

FORTIFYING AGAINST THE THREAT: CAN WALLS STOP IRREGULAR MIGRATION?

Ondřej Filipec¹, Lucie Macková²

Abstract

After the election of Donald Trump and his ambitious plan to erect a "great wall" between the USA and Mexico, the issue of walls is being increasingly discussed. But can the walls really stop irregular migration? The main aim of this article is to provide five examples of walls and assess their effectiveness in stopping irregular migration. Do walls matter and what are the key variables influencing their effectiveness? The analysis will focus on four factors such as the purpose and aims of the wall, the operative logic of the wall, type of the wall management and nature of the environment divided by the wall. The research was unable to find a single key variable which determines the effectiveness of the wall; however, it discusses various interrelated aspects.

KEY WORDS: walls, irregular migration, securitization, border control

INTRODUCTION

Since the early history of mankind walls have represented an important physical barrier which ensures security and protection. There are countless examples of city fortifications separating inhabitants from the outer environment and in some cases, walls such as Hadrian's Wall or the Great Wall of China were used for creating a real border of emerging empires. For centuries walls were used to protect inhabitants or to prevent migration. With movements of capital and goods, free movement of people remains the last prerogative of the states. However, due to the advances in flight technology and globalization, there is the principal question: Do walls still matter in preventing migration flows? Or did they ever matter in the past?

The main aim of this article is to examine the effectiveness of the walls used a tool to prevent migration and identify factors which make a wall effective. For this reason, the principal research question is: "What factors lead to a wall as an effective measure for limiting irregular migration?" In order to

¹ Mgr. et Mgr. Ondřej Filipec, Ph.D. Department of Politics and Social Sciences, Faculty of Law, Palacký University Olomouc, Czech Republic, E-mail: ondrej.filipec@upol.cz

² Lucie Macková, M.A. Department of Development and Environmental Studies, Palacký University Olomouc, Czech Republic, E-mail: lucie.mackova@upol.cz

determine the factors, an analysis of five case studies will be conducted of which two are historical (the Great Wall of China, the Berlin Wall) and three are contemporary examples (the “Green Line Wall” on Cyprus, the Israeli West-Bank and Gaza Barriers, and the border fence between Spain and Morocco). For the systemic analysis, case studies will focus on four areas: 1. Main reasons for erecting the walls and aims of the wall, identifying key actors and their expectations; 2. The logic of the wall: whether the wall is built against the threat from the outside or erected to prevent outflow from the inside; 3. How the national/international dichotomy plays out in the wall management; and 4. What is the nature of the environment in which the wall has been erected. The assessment of these four areas in the cases will help to determine the factors influencing the effectiveness of the wall. For the purposes of the analysis, the article is composed of three sections. While the first section is providing a theoretical overview, the second section contains five case studies in which all four above mentioned areas are examined. The third section provides results of the comparison.

The article focuses mainly on irregular migration. However, authors are aware that the distinction between “regular” and “irregular” migration is problematic and rarely clear. This is especially due to the fact that the majority of migrants travel in a regular manner but some of them might later become “irregular”. Walls and other physical barriers may have a considerable effect on both types of migration because they signal an openness of the state towards outsiders. Moreover, there is no universally accepted definition of “irregular migration”. For this reason, we understand irregular migration as migration which takes place outside regulatory norms and thus without the approval of transit or target country; and/or without legal reason of the migrant to cross the state border.

The article contains five case studies connected by the application of the Mill’s methods. In 1843, the British philosopher John Stuart Mill introduced five inductive methods in his book *A System of Logic*, which are able to identify variables of causation. Despite more than one and half century since its publication and the same time of criticism the theories were largely used in the various fields of science including social sciences. Despite John Stuart Mill warning against the use in social sciences due to the much complicated and unforeseeable environment than in natural sciences his methods were also used by political scientists. For example, in 1999 Valerie Bunce published a study dedicated to the breakdown of federations in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (as a dependent variable) which has been analyzed in relation to various independent variables with the use of

Mill's methods (Bunce 1999, pp. 102-126). Another good example is brought by Marc Mojré Howard (2003) who used Mill's methods in analyzing the relatively low level of civic participation (dependent variable) in Eastern Germany and Russia in the context of several independent variables (Howard 2003, pp. 6-8). In terms of methodology both articles provided an inspiration for this study.

Unfortunately, there are several methodological shortcomings associated with the use of Mill's methods. First, Mill's methods require certain reduction to nominal value (0.1) or at least some sort of ordinal value which necessarily leads to loss of information value and implies that Mill's methods are very sensitive to small mistakes which may play a difference in classification of the nominal value. Second, Mill's methods are associated with the issue of mono vs. multi-causality. It is thus necessary to identify all key factors which might have an influence on causality. In other words, Mill's methods sometimes have "unrealistic expectations" (Odell 2004, p. 72). Third, due to the small number of cases involved there is an issue of selectivity which prevents or undermines generalization of outcomes as the results are bounded to case studies involved in the analysis. As elaborated by Lieberman (1991, p. 307) the use of Mill's methods in the case of small n's is demanding as there is a general need to use a deterministic rather than probabilistic approach, ensure no errors in measurement, focus on the existence of only one cause and ensure absence of interaction effects.

Authors of the research acknowledge the existence of some inherent disadvantages of the methods; however, they do not consider them as critical. Above mentioned weaknesses may be limited and compensated with other factors influencing the quality of qualitative research including empirical approach, high quality of data and its assessment or cautious approach in drawing conclusions. Lieberman's strict conclusion is questioned also by Jukka Savolainen (1994, p. 1217), who supports the use of Mill's methods and claims that Lieberman failed to appreciate the aims of case-oriented explanations or narrow conception of cause. He also concludes that small n's shall not be an obstacle to application of Mill's methods. Despite some inherent limits, next to the explanatory value studies designed to use Mill's methods provides structured comparative and analytical framework. In some aspects the presented article develops the work presented by Élisabeth Vallet and Charles-Philippe David who assessed the "return" of the wall into international relations in the first decade after 9/11 (see Vallet and David 2012). However, our study focuses more deeply on the selected cases.

