difference, in world image, between scholars who deal with this field.

Images, however, are not theories. They are spectacles through which one can see the world and its perspectives. They don’t only contribute towards a better understanding of international politics or political economy but also help to generate a theory. There are at least three such major world images: Realism, Pluralism/Liberalism and Globalism/Socialism. The relation between these images and how far their teachings conflict or can be applied in the modern period of a highly interdependent world becomes crucial.

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<sup>19</sup> See also Wallerstein (2002).

As for their relations, one can observe the existence of some common ground among them. But, in many ways they conflict and their assumptions are, thus, incommensurable. For example, realism assumes that states are unitary international actors that they speak with one voice and act rationally<sup>20</sup>; to the contrary pluralism assumes that states are not unitary actors they are not single physical being to act with single mind they can't be rational, while globalism asserts pattern of dominance dependency relations between North and South and that the Southern states are not actors strong enough to advance their national interest and states alone should not be counted as international actors. Such visible incommensurability has affected the possibility of generating global philosophy and various related aspects. The concept of Human rights, terrorism, globalism, imperialism, for instance, do not have universally uniform meaning that would fit all over.

Realists largely examine the balance of power, pluralists transnational process and globalism pattern of domination. These different topics require not only the use of different level of analysis but also conflicting assumptions. Meanings are often incommensurable, the same term being defined in different ways, incompatible with one another. The term imperialism, for instance has been defined by Morgenthau as a reverse of the power relations between two or more nations. Where as to Lenin it is just the highest stage of capitalism.

Robert Keohane and John Ruggie (realist and pluralist) both argue in attempting to construct theory of international relations, that, one must begin with the realist emphasis on power and the state. But, structural analysts (globalists/socialists and neorealists, who both insist on the importance of system, thus also known as structuralists), scholars such as Immanuel Wallerstein and Kenneth Waltz by stressing the importance of system, provide critical context by which pluralist insights and actors are to be analyzed.

Notwithstanding the apparent incommensurability of the images earlier and recent work often defies easy categorisation in just one of the images. Such as work being done, in sociological institutionalism on hypothesis concerning common global culture, which compete with those of realism and pluralism. Elements of social constructivism and institutionalism can be found not only in realist and pluralist or neoliberalist but also in globalist scholarship.

These three images remain a durable guide to theoretical work in the field of international relations. It would be good step to search the root of realism, liberalism and globalism as global philosophy to unite humanity.

## DIPLOMACY AND SOVEREIGN STATES

Since 15<sup>th</sup> century with the emergence of sovereign nation states in Europe, states have started paying attention on the ways and means of diplomacy or communications among each other with regard to security concerns, and the conduct of relations among them in both war and peace. Diplomatic relations are established by mutual consent between the two states concerned. However, they may be broken off

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<sup>20</sup> See Morgenthau, 1985; Viotti and Kuappi, 1999.

unilaterally (often as a mark of disapproval of an illegal or unfriendly act by the other state); when one state withdraws its diplomatic mission, it also requires the other state to withdraw its mission from its territory. The receiving state may at any time declare a diplomat *persona non grata* or not acceptable, this forces the sending state to withdraw him. This is a step which can be employed as a sanction, if immunities are abused (see Malanczuk, 1997).

As *positivism* emerged in international law, 18<sup>th</sup> century, it regarded the actual behaviour of states as the basis of international law emphasising on the theory of *sovereignty*. According to the doctrine of positivism, solely states have unlimited right to wage war, to enforce claim or to protect national interest.

The sovereignty of state covers the right to exercise complete jurisdiction on its own territory as well as a right to be independent or autonomous in conducting foreign policy or international relations. On this basis, states are legally equal regardless their size, economy or power in international relations. This is the source of legal equality that sovereign members of the UN and other international organisations enjoy up until today, as stated in Article 2, Section 1 of the UN Charter that the „Organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.“ Diplomatic representation has served, as *customary international law* over long period of time, until it, finally, together with other rules governing diplomacy were specified formally as treaty obligations in the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations in 1961 and 1963 respectively. Diplomacy primarily remains the domain of states and international organisations made up of states. States can assign diplomats, or can wage war, or can call UN Security Council but non-state entities or individuals cannot.

