Disinformation as a Weapon: Media Tactics and Psychological Warfare in the Ukrainian Conflict

Authors

  • Urszula Soler Institute of Sociological Sciences and Pedagogy, Warsaw University of Life Sciences (Poland)
  • Stefano Lovi University of International Studies of Rome UNINT (Italy)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.34135/sjps.250102

Keywords:

Disinformation, Misinformation, Psychological Warfare, war in Ukraine, social media

Abstract

This article critically examines disinformation as a strategic weapon in the Russian-Ukrainian war, arguing that it forms a core pillar of hybrid conflict by targeting cognition and perception rather than solely battlefield outcomes. The study aims to define and investigate key research problems: how disinformation campaigns are structured and disseminated; which objectives they pursue (shaping opinions, eroding social cohesion, delegitimizing authorities, justifying aggression); and how effectively Western responses mitigate their impact. Methodologically, it employs qualitative content analysis of state media, digital platforms, and social networks, tracing techniques from fabricated news and manipulated audiovisuals (deepfakes) to coordinate bot/troll operations, and reviews counter-disinformation policies and media-literacy initiatives by the EU, NATO, and allied actors. Major findings show Russia operating as a particularly sophisticated information-warfare actor, with campaigns that manipulate emotions—fact-checking, education, detection technologies, and international cooperation—have value but face structural limits due to rapid content diffusion, platform dynamics, and growing distrust of institutions.

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Published

2025-09-01

How to Cite

Soler, U. and Lovi, S. (2025) “Disinformation as a Weapon: Media Tactics and Psychological Warfare in the Ukrainian Conflict”, Slovak Journal of Political Sciences, 25(1). doi: 10.34135/sjps.250102.