1 BEYOND THE PHYSICAL DIMENSION OF WALL

While many thought that the walls and fences are facing their demise (Ohmae 1990), the opposite is true. In 2010, there were 45 border walls³ totalling more than 29,000 km² (Vallet and David 2012; Noack 2014). Many authors asserted that since 9/11, the significance of the border had been increasing (Vallet and David 2012). While geography plays a certain role and physical barriers such as rivers and mountain ranges tend to discourage migration, walls have been erected as a physical barrier to prevent the movement of people. In the past, they might have kept the intruder at bay and even today, they might be seen as a less sophisticated take at border management. They represent a type of infrastructure which means to keep the migrant away, bordering and excluding the other - be it a foreigner, non-citizen. While borders attempting to homogenize societies, the notion of heterogeneity is an operating feature of human societies over time (Giddings 1896). The walls conquer our collective imagination and offer an illusion of ontological security and homogeneity.

The walls are in line with the sedentary bias that is prevalent in our understanding of contemporary society (Malkki 1992). While mobility is perceived as something suspicious, being put in one place is the general norm. Cresswell (2006, p. 55) argues that “the mobility of others is captured, ordered, and emplaced in order to make it legible in a modern society”. Some authors argue for the shift from states as the reference objects in order to focus on the techniques of the government (Malkki 1995), yet others show that they are increasingly happening beyond the realm of the state and are transnational in their scope (Vertovec 2009). The walls only represent one aspect of migration management, while there are others, more subtle means to prevent migration (Geiger and Pécoud 2010). Migration management reinforces the border and its strategies force it outside of the state. What we are witnessing now is the externalization of the border or the process of transferring the border to a third state such as in the case of moving the European border to African states (Collyer 2007; Andersson 2014).

The borders are also present inside the state territories but they are mainly concentrated on the edges, sometimes materializing in the form of a

³ Among the most famous are the wall between Gaza Strip and Israel, Egypt and Gaza Strip, Israel and West Bank, USA and Mexico, India and Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, North and South Korea, Georgia and South Ossetia; a wall is also dividing Cyprus, Morocco and Western Sahara, Spain and Morocco, Ireland and Northern Ireland or the EU and some of its neighbouring countries along its external border.

wall. Topak (2014) calls these spaces border zones, which are “biopolitical spaces in which surveillance is most intense and migrants suffer the direct threat of injury and death” (Topak 2014, p 815). When looking at it broadly, borders and walls are connected to methods of control, complex technologies and the discourse surrounding them. Typically, the walls stand for much more than a physical barrier and according to Vallet and David (2012, p. 112),

They are flanked by boundary roads, topped by barbed wire, laden with sensors, dotted with guard posts, infrared cameras and spotlights, and accompanied by an arsenal of laws and regulations (right of asylum, right of residence, visas).

Walls have direct consequences for the states and international relations as well as for individuals and human security. While arguing the case for open borders, Joseph Carens (1987, p. 251) famously stated that “borders have guards and the guards have guns.” As has been asserted by some, the borders are a matter of life and death (Weber and Pickering 2011).

Borders might be open or closed and the walls are not necessarily hermetically sealed, either. They control and survey but sometimes let people in through the checkpoints and openings penetrating the wall. We can distinguish between a soft, porous border and a hard, impermeable one (DeBardeleben 2017), with the wall being at the harder end. The borders have become increasingly visible as a functional element of the state apparatus and its connected surveillance processes (Ritaine 2009). However, the increased security that comes with attempting to seal off the state territory will inadvertently impact the citizens as well as the foreigners as increased securitization curtails everyone’s rights.

The securitization processes are tied with borders and walls. Critical security scholars go beyond a simple dichotomy of restrictive migration policies and limiting migration, they attempt to capture how discourses connected to migration securitize it (Boswell 2007). However, there is not a clear connection between politics and policy practice. In a similar vein, the critical geographers caution not to essentialize maps, territories, and borders (Sparke 2006). All of this downplays the political dimension of people’s movements and the power structures. It is important to also bear in mind the economic dimension of the wall. Sometimes arguments about the economic importance of migration trump “geopolitical imaginations of homeland fortification” (Sparke 2006). To sum up, the wall is not a simple

physical structure but it is embedded in different discourses and security processes. It raises imaginations that may be important for a domestic audience but it cannot entirely erase the movement of people which is a fact of life.

2 WALLS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON MIGRATION

The following case studies have been selected with the aim of capturing the diversity of the walls or wall-like structures in the world as they include both historical and contemporary examples. They are among the better known walls with the expectation that the necessary information about them and data would be available. This section presents the information about them, while the final section assesses their usefulness in migration management. These case studies do not attempt to show the entire spectrum of the walls that exist in the world but they are illustrative of the broader processes at play.

2.1 The Great Wall of China

The Great Wall of China is probably one of the oldest and greatest attempts in human history to build a defensive structure. The origins are still covered in mystery as there are several theories about its origin, the purpose of the wall and the wall itself. In history, it was a source of various interpretations and propaganda. Moreover, there are hundreds of authors dealing with the history of the Great Wall (an interesting overview might be found in Jing 2015). As pointed out by Julia Lovell, throughout its almost three thousand years⁴ of history the Great Wall of China as a defensive structure was merely a symbol of weakness, political and diplomatic failure and fear, rather than national strength. The wall provided a temporary advantage to generals or provided protection against raiders and pillagers (Lovell 2006, p. 17). However, the strategic significance against the raids of barbarians or the expansion of Mongolian tribes was questionable.

Despite the wall being primarily built for security purposes, the Great Wall did not prevent the Mongolian expansion. By 1215 Genghis Khan conquered large swathes of China and the Great Wall presented only little obstacle due to its state. Moreover, as Genghis Khan claimed, "*The strength*

⁴ While some scholars date the origins back to the Emperor Qin Shi Huangdi who forced thousands of men to build a wall between 221 and 210 BCE, others claim its origins were more than five centuries earlier (Tamura et al. 1997, p. 59).

of walls depends on the courage of those who guard them" (Lovell 2006, p. 17). Simply said, the Great Wall was unable to stop a large scale invasion. It is a question what were the implications of the Great Wall for migration. Due to the lack of statistical data, there are only indirect methods of how to assess the impact of the wall.