Since its emergence in the thirteenth and fourteenth century, modern diplomacy has been a primary means by which states attempt to exert influence over other states. With the development of the modern state system, dating from 16<sup>th</sup> century, it took its contemporary narrow meaning: managing the foreign affairs of states at the government level.<sup>21</sup> It is used to avert war, to resolve a crisis, or to negotiate a peace settlement. These are the main besides the lower-profile activities of diplomats which include the daily work conducted at embassies and consulates: issuing tourist and immigrant visa, providing citizen services for overseas travellers, encouraging commercial activity among nations, and regular meetings with host foreign ministry personnel. Diplomacy, whether applied in varying ranges including mild mutual negotiations or moderately coercive or coercive approaches, is thus used to finding mutual gains as bases for agreement. An approach where by, solely one party, due to its political, geographic, economic and financial, technological, military, social, cultural dominance gains and the other loose is not a solution. Diplomacy and its uses, in the sense of finding mutual gains as basis for agreement, in the present international environment seem sleeping. It is not, however, completely dead.

## CONTEMPORARY DIPLOMACY AND THE USE OF FORCE

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<sup>21</sup> Stempel, Rev. Nov. 1995, <http://www.uky.edu/stempel/diplomacy.html>

Contemporary diplomacy, unfortunately, seems to lean deliberately towards satisfying the interest of only one party, probably, due to dominant capabilities that the party possesses. In today's environment, where the capabilities among the states involved diametrically differ, the dominant party will have leverage to conclude bilateral consents with individual states to coerce the unwilling party. In such cases all governments will not have a common interest in seeing an agreement reached, but would be forced to consent with the interests of the dominant party even though these interests do not match to their expectations. Generally speaking, fake pretexts will appear to be reasons for waging war or taking any serious measure against a weaker state. Even in those situations in which states' preferences or interstates are close enough to be reconciled and the parties involved desire to achieve a mutually beneficial accommodation, non coercive diplomacy will shrink to play a major role in achieving productive outcomes.

Threatening to use force is a prevalent aspect of diplomacy if it is used skilfully within a frame of multilateral diplomacy. Such threats are designed not unilaterally but on the bases of the consent of international community of states, to get other state or states to do what they would not otherwise do – to compel them to take particular actions. This approach, which is often termed as coercive diplomacy, may vary from economic sanction to the use of military force. Threat of force when wisely applied can also be an aspect of deterrence – a way to persuade states from doing what they intend or might like to do. No one is quite competent than the UN to apply this use of force in today's international environment. Any attempt that surpasses this way, more likely, diminishes respect to democratic principles and trustworthiness among members, and would lead, in effect, to more unmanageable chaos and breach of international norms rather than strengthen norms binding relations of actors.

In the process of the development of modern diplomacy, the Congress of Vienna (1814-15) holds great historical importance. It displayed a collective hegemonic state system – the Concert of Europe. As studies confirm diplomats of that time attempted to establish a successful international system that was capable to mitigate the worst aspects of anarchy among states. Necessary adjustments were made to the European order – the balance of interests and power, which contributed to the avoidance of major war and supported stability in Europe until this system and its diplomatic mechanism fell apart in 1914. The Vienna Congress has to be remembered because it was a record of a successful multilateral diplomacy, where a number of countries communicated and negotiated over the most contentious issues to attain co-operative end.

Successful multilateral diplomacy depends, however, on accommodating the interests and specific objectives of not only two states as in bilateral diplomacy but also a number of participants. As mentioned above, any kind of domination or reluctance to stick to the rules of the game will reduce the utility or functionality of international institutions in multilateral diplomacy, leading perhaps to their ultimate collapse.