It is known that there was a tendency to migrate from the north of the wall to the south. For example, in between the Han Empire and the beginning of Sui Empire nomads passed the wall, settled in southern territories and adopted Chinese culture which was in return partially influenced by them (see Knapp 2000, p. 221). It is very likely that nomadic migration was the result of various factors involving both push and pull factors such as climatic cycles, changes in socio-political environment or attractiveness of agricultural life behind the wall different to that in steppe (Lattimore 1937, p. 547). Due to the immigration of nomads, Chinese population migrated to marshlands of the south where they brought Chinese culture. As pointed out by Liu (2010) both migration flows expanded Chinese culture to new territories (Liu 2010, p. 76). The extent of migration in this and similar cases is hard to estimate. While built on an ethnocentrist premise, history has proven that different contacts across the Great Wall of China led to bringing in new ideas or technologies and hence, it has not been ironclad (Yang 2017). However, it has resulted in creating a divide in the diversity of plant populations along the wall. For example, the authors from the Beijing University demonstrated that the Great Wall served as a physical barrier to gene flow of separated plant populations (Su et al. 2003, p. 219). Nonetheless, migration of people is much complicated than that of plants and due to the long time and distance it is difficult to assess. On the other side, it may serve as an interesting historical example of one of the earliest human attempts to limit migration.


2.2 The Berlin Wall

One of the best-documented walls was that dividing the Western democratic World and Eastern communist Bloc. The Berlin Wall was created solely for the purpose of stopping migration. Despite Berlin Wall being a political symbol of the division between two parts of the world and official propaganda of the German Democratic Republic presented the wall as the "Anti-Fascist Protection Rampart" (in German *Antifaschistischer Schutzwall*), we may argue that the primary motivation to build up the wall was economic. According to data from West Germany provided by Matthias Judt (1997),

between 1949 and 1961 in total 2,738,665 people emigrated from the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany (Judt 1997, pp. 545-546). However, some authors estimate numbers close to 3 million people (see Mueller, Nauck and Diekmann 2000, p. 1221). It is important to note that migration represented a critical and unhealthy development for East Germany. While in other European countries populations were growing after the Second World War, Eastern Germany experienced the opposite demographic development. If we consider the relatively small size of Eastern German population roughly around 17 million then we can conclude that emigration was not only endangering the reputation of the communist project but also the survival of the state as such. On average, between 1949 and 1961 more than 200 thousand people left the country every year which implied an economic disaster and was unsustainable for the centrally planned state economy.

Construction of the wall started on 13th August 1961 and soon encircled the city. It is important to note that the impact of the wall was immediately visible on the data. While in 1961 in total 207,026 people escaped, in 1962 it was “only” 21,365 people (Judt 1997, pp. 545-546). Despite a slight increase in the following years to 42,633 people in 1963 and 41,866 in 1964 the numbers were far from those of 1961 and before. As shown in the Figure 1, the flow between 1962 and 1988 was 20 thousand people per year on average.

Figure 1: *Emigration from Eastern to Western Germany (1949-1989)*



Source: Judt (1997, pp. 545-546), adapted by authors

If we consider that the number of emigrants was 210 thousand per year between 1949 and 1961 and the average was 20 thousand of emigrants in the period between 1962 and 1988, then the effectiveness of the wall to stop migration is about 90 %. However, the issue of measuring effectiveness is much more problematic as many other factors might be involved including the opportunities to emigrate, changing liberalization of the border and permit regime, etc. Nevertheless, the physical existence of the wall was a key factor which defined one era for Germany and the world. The significance of the wall might be also demonstrated by its fall and the migration wave that followed in 1989 when the number of emigrants to Western Germany reached the numbers of the pre-wall period.

It has to be noted that the Berlin Wall was a source of many tragic events with both personal and political dimension. Next to the divided city and divided families, there was a considerable number of fatalities in relation to the wall. Depending on the method it can be concluded that there were around 251 documented wall-related deaths (involving suicides and accidents, killings by soldiers or deaths in the border zone), involving 136 proven and well-documented victims (Baron 2011, p. 486; Sheffer 2011, p. 196). These are, however, conservative estimations.

The wall itself was managed by the German Democratic Republic and was protected by the Border Troops of the German Democratic Republic (*Grenztruppen*), subordinated to the Ministry of National Defence, whose primary aim was to fight irregular migration. Hence, the management of the wall was purely national (with the influence of Soviet advisors). The wall itself may be considered as unique because it divided ethnically homogenous German society. The division is the consequence of specific historical factors. It is thus questionable how important is the variable of the heterogeneity of the divided territory. Division of homogenous territory may provide incentives for reunification (on the level of families and society as the whole) and as such may contribute as the factor limiting the effectiveness of the wall in contrast to a division of heterogeneous territories. In this case the incentive might be much stronger due to the already existing experience of the unified country. These factors may be absent and thus irrelevant in the case of walls built in between two separated countries.

2.3 The Israeli Barriers

Israel is a land of fences. Next to the “Underground Wall with Egypt”, the planned Sinai fence which resembles the famous Bar-Lev line, Golan

Heights Fence, and a fence on the Jordan-Israel borders there are two other noticeable barriers on the Israeli borders - the Israel-Gaza barrier built in 1994 and the Israeli West-Bank barrier being built since the Second Intifada (the first continuous segment was finished in late 2003). Since then this “temporary and reversible line of defense” exists (MFA 2004). Nonetheless, the number of deaths on the Israeli side due to suicide bombings dropped from 220 in 2002 to 142 in 2003, 55 in 2004, 22 in 2005, 15 in 2006 3 in 2007, 1 in 2008 and zero in 2009 and 2010 (Dzikansky, Kleiman and Slater 2012, p. 223). This drop, however, may be caused by other factors including the Hamas abandoning suicide bombing operations or Israeli operations within Palestinian territories with the aim to prevent terrorism. However, the statistics of terror incidents according to Global Terrorism Database questions the effectiveness of the barriers as the total number oscillated from approx. 20 in 2010 to almost 300 in 2014 and then back to approx. 30 in 2016 (GTD 2019). The question is how high the number would be without the existence of the wall. Despite both barriers having a clearly defensive structure they are also associated with a physical border between Israel and Palestine and thus criticised for segregation. On the other side, construction of barriers had a significant impact on the decrease of suicide bombers and possibly also terrorists penetrating Israeli territories.

The security aspect of the barriers has been repeatedly emphasized by key Israeli politicians and barriers has been presented as an important obstacle for terrorist infiltration. For example, Benjamin Netanyahu refused to remove the barrier, *“The separation fence will remain in place and will not be dismantled... I hear they are saying today because it’s quiet, it’s possible to take down the fence. My friends, the opposite is true. It’s quiet because a fence exists”* (Reuters 2009). In other words, the barrier is presented from a security perspective as effective and that is why Israel started constructions and improvements of other walls (e. g. Gaza “Sea Barrier”, Sinai Barrier, etc.). Moreover, emphasizing security aspects contributes to the legitimacy of the wall, at least on its one side.