Compared to the success of the Vienna Congress, the Versailles Peace Treaty followed World War I, as multilateral diplomatic settlement, lasted only two decades. The multilateral diplomacy that followed World War II proved to be much more successful though marked by periods of high tension due to East-West competition during the cold war. Nevertheless multilateral diplomacy in international conferences

and within international organisations has assumed an increasingly important role in world politics since 1945. More recently, multilateral diplomacy has been dealing with demographic, environmental, economic development, humanitarian issues and the like.

Once other sovereign states recognize a population living in a defined territory that is administered by a government, under international law a sovereign state comes into existence. This recognition of a state's sovereignty is basically intertwined with its internal and external claims. The internal claim refers to a right as a sovereign state to exercise complete jurisdiction over its own territory free of interference by other states in its domestic affairs except in exceptional cases when the use of military force or coercive intervention for humanitarian reasons or otherwise becomes inevitable after multilaterally approved and applied under UN auspices.

The highest legal attempt, in human history, about prohibition of the use of force has been grasped in Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, which provides:

“...All member states refrain in their international relations from the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state...” This rule is of Universal validity; even the few states, which are not members of the UN, are bound by it because it is also a rule of customary international law.

A unilateral right to use force to intervene for humanitarian reasons or otherwise in other state is illegal in view of prohibition of the use of force in the UN Charter. The legality of the use of armed force or other compelling coercion by third states as a response to severe human rights violation in other states – right of *humanitarian intervention* has been abused in the past by strong states to pursue other political, economic or military objectives. The question of intervening to adopt peaceful measures or protect and implement fundamental human rights is unclear and has not been yet decided by International Court of Justice nor has the International Law Commission answered it in a definite sense (see Malanczuk, 1997).

This kind of imprecision is the biggest defect in modern rules. Practice has done little to reduce such imprecision. Many states, instead of moving towards precision and correcting defect, rather want to retain the possibility of using force in certain circumstances, but they know that an interpretation which allowed them to do so would also allow other states to use force against them; so they ‘keep their option open’ by failing to adopt a clear attitude towards the problem of interpretation (see Malanczuk, 1997). This in effect generates vicious circle of crises leading towards undermining the crucial importance of international institutions such as UN.

Practically, powerful states do not always respect the sovereign claims of other states. When they choose to unilaterally interfere in the domestic affairs of another state, the response may well be a diplomatic protest note or public declaration to the same effect. For instance, during the bipolar international system, the US privately and on occasion publicly condemned Soviet policies for violating human rights of its citizens, particularly Jews, who were not permitted to leave the country. The Soviet response at the time was to condemn the US for unlawful interference in its domestic affairs: Soviet emigration policy in Moscow's view was a domestic matter and not the business of the US. The official American position was that the Soviet Union had obligation under international law to respect the human rights of all people and should

not try to exempt itself from international scrutiny just because it was a sovereign state. This row was, of course, jeopardized by ideological differences, which was subject to superpowers' competition. These super powers glared at each other in what became known as the Cold War bringing international relations on the brink of the doom's day – where all would have perished and nobody won, if war had broken out. Multilateral diplomacy was not in a position to avoid the threat of war for it was manipulated and abused by one or the other side's veto, causing mutually co-operative end impossible, eventually the decayed system fell apart.

In another example, which is more serious because a state had committed aggression against another state. We can observe the Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, which took place soon after the fall of the bipolar system, in 1990. In this case Iraq's behaviour was considered an act of aggression by most states, which refused to recognize the legitimacy of Iraqi claims to Kuwaiti territory. The government in Baghdad asserted, of course, that Kuwait was not legitimately a state in the first place, since it was created as an artefact of British colonialism. Quite apart from the fact that control of Kuwaiti oil fields was also at stake, Iraq maintained that Kuwait was really Iraqi property that it had rightfully retaken by force. Other states rejected Iraq's efforts to extinguish Kuwait as a sovereign state. They formed a coalition under United Nations auspices to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and restore control to the Kuwaiti government then in exile. In this case, we observe that when diplomatic efforts failed, military forces of a broad coalition of states drove the Iraqi armed forces out of Kuwait in 1991. This witnesses the effectiveness and prevalence of multilateral diplomacy, which is occasionally needed to coerce a wrong doing state, over unilateral, largely unproductive, use of force.

The latest example to be considered is the invasion and occupation of Iraq, in 2003, by the coalition that has been composed of US and Britain unilaterally, to underway a precedence of circumventing multilateral diplomacy. Many sources confirm that this invasion was absolutely illegal referring to the preamble of the UN Charter – the shared law of our planet, still in place – which states: “We the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of method, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims.” The first article of the Charter says that the purpose of the UN is to “maintain international peace and security” and to suppress “acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace”<sup>22</sup> This UN material is directly against the arguments of the US and UK leaders, who showed an extra ordinary appetite of rushing to war. It is illegal to start war of intervention without UN mandate and without the authorisation of any legitimate international body. This easily presents that US is becoming aggressor.

There was no possible juridical basis for this an “outright intervention of Iraq, which amounts to a war of aggression”. It only speaks about recent position of the US towards the UN that wants to weaken the strong position of the UN at the expense of NATO.

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<sup>22</sup>See Carrel, S. & Verkaik, R., “War On Iraq Was Illegal, Say Top Lawyers,” August 2003, p.1  
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/law/lawless.htm>

Lawyers, which are vindicating these groups, find not so close example in near history. According to Lobe, “some international lawyers, such as Yale University’s Ruth Wedgwood, have claimed that the previous resolutions gave Washington adequate legal cover to unilaterally enforce disarmament, and precedent for circumventing the Security Council was established when Washington and NATO allies launched their air campaign against Serbia in 1999 without the Council’s authorisation.”<sup>23</sup> But the situation in former Yugoslavia was more critical, contrary to the case of Iraq; it had endorsed the consent of most states in support of military intervention.

According to the UN Charter, there are only two possible options in which one state can use military force against the other. The first refers to individual or collective self-defence – a right under customary international law, which is expressly preserved by Article 51. The second is where, under Article 42, the Security Council decides that use of force is necessary “to maintain or restore international peace and security” where its decisions have not been complied with.<sup>24</sup> But the US and UK leaders’ inducement to the world about necessity of war because of dangers of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, which have not been found till now was impious, it doesn’t meet any of the conditions to wage war. “The mere fact that Iraq has a capacity to attack at some unspecified time in the future is not enough” (Starmer 2003, p. 3). It is hardly believable that Iraq could directly jeopardize the USA and the UK.

Many international lawyers argued about illegality of the war against Iraq. Carrel writes about this by quoting a prominent international lawyer, Prof. Sands, who publicly warned Tony Blair that the war was illegal, and that it raised two major issues: “ first, did the Security Council authorize the use of force, the answer to that is no. And [second] were we misled about the presence of weapons of mass destruction? Apparently, yes. These things are going to come back to haunt us” (Carrel 2003, p.4).

The US-led invasion of Iraq violates the basic rules of the UN Charter requiring countries to exhaust all peaceful means of maintaining global security before taking military action only in self-defence. Except for little number of states most states are not even keen on contributing towards the reconstruction of Iraq in the aftermath of the war without the key role of UN.

Today, many international and special groups insist that the war is unjust and the continuing conflict is unlawful. “The two groups, the US affiliates of the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANS) together with Canadian international law professors have recently released an open letter that called a US attack against Iraq “a fundamental breach of international law that would seriously threaten the integrity of the international legal order that has been in place since the end of the Second World War.” Such an action “would simply return us to an international order based on imperial ambition and coercive force” (Lobe 2003, p.1) according to them. The fact that a country like US, which calls itself an old democracy presenting itself, as a leading example of liberal democracy is not respecting international law, raises the question will there ever be willingness to

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<sup>23</sup> See Lobe, J., “Law Groups Say US Invasion Illegal”, March 2003, p.6.  
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/law/illegal.htm>

<sup>24</sup> Starmer, K., “Sorry, Mr. Blair, but 1441 Does Not Authorise Force,” March 2003, p.3.  
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/law/sorryblair.htm>

reinforce the rule of law at an international level? Could not such a behaviour evoke other attacks between other nations?