It is important to note that historically the regime on the borders between Israel and Palestine territories was subject to various border regimes. For example, between 1967 and 1993 the borders were relatively free and Palestinians could work on the Israeli territories. As pointed out by Leila Farsakh (2005), between 1974 and 1992 one third of Palestine workforce worked on Israeli territories and generated more than one quarter of West Bank and Gaza Strip GNP (Farsakh 2005, p. 1). Just in the period between 1969-1981, in total 150 thousand Palestinians emigrated from the

territories of which more than 110 thousand were originally from the West Bank. As pointed out by Gabriel and Sabatello (1986, p. 253), migration was equivalent to 40% of the natural population increase in the West Bank and 29% in Gaza during this period.

However, due to the Israeli policy seeking to maintain the Jewish majority, Palestinian workers were not allowed to settle within Israel unless they had Israeli citizenship. For this reason in the decade between 1993 and 2003 up to 140 thousand Palestinians obtained the right to settle in Israel in an alternative way thanks to the family reunion law. However, this “loophole” was filled by the adoption of Temporary order 5763 “Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law” which prevents Palestinians in Gaza Strip and West Bank to obtain Israeli citizenship by marriage with Israeli citizens. To determine the scope of the migration between West Bank and Gaza Strip on one side and Israel on the other is difficult, as Israel does not recognize Palestine and Palestinians are considered merely as “Indigenous people of Israel”.

The migration between Israel and Palestine territories has two directions. First, there is a build-up of Israeli settlements which is of close attention to Palestinians and the international community. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2017), the number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank grew from 190,953 in 1988 to 636,452 in 2016 as is visible in Figure 2.

Figure 2: *Number of Israeli Settlers in the West Bank*



Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS 2016)

The opposite migration from the Palestinian territories is hidden as there is a lack of official data. However, there are data provided by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics about the number of Palestinians in Israel. Similarly to Israeli settlements in the West Bank, the number of Palestinians in Israel rose from 154,900 in 1948 to 1.38 million in 2016 (PCBS 2016). However, it is questionable whether the number of Palestinians in Israel increases due to migration or due to natural growth associated with fertility rate. Nevertheless, the Muslim fertility rate dropped significantly from 9.2 in between 1960-1964 to 8.5 in 1970-1974, 5.5 in 1980-1984, 4.7 in 1990-1994, 4.6 in 2000-2004, 3.9 in 2005-2009 and 3.3 in 2016 (CBS 2016). If we adjust the data, then we can conclude that the growth of the Israeli Arab population slowed down. While it was 2.53 % per year on average between 2003-2015, it was 4.1 % between 1995-2002. In reality, the data may slightly vary as Israeli Arab population does not equal to the Muslim population. Around 80% (approx. 130,000) are Arab Christians, mainly of the Melkite Greek Catholic Church.


The Israeli Arabs, however, have a different status than Palestinians who enter Israel on a daily basis. Again, there is a lack of data. However, some picture has been created by Anne Paq (2018) who claims that there are approx. 121 thousand Palestinians working on Israeli territories who pass through the border on a daily basis. While 64 thousand of them have a working permit, tens of thousands are passing through the border without permit through “clandestine channels” (Paq 2018). As a result, some of the 98 checkpoints in the West Bank are overcrowded and security checks may last for hours.

Although this contribution focuses on irregular migration in the relationship between Israel and Palestinian territories, regular (economic) migration plays an important role as people from these territories represent a significant working force. The minimum monthly wage in Israel was 5,300 NIS and the average wage around 10,584 NIS (around 2,930 USD) in January 2019. However, average wages among foreign workers are just around 6,181 NIS, which is around 1,720 USD (see Trading Economics 2019). Until 2012 there was no minimum wage approved by the Palestinian Authority which later set minimum wage to 1,450 NIS. However, it is estimated that approx. 30 % of wage employees in the private sector received less than the minimum. The average, which is unreachable for the majority in Palestine, is around one third of that within Israel. Approx. half of the employees in the private sector are hired without any contract, 25 % save some money to a pension fund and approx. 43 % of female employees have a paid maternity

leave. Generally, the labor situation in Gaza is worse than that in the West Bank (Government of the State of Palestine 2019). In this sense, both barriers are dividing two economically different worlds. This economic gap serves as an important factor and stimulates economic migration.

Similarly to the Berlin Wall, there were many cases when tunnels were dug under the walls. Nonetheless, while in the cases of the Berlin Wall secret underpasses were used for irregular migration, smuggling, and trafficking, the tunnels under the Green Line are posing a serious threat for Israel due to the increased threat of terrorism, especially in relation to the Gaza Strip. To sum up, both Israeli barriers are important tools of defensive nature which are used to manage migration. However, they only exist in addition to other measures of control.

Figure 3: *Number of Palestinians in the Palestinian Territories Occupied in 1948*



Source: *Nishikida and Hamanaka (2013)*

The border walls separating the land ruled by the Israeli government and Palestinian territories are ruled from Israel and the management may be considered as national, created especially for security purposes (Dzikansky, Kleiman and Slater 2012, p. 223). Crossing points are managed by various national authorities. For example, the Karni Crossing in Gaza Strip is managed by the Israel Airport Authority while Erez Crossing is managed by Israel Defense Forces. However, the crossing points and checkpoints are usually staffed by the military, police or even private security companies.

The obstacle occurs when assessing the heterogeneity/homogeneity of the territory divided as the areas experienced one of the most dynamic developments in the World and the borders are still disputed. If we set aside *de iure* status then both barriers are separating two different worlds and *de facto* dividing two territories of different effective control. However, due to the generally different structure of populations living behind the wall and different structure and nature of subjects (entities) separated by both barriers, it may be considered as a separation of ethnically heterogeneous territories. In the case of Israel, the separation was artificial, resulting in thousand inhabitants living in various enclaves and exclaves. For example, Said Saddiki points out that fences in Israel had a huge negative social impact on thousands of people when some were even prevented from sustaining on agriculture, which may have contributed to further radicalization of Palestinians (see Saddiki 2017).


The wall between Israel and the Palestinian territories will continue to be part of political controversy. However, due to its presented effectiveness, it seems that the wall is a source of inspiration for other leaders. For example, Donald Trump on several occasions referred to Israel in search for arguments to support his own projected wall between the USA and Mexico. However, as pointed out by Isabel Kershner (2017) there are many differences between Israeli and US situation. Most importantly she points out that Israeli barriers were built at the times of second Palestinian uprising when Israel was hit by suicide terrorism. The number of suicide terrorist attacks significantly dropped but this might be caused by Hamas moratorium or Israeli operations behind the wall aimed at terrorism prevention. Moreover, Kershner points out that the system of walls is far from being hermetic and there are up to 60,000 Palestinians without work permits who sneak across the barrier (Kershner 2017). In other words, the context of the US wall is different and there are doubts if a wall like the Israeli one will work on more than 3,000 kilometers long border with Mexico.