President Bush had tried to connect Iraq and its leaders with terrorism and al-Kaida before he publicly apologized for this wrong connection. Writing about this, Ramonet states, "It seems that since the attacks of 11 September 2001 the US under president Bush, has arrived at a cynical definition of proper behaviour by governments. Bush and his staff have thus decided to take action which is against morality, human rights and international law."<sup>25</sup> Therefore many people think that Bush does not respect elementary human rights. This is against everything that America has been saying it has stood for.

The lives and property of civilian requires tight protection as far as possible. A measure of collateral damage is permissible only in the case of legitimate military actions. According to Delphy a growing chorus of world legal authorities has declared that intervention which defies the UN Charter is totally illegal."<sup>26</sup> In this case, civilian deaths are simply considered a war crime. "Any failure to protect civilians would be a violation of the 4<sup>th</sup> Geneva Convention. Article 55 of this Convention obliges that the occupying power must secure the civilian populations' basic needs, guarantee their fundamental rights to care, education, freedom of movement and settlement. Wherever the occupying power fails to respect or assure respect to these rights, it will be guilty of a serious violation of the Geneva Convention, and such a violation is considered a war crime" (Delphy 2003, p. 2). Therefore today also the soldiers in Iraq are in dubiousness, hated in the eyes of Iraqis. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has the power to bring to trial individual soldiers and their commanders if there is evidence that a war crime has been committed against civilian, for instance if they fire on civilian rioters.<sup>27</sup> Therefore states want to protect soldiers against punishment of ICC by invoking their own law. Washington invokes bilateral agreement to immunize Americans from ICC scrutiny. "So long as Washington resists that oversight, even for crimes committed in countries that have ratified the ICC treaty, European governments should collectively refuse to shield Americans from transfer to The Hague. No European Union government has yet acquiesced, but Britain, Spain and Italy have blocked a common EU rejection."<sup>28</sup> The US attempts to spread new rules, which satisfies solely its own interest along this line.

The alleged weapon of mass destruction, which holds the biggest chance to justify this use of force as legal under International Law has not been still found. Lobe on this point quotes another prominent expert, Anne-Marie Slaughter, who argued that while technically illegal, Washington's decision to take military action without the Council's backing might still be legitimate (see Lobe, 2003). The problem here is to proof the existence of alleged weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. According to Lobe Washington could still gain UN approval if its forces found "irrefutable evidence" that the Iraqi regime possessed weapons of mass destruction" (p. 5). Not many people,

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<sup>25</sup> Ramonet, I., "Lawless War," April 2003, p.6.

<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/law/lawless.htm>

<sup>26</sup> Delphy, Ch., "International Law and the Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq," March 2003, p.3.

<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/law/geneva.htm>

<sup>27</sup> Royle, T. & Mackay N., "Soldiers Fear They Are Acting Illegally," August 2003, p.3.

<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/law/soldiers.htm>

<sup>28</sup> Ruth, K., Allies' Post-war Panic Puts Justice in Jeopardy," August 2003, p.5.

<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/law/justice.htm>

however, now believe that any of those alleged dangerous weapons are in Iraq or will be found there.

### IS THE WORLD SAFER NOW?

Since the end of what was known as the bipolar world, international relations do not seem to be moving in the direction where all actors would benefit from the relations. Diplomacy, international legal norms and multilaterally coordinated use of force, which would have contributed to establishing a better world appears to be enormously undermined.