2.4 Ceuta and Melilla Fences

There are two fences built between Spain and Morocco in order to stop irregular migration and smuggling: an 11 km long fence around the city of Melilla and an 8.4 km long fence around the city of Ceuta. The beginning of the current fence systems has its origins in the period between 1993 and 1995 when the Spanish government decided to build 3 meters high fence in order to limit irregular migration. Later the fences were equipped with

modern technologies including infrared cameras (Saddiki 2017, p. 56). However, since both fences are relatively small (since 2005 the height was doubled from 3 to 6 meters) the migrants often use equipment including home-made stairs and ladders to overcome razor wires. The installation of razor wires temporarily reduced the number of crossings. As pointed out by the Overseas Development Institute the improved fence reduced the number of migrants from approx. 5.5 thousand in 2005 to less than 2 thousand between 2006 and 2010. However, thereafter the numbers had been increasing from approx. 3 thousand in 2011 to more than 7 thousand in 2014 and 2015 (Overseas Development Institute 2016, p. 21). This was partially due to general changes in the migration flows but also because migrants were creative in ways how to overcome or bypass the fence. In some cases, unsuccessful attempts ended up with death or serious injuries (see Overseas Development Institute 2016, p. 21). Making fortification higher had some effect, albeit temporary. See Fig. 4. for further details.

Figure 4: *Irregular Migration via Melilla*




Source: *Gobirno via El Mundo (2013)*

These enclaves have been dubbed “The Fortress of Europe” because of their fortified nature. Even if some people manage to cross these fences⁵,

⁵ The vast majority of immigrants enter Ceuta and Melilla on the ground while just a few by the sea. Spanish authorities document the intentional entries (*intentos*) and real entries (*entrados*). The ratio between the intentional entries and real entries varies from approx. 1:13 in 2015 to 1:7 in 2016. Only a minority of migrants succeed (see Ministerio del Interior 2017).

they are often deported back to Morocco. What the fences obfuscate is the legality of such deportation which is not in line with the international law. Those who are having their asylum claims assessed stay within the enclaves without the possibility of transfer to Spain (Andersson 2014). Meanwhile, others wait for the opportunity to cross the wall which leads to the creation of informal settlements such as Gourougou in Melilla and Belyounech on the border of Ceuta (Cimadomo and Martínez Ponce 2006). Overall, the irregular migration to Ceuta and Melilla seems to be increasing in spite of the fences which prevent entry to these areas. Fig. 5 provides more a complex overview.

Figure 4: *Irregular Migration via Ceuta and Melilla*



Source: *Ministerio del Interior (2017)*

2.5 The Green Line in Cyprus

Rather specific examples of walls are those built as a part of UN Buffer Zone in Cyprus which was established in 1964 and further extended ten years later after the Turkish invasion. The “Green Line”, sometimes also referred as the “Attila Line”, represents 180 km long and from 20 meters to 7 kilometers wide corridor from the Paralimni in the east of the island to the Cato Pyrgo on the west side. The barrier built up by Turkish military is located at the north of the line and represents the real border between the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which is recognized only by Turkey, and the Republic of Cyprus, which is also a member of the EU.


In the 1970s Cyprus experienced great demographic changes⁶ and migration flows in both directions. In between 1974 and 1980 approx. 30 thousand immigrants came from Turkey to TRNC and UNHCR estimated to have in total 240 thousand migrants on the island: approx. 180 thousand Greek Cypriots who moved south and approx. 60 thousand Turkish Cypriots who moved north (Jensenhaugen 2014, p. 57). Demographic changes had important economic implications on both parts of Cyprus. However, as the consequence of war and international agreements (especially the 1975 Vienna Population Exchange Agreement on the “Voluntary Regrouping of Population Agreement”), both territories were almost ethnically clean: two months after the conclusion there were only about 130 Turkish Cypriots in the south and in 1978 approx. 1,600 Greek Cypriots living in the north (Jensenhaugen 2014, p. 48). Due to separation and ethnic division, the potential for irregular migration was low.

In the last two decades, TRNC has been used mainly as a destination for labour migration from Turkey (often irregular) and as a transit territory especially for migrants from Syria who aim to cross the EU borders with the Republic of Cyprus. The number of irregular migrants arrested in TRNC has been rising since 2000. While in between 2000 and 2002 it was 166 people, in 2003 another 99, in 2004 in total 163 people, 111 people in 2005, 289 people in 2006, 362 in 2007 and 83 in 2008 (Çolak, Aidin and Tekin 2014, p. 120). It is important to note that the increasing number was mainly caused by the liberalization of the border regime since 23rd April 2003 when TRNC unexpectedly opened the Green Line for crossing (Çolak, Aidin and Tekin 2014, p. 120). It was the result of the case *Djavit An vs Turkey* in which a leading member of the Movement for an Independent and Federal Cyprus sued Turkey for restricting movement and discriminatory practice as there was only a small number of permits approved (6 out of 46 between 1992 and 1998) by Turkey to cross the Green Line and there was no law about the eligibility to cross (Anastasiou 2006, pp. 299-300).

A specific regime based on Council Regulation (EC) 866/2004 (Green Line Regulation) established the free movement of Cypriots which is widely used. As for 2007 in total 788,823 Greek Cypriots crossed the border to the north and 1,348,215 Cypriot Turks crossed to the south (Gregoriou 2008, p. 12)

⁶ In the case of Cyprus the available data are very sensitive and may significantly vary which is confusing for the researchers. Hansjörg Brey and Günter Heinritz (2002) call it “statistical fog”.

Figure 6: *Asylum Applications in Cyprus*



Source: authors, based on the Cyprus Police Statistics (2019) and Eurostat (2007), combined data

As visible from Fig. 6 the number of asylum seekers rose dramatically when the Green Line was opened. However, as for 2003, most asylum seekers were from Bangladesh (2,075), followed by Pakistan (480), Iran (465), Turkey (295), Russia (250), and other countries (840) (Juchno 2007, p. 6). The rapid increase due to regime change at the borders proves that the border had some impact on migration. Nevertheless, migration from the northern parts of the island in search for asylum in the south has an increasing significance.