The world is, some argue, waking from a liberal dream of global harmony to the reality of chaos and conflict. The theory of peace, which promises stability on earth onto future, with Cold War gone, doesn't seem to have neither logical nor historical analysis; it is unwarranted optimism. Mearsheimer in his article "Why We Will Soon Miss Cold War" points to the fact that the end of Cold War may lead to some troubles especially in Europe. Untamed anarchy – Hobbes's war of all against all – in which Europe had behaved before the Cold War – is a prime cause of armed conflict; this may turn Europe, as the violent conflict of 1990s in former Yugoslavia witnesses, back to where it was before 1945.<sup>29</sup> To some, the end of CW means just the beginning of some other war. In his interview for CNN for instance Gorbachev indicated, "Now we've got the expansion of NATO. There are suspicions about who threatens whom, and the average person asks: 'why should NATO be revived'? There are attempts to change the strategy – to veer toward the military path. This is an attempt to take advantage of the situation at a time when Russia is weakened, when Central and Eastern European states are weakened, and all are busy with reforms – because NATO wants to fish in murky waters. So the geopolitical struggle has obviously started again: the struggle for resources, for regions of influence..."<sup>30</sup> Today the potential for growth is in question. Peace is in danger. There is a fundamental concern about the limits to growth, and a feeling that the way we now live is not sustainable.

America still remains predominantly optimistic but in Europe in particular, including Britain, opinion surveys show that almost half the population have lost their faith in progress, leave alone developing countries the so called 3<sup>rd</sup> world or South, where progress and its philosophy are in deep crises. Material living standard may be rising but very large number of people no longer believe that the world of tomorrow will be a better place in which to live.

It seems more and more clear that the source of this pessimism is the cumulative impact of key factors such as: the pressures of population growth, the pressure of urbanisation, water shortage, environmental challenges, the quality of the air we breathe, the pollution of oceans, the loss of species as habitats are transformed, the gathering evidence of a fundamental change to the climate caused by human activity.

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<sup>29</sup> See Mearsheimer, John, J., "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," 1990  
<http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/foreign/mearsh.htm>

<sup>30</sup> See Gorbachev, Michael, CNN Interview, September, 1997  
<http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episods/interviews/gorbachev.htm>

Sustainability is about the environment and biodiversity, but there are other factors as well. Such as problems related to world politics and international relations, problems of peace and security, poverty and the like.

The pressures created by a world in which global markets, without global norms, operate, portray a world without certainty – except for, of course, certainty of change. We've entered into the world where national cultures and the credibility of institutions of democracy are challenged by global competitive pressures.

The imposition of globalised economic model, without showing endeavours of fostering legal norms to improving the anarchic international environment, has evoked the surrender of power to the corporations – serving as means of keeping the poor nations much more poorer solely in a position of raw-material suppliers. Power management at international level remains at stake. An attempt of generating global legal norms that would bind on all international actors, without distinction, lacks. The idea of universal civilisations seems to run without universally accepted rules in place. International relations of this shape would not generate a policy which should be able to change the lives of billions who live in extreme poverty domestically and else where. An environment of anarchy is a condition under which only the powerful actor, apparently, secure his interest, and where the other smaller entities live under enormous fear, insecurity, despair; that has been allowed to spread by the powerful as a means of global control.