While there are patrols on both sides, the Green Line may be considered as managed internationally under the surveillance of the UN. However, due to the direction of migration from the North to the South, an important role is played by the Republic of Cyprus. The zone as such is patrolled by the UN Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus (UNFICIP), originally established and operating under the mandate of UNSCR 186 from 1964, whose mandate has been repeatedly renewed until recent days. The main aim of the UNFICIP is to prevent the renewal of violence and it demonstrates the key aim of the buffer zone: to maintain security. For this reason, the wall has mainly the security purpose.

3 THE WALLS ASSESSMENT

Walls and fences are complex structures that attempt to block the movement of people. Yet the tensions between security and humanitarianism are clearly visible along them (Pallister-Wilkins 2017). While the main idea is to hamper the movement, there are other objectives and consequences which are inherent to the wall. In other words, migration is a complex and multi-causal phenomenon and walls as the physical barriers may address various types of migrations and might be built for various reasons (e.g. security, economic, political). This chapter is attempting to assess the above examples in the light of Mill's methods. However, as mentioned above, the Mill's methods serve here as an advanced comparative approach rather than as a fully operational causal-based method of analysis. This is mainly due to the scope of variables involved and their nature, which are merely polytomic and connected rather than dichotomic and disconnected.

Table 1: *Effects of the key variables on the wall effectiveness*

	Great Wall of China	Berlin Wall	Israel-Palestine	Ceuta and Melilla	Cyprus
V1: Primary purpose of the wall	Security	Economic	Security	Economic	Security
V2: The Wall Logic	Externally oriented	Internally oriented	Externally oriented	Externally oriented	Neutral
V3: Regime	National	National	National	National	International
V4: Original heterogeneity of the environment	Heterogenous	Homogenous	Contested	Heterogenous	Contested
Effectiveness	High	High (approx. 90 %)	Considerable	Considerable	High

Source: authors

The first variable considered was the primary purpose of the wall divided. In most of the cases political, economic or security reasons are present simultaneously; however, one of them might be labelled as dominant. All divisions have a significant political dimension and the examples above failed to show relevant differences between the purposes and their influence on

the wall effectiveness. The walls in all assessed cases are or were watched mainly by the military or other security forces. It is thus questionable whether increasing security significance of the wall is positively correlated with greater involvement of the military in the wall management. This is observable especially in the case of Israel or in the case of Cyprus where the security motives are dominant. However, in the case of Berlin Wall the presence of military and its influence was also significant in spite of the primary reason which was evaluated as economic. On the other side, security factors in the case of the Berlin Wall are also significant due to the specific geopolitical situation of the German Democratic Republic and the "Cold War" atmosphere including spying, threat of infiltration, trafficking, smuggling and other border related crimes.

Another variable "the logic of the wall" had three possible modifications: (1) walls predominantly protecting from external threat; (2) wall predominantly aimed at preventing the escape of own citizens - internally oriented; or (3) neutral, with the aim to separate two hostile populations and prevent further conflict. Especially the second type seems to be very relevant for lowering the effectiveness of the wall which might be demonstrated in the case of Berlin Wall. However, one example does not allow to derive generalized conclusions. Nevertheless, in this and similar cases we may accept that two forces (from within and outside) are having an influence on the wall and as a result, may reinforce each other. In the case of the Berlin Wall, from the early beginning there was the desire of Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and Western leaders to remove the wall as best demonstrated by the US President Ronald Regan's speech "Tear down this wall!". In this sense, FRG presented anti-wall power and positive change appeared when citizens from the second side of the barrier transformed into the anti-wall power. The joint influence of the forces contributed to a breakdown of the wall. In other words, the wall remains an effective instrument until used and maintained by both or at least one of the actors.

Most of the analyzed examples (except for Cyprus) had a predominantly national border management. This is rational as borders are the symbol of national sovereignty. Nonetheless, there might be some exceptions when borders are composed of demilitarized areas run by international organizations (UN), or are of specific international regimes or international arrangements with some supranational features (e.g. Schengen external border). The five examples above show too little evidence to derive implications of the border regime on border effectiveness, which requires much deeper analysis. This analysis, however, would be hard to execute as

each border has its specific characteristic and even the Schengen external borders show different effectiveness, despite the multidimensional approach and valuable recommendations from Frontex. Management of the wall (or borders in general) may be important from the perspective of legitimacy. The case of Israel showed that barriers may be highly controversial and politically sensitive topic. While the majority of Israelis sees the wall as a legitimate tool of protection aimed at enhancing security, Palestinians strongly criticise the wall as a tool of segregation. Much less controversial is the barrier on Cyprus, which is part of the internationally managed Green Line. As such it has much greater legitimacy, compared to the situation when the border would be controlled by authorities from Northern Cyprus. Thus, legitimacy is also an important factor which in the end helps to keep the wall standing.

Heterogeneity of the environment divided by the wall may also play an important role. This variable is closely connected with the second variable presented above and has three varieties. The environment might be (1) heterogeneous, (2) homogenous, or (3) contested. When the wall is separating two different environments then it may be perceived more positively, than in the case of separating (and thus cutting through) homogeneous environment. In the five examples above, only the Berlin Wall divided an ethnically homogeneous environment, which might have contributed to increasing forces driven against the wall (e.g. the will for unification). In this case, the wall was a result of the ideological division directed at enforcing economic security. In other words when cross-cutting homogeneous environment the wall has a limited legitimacy and its effectiveness strongly depends on its perceived value communicated by political elites. On the contrary, a wall separating two heterogeneous environments may have a more variable support, depending on the previous interaction between separated territories, ideological orientation of entities, the difference in economic development, etc. The premise suggests that the higher push and pull factors, the higher incentive to migrate behind the wall. On the other side, ethnic differences in both areas may be a limiting factor as the migration behind the wall may imply violence.

In the case of a contested environment (e.g. Israeli-Arab division) the wall can be seen as illegitimate by another group and under constant pressure, while the second group sees it as necessary and welcome. This example is similar to the case when the wall is separating two different environments. However, in the first example, one may accept some stalemate and legal status of the wall. Moreover, the legitimacy of the walls changes over time

and so does also symbolism and perception of their significance. Therefore, it is the political interest of Israeli leaders to present walls as effective because their perceived effectiveness makes them more legitimate. However, their effectiveness may be questioned. Similarly to the Berlin Wall, the Israeli Walls did not prevent migration and in reality are not hermetic.

To measure wall effectiveness is problematic as migration may occur in a regular and irregular way. Assessing the “wall effect” in an empirical way is necessarily connected with data inconsistency. Measuring trends of migration and calculating the numbers of migrants before the wall is built and comparing it with the situation after may be misleading as the wall itself is just one of the intervening variables within migration process and it may be expected that at some lower levels the effect may be rarely distinguished. However, as demonstrated in the case of the Berlin Wall, large data can show a relatively high effect. Nonetheless, even in this case the wall did not fully stop migration. It is also important to mention that walls work also as a mental barrier: they may contribute to a feeling of security and discourage migrants from moving behind the wall (in this sense walls serve as “anti-push” factors). However, measuring potential indirect impacts of walls on behavior and decision-making process is similarly problematic as measuring a direct impact.

CONCLUSION

All of the above-presented examples show an important impact on human migration. Throughout centuries walls were used for regulating migration and limiting security threat. These assumptions are valid even nowadays in spite of the progress in technology. Walls and fences may significantly reduce migration flows. However, they are unable to stop migration at all or provide a state of absolute security. Providing the illusion of security is an important allure of the border that materializes in the form of a wall or a fence. Despite the impacts on migration shown above, walls and fences are also associated with negatives ranging from the marginal one including a negative impact on plant genetic variability to the significant ones including humanitarian or ethical reasons. Already physical emergence or existence of the fence is a politically sensitive issue which might produce tensions in the international relations and be a source of criticism. So, do walls still matter in preventing migration flows? The answer is yes, but it depends on various intervening variables which might have a greater variability. In other words, each wall is erected in

a different environment and for a slightly different purpose which may change over time.

It is hard to determine the most important factor which will have the most significant influence over the effectiveness of the walls in just five cases. A certain level of physical arrangements as well as its management might turn the wall into an effective migration management tool. However, when impenetrable, the Genghis Khan logic is valid: "*The strength of walls depends on the courage of those who guard them*". On the other side, we can add that the strength of the walls depends also on the determination, creativity and resilience of those who want to overcome them. As a result, no walls provide a genuine protection. Moreover, due to technology development, globalization (e.g. air transportation, mining methods...) or social media development walls do not stop the transfer of ideas which empowers migration push and pull factors.

Next to the effectiveness of the walls, there are other issues which might be considered during research. Complex defensive barriers may often lead to an adjustment of migration routes and result in more casualties. In other words, instead of preventing migration the walls may make migration more dangerous and lethal. Moreover, walls rarely help to address structural injustice and inequalities, rather they maintain the status quo and thus contribute to polarization of the societies. These topics might be subjects of further research which is now having more attention due to Trump's pledges to erect the wall on US-Mexican border. Trump often cited the Israeli walls as an example. However, this is a misleading comparison as the Israeli walls have been built under different circumstances and with a different purpose.

REFERENCES

- ANASTASIOU, H. (2006). *The Broken Olive Branch: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and the Quest for Peace in Cyprus*. Milton Keynes: Author House.
- ANDERSSON, R. (2014). *Illegality, Inc.: Clandestine migration and the business of bordering Europe*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- BARON, U. (2011). *The Victims at the Berlin Wall 1961-1989: A Biographical Handbook*. Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag.
- BOSWELL, C. (2007). Migration control in Europe after 9/11: Explaining the absence of securitization. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45(3), pp. 589-610.
- BREY, H. and HEINRITZ, G. (1991). Ethnicity and demographic changes in Cyprus: in the "statistical fog". *Geographica Slovenica*, 24, pp. 201-222.

- BUNCE, V. (1999). *Subversive Institutions. The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- CARENS, J. H. (1987). Aliens and citizens: the case for open borders. *The review of politics*, 49(2), pp. 251-273.
- CBS (2016) *Statistical Abstracts of Israel*. Central Bureau of Statistics. Data derived from Table 3.13.
- CIMADOMO, G. and MARTÍNEZ PONCE, P. (2006). Ceuta and Melilla Fences: A defensive System? *Saria Reader 2006 Turbulence*, pp. 336-341. http://www.sarai.net/publications/readers/06-turbulence/10_guido.pdf
- ÇOLAK, Y., AIDIN, R. and TEKIN, H. A. (2014). Transit Migration in North Cyprus (TRNC). *Epiphany - Journal of Transdisciplinary Studies*, 7(1), pp. 109-139.
- COLLYER, M. (2007). In-between places: trans-Saharan transit migrants in Morocco and the fragmented journey to Europe. *Antipode* 39(4), pp. 668-690.
- CRESSWELL, T. (2006). *On the Move: Mobility in the Modern Western World*. London: Routledge.
- CYPRUS POLICE. *Statistics 2011-2016*. [online]. Available at: http://www.police.gov.cy/police/police.nsf/dmlstatistical_en/dmlstatistical_en?OpenDocument [Accessed 17th January 2019].
- DEBARDELEBEN, J. (2017). *Soft Or Hard Borders?: Managing the divide in an enlarged Europe*. London: Routledge.
- DZIKANSKY, M., KLEIMAN, G. and SLATER, R. (2012). *Terrorist Suicide Bombings: Attacks Interdiction, Mitigations, and Response*. Boca Raton: CRC PRESS.
- EL MUNDO (2013). Melilla, Puerta de la inmigración ilegal más allá de la valla. [online]. Available at: <https://www.elmundo.es/espana/2013/12/08/52a453320ab740b7768b4580.html> [Accessed 14th April 2019].
- EUROSTAT (2007). *Statistics in Focus. Population and Social Conditions*. Eurostat 100/2007.
- FARSAKH, L. (2005). *Palestinian Labour Migration to Israel. Labour, Land and the Occupation*. London: Routledge.
- GABRIEL, S. A. and SABATELLO, E. F. (1986). Palestinian Migration from the West Bank and Gaza: Economic and Demographic Analyses. *Development & Cultural Change*, 34(2), pp. 245-262.
- GDT (2019) *Global Database of Terrorism* [online]. Available at: <https://www.start.umd.edu> [Accessed 14th April 2019].
- GEIGER, M. and PÉCOUD, A. (2010). *The politics of international migration management*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