Diplomacy, universally accepted existing initial norms and multilateral-based use of force are not allowed, first of all, to work in a coordinated fashion for the satisfaction of mankind's basic needs. Some vital international norms which function as a linchpin upon which peaceful relations between actors work are being eroded. For instance some great powers defy principles of peaceful resolution of conflicts and other several international treaties when it does not match with their singular wish. They rather prefer to insist on the controversial ones, such as universally not approved norm of pre-emptive attack, to be implemented whenever suitable to them. Free market and free trade do not yet truly exist. The idea that, in the absence of this background, people should be left free to trade with each other in peace must be the most wicked and dangerous doctrine ever devised. It promises riches to everyone but delivers to the few. Not only it oppress the consumers of the rich West, undermines the welfare state, emasculate democracy, despoil the environment, and entrench poverty in the third world; that is clear to us already. In addition, we now know, it is a utopian schema for global ideological conquest. In relation with this, Stiglitz in his book *Globalization and Its Discontents* points out in order to make globalisation more human, effective and equitable, the actors, i.e. the international economic and financial institutions, which are not democratic yet should reform themselves first before they tell others to change (Stiglitz, 2002). Otherwise, they could hardly claim they are democracy promoters and protectors. Pointing out its danger to democracy he warns that globalisation, thus, seems to replace the old dictatorships of national elites with new dictatorship of international finance. Countries are told if they don't follow certain imposed conditions, the capital market or the IMF – a public institution will refuse to lend them money. They are basically forced to give up part of their sovereignty, by 'disciplining' them, or telling them what they should do and should not do. They don't have other choice and must accept things against their will.

Contemporary diplomatic practices are undoubtedly under the pressure of global trends of interdependence and crises of authority. Power is the basic tool in international politics. The way how this power at an international level works matters a lot (Shively, 2003). Its distribution between various actors such as states, governmental and nongovernmental international organisations and the level of their participation in making choices and collective decisions in international politics seem inevitable step to see a better world and international relations which is functioning for all actors. The process of reaching international decisions in such a way which is also known as diplomacy needs to focus on effective way that would satisfy not few but most actors. It is in diplomacy, rather than military action, that most activity by international actors take place. The use of power in diplomacy, like the use of power in any other sort of politics, may run the full range from persuasion to coercion.

Diplomacy, however, seems to be senseless, unproductive in the face of achieving effective international relations if other entities are doomed to accept solely interests of a dominant actor or actors, that have been imposed on them. It may appear as a great deception in the face of other actors and the whole world. This would only lead to vicious circle of imperial dominance – hegemony; hence it provides no solutions that would allow us to see a safer new mutual world of international relations.

## CONCLUSIONS

To sum up, the use of diplomacy, international norms and multilaterally orchestrated force has to mark contemporary international relations implicitly. Key questions like the role of force in international relations and the relationship between force, diplomacy and even ethics would demand actors' careful and appropriate re-evaluation. Moreover, cross-cultural studies have come to the fore as religious, ethnic and national issues move up the world political agenda. For instance, the US and Europe have had to face the issue of whether or not all fundamentalist movements are inherently hostile to basic American values and how best to deal with them in each of the alternatives. International actors need to work cooperatively and harder to be able to achieve their common goal. As a vehicle of achieving this goal, they probably need to uphold an effective model of co-operation, where they could be able to see the role of UN reinforced rather than diminish.

One may also think about transforming the UN, on the normative level, into a really functioning serious universal organisation that reflects the collective wishes of international actors. Its structures which have hitherto been largely open to loyal individuals should now assume more professional employees and skilled diplomats. Actors must do more to improve the organisation into a dynamic and creative one, where individuals are devoted to the purposes, than flourish bureaucratic tendencies and aspiration of securing pensions.

A significant endeavour to look at the development of UN and to educate what is it about must heighten public and elite awareness of the changing international environment and the expanding importance of the UN not only for local, state, and national affairs, but mainly for the international system. There is merit in this enterprise, not just the result. Such an attempt will be successful, of course, if it is cast

across the broadest possible spectrum and accompanied by an effective intellectual revitalisation of the subject. More efforts should be given to improving UN, for otherwise the planet will, likely, change into a large havoc.

### **KEY WORDS:**

Diplomacy, International relations, International norms, Multilaterally orchestrated use of force, Realism, Liberalism, Globalism, Domination, The new liberal imperial model, The anarchic model, The cooperative model, The unifying model, Idealism, International regimes, Global society, Pre-modern states, Modern-states, Post-modern states, Gap, Seam, Periphery, Customary International law, Hegemony, Post-balance-of-power, Extra legal factor, Vassal state, Actors, Humanitarian intervention, *Ultra vires*

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