- GIDDINGS, F. H. (1896). *The Principles of Sociology: An analysis of the phenomena of association and of social organization*. New York: Macmillan.
- Government of the State Palestine (2019) Labour Force Survey (October-December, 2018) Round (Q4/2018): Press Report on the Labour Force Survey Results [online]. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/labour-force-survey-october-december-2018-round-q42018-press> [Accessed 14th April 2019].
- GREGORIOU, Z. (2008). *Cyprus. Policy Analysis Report (WP3). Gender, Migration and Intercultural Interaction in South-East Europe*. Larnaca: University of Cyprus.
- HOWARD, M. M. (2003). *The Weakness of Civil Society in Post Communist Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- JENSENHAUGEN, H. (2014). The Northern Cypriot Dream - Turkish Immigration 1974-1980. *The Cyprus Review*, 26(2), pp. 57-83.
- JING, A. (2015). *A History of the Great Wall of China*. New York: SCPC Publishing Corporation.
- JUDT, M. (1997). *DDR-Geschichte in Dokumenten*. Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag.
- KERSHNER, I. (2017) Trump Cites Israel's 'Wall' as Model. The Analogy Is Iffy. *The New York Times*, 27. 1. 2017 [online]. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/world/middleeast/trump-mexico-wall-israel-west-bank.html> [Accessed 14th April 2019].
- KNAPP, R. G. (2000). *China's Old Dwellings*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- LATTIMORE, O. (1937). Origins of the Great Wall of China: A Frontier Concept in Theory and Practice. *Geographical Review*, 27(4), pp. 529-549.
- LIEBERSON, S. (1991). Small n's and big conclusions: An examination of the reasoning in comparative studies based on small number of cases. *Social Forces*, 70(2), pp. 307-320.
- LIU, X. (2010). *The Silk Road in World History*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- LOVELL, J. (2006). *The Great Wall: China Against the World, 1000 BC-AD 2000*. New York: Grove Press.
- MALKKI, L. (1992). National geographic: The rooting of peoples and the territorialization of national identity among scholars and refugees. *Cultural anthropology*, 7(1), pp. 24-44.
- MALKKI, L. (1995). Refugees and exile: From "refugee studies" to the national order of things. *Annual review of anthropology*, 24(1), pp. 495-523.
- MFA (2004). *The Anti-Terrorist Fence vs. Terrorism*. Ministry of Foreign

- Affairs, 10. 1. 2004 [online]. Available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20040110054951/http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il/mfm/web/main/missionhome.asp?MissionID=45187> [Accessed 15th January 2019].
- MILL, J. S. (1872). *A System of Logic*. 8th edition, London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer.
- MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR. *Inmigración Irregular Balance 2016*.
- MUELLER, U., NAUCK, B. and DIEKMANN, A. (2000). *Handbuch der Demographie: Anwendungen*. Berlin: Springer.
- NISHIKIDA, A. and HAMANAKA, S. (2013). Palestinian Migration Under the Occupation: Influence of Israeli Democracy and Stratified Citizenship. *Sociology Study*, 3(4), pp. 247-260.
- NOACK, R. (2014). These 14 walls continue to separate the World. *The Washington Post*, 11. 11. 2014 [online]. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/11/11/these-14-walls-continue-to-separate-the-world/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.82a0b13a38a5 [Accessed 14th April 2019].
- ODELL, J. S. (2001). Case Study Methods in International Political Economy. *International Studies Perspectives*, 2(2), pp. 161-176.
- WOLINSKY-NAHMIAS, Y. (ed.): *Models, Numbers and Cases. Methods for Studying International Relations*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- OHMAE, K. (1990). *The Borderless World*. New York: Harper Business.
- OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE: *Europe's refugees and migrants: hidden flows, tightened borders and spiralling costs*. London, 2016.
- PALLISTER-WILKINS, P. (2017). The tensions of the Ceuta and Melilla border fences. In: P. Gaibazzi, S. Dünwald and A. Bellagamba, eds., *EurAfrican Borders and Migration Management*, Palgrave Macmillan: New York, pp. 63-81.
- PAQ, A. (2018). "It's not a life" – Palestinian workers' daily struggle with Israeli checkpoints. *Equal Times* [online], 6. 8. 2018. Available at: <https://www.equaltimes.org/it-s-not-a-life-palestinian?lang=en#.XD0HKGICfIU> [14 January 2019].
- PCBS (2016). *Number of Palestinians (In the Palestinian Territories Occupied in 1948) for Selected Years, End Year*. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics [online]. Available at: http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/Eng%20time%20series%20p.htm [Accessed 14 January 2019].
- REUTERS (2009) Netanyahu says West Bank barrier to stay for now.

- REUTERS, 22. 7. 2009. [online]. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-israel-barrier/netanyahu-says-west-bank-barrier-to-stay-for-now-idUSTRE56L39W20090722> [Accessed 14 January 2019].
- RITAINE, E. (2009). La barrière et le checkpoint: mise en politique de l'asymétrie. *Cultures & conflits* 73, pp. 15-33.
- SADDIKI, S. (2017). *The World of Walls: The Structure, Roles and Effectiveness of Separation Barriers*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- SAVOLAINEN, J. (1994). The Rationality of Drawing Big Conclusions Based on Small Samples: In Defense of Mill's Methods. *Social Forces*, 72(4), pp. 1217-1224.
- SHEFFER, E. (2011). *Burned Bridge: How East and West Germans Made the Iron Curtain*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- SPARKE, M. B. (2006). A neoliberal nexus: Economy, security and the biopolitics of citizenship on the border. *Political geography*, 25(2), pp. 151-180.
- SU, H., QU, L.-J., HE, K., ZHANG, Z., CHEN, Z. and GU, H. (2003). The Great Wall of China: A physical barrier to gene flow? *Heredity*, 90(3), pp. 212-219.
- TAMURA, E. (1997). *China: Understanding its Past*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- TOPAK, Ö. E. (2014). The biopolitical border in practice: surveillance and death at the Greece-Turkey borderzones. *Environment and Planning D: Society and space*, 32(5), pp. 815-833.
- Trading Economics (2019) Israel Average Monthly Wages [online]. Available at: <https://tradingeconomics.com/israel/wages> [Accessed 14 April 2019].
- UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 186 (1964) [The Cyprus Question], 4 March 1964, S/RES/186 (1964). Available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f20ac.html> [Accessed 15th April 2019].
- VALLET, É. and DAVID, C.-P. (2012). Introduction: The (Re)Building of the Wall in International Relations. *Journal of Borderlands Studies*, 27(2), pp. 111-119.
- VERTOVEC, S. (2009). *Transnationalism*. New York: Routledge.
- WEBER, L. and PICKERING, S. (2011). *Globalization and borders: Death at the global frontier*. Basingstoke: Springer.
- YANG, M. (2017). Crossing between the Great Wall of China and the "Great" Trump Wall. *Palgrave Communications*, 3(1), p. 25.