

LOVED, HATED, OR IGNORED? PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND PARTISANSHIP IN SLOVAKIA

Olga Gyárfášová¹ - Martin Slosiarik²

Abstract

When studying social and political dynamics in modern representative democracies the relationship between citizens and political parties cannot be neglected because it is essential for understanding social processes. The concept of party identification largely follows the classic work of research on voting behavior - The American Voter (Campbell et al., 1960). It is understood as exogenous predispositions which affect attitudes and political behaviour. It is mostly seen as a positive trait and affirmation. However, in post-Communist countries (and not only there) we see strong negative party identification, operationalized as a party that an individual would never vote for or perceives as distant and evoking negative feelings. Challenged by the question of the dynamics of, and relationship between, positive and negative partisanship this paper contributes to the research of partisan identification, positive as well as negative. Based on empirical data from several surveys the study shows the dynamics of party identification in Slovakia. There are partisans who hold either positive or negative party identification, or both, or none. The representation of different types depends heavily on the pattern of electoral competition. Though the study concentrates on single country case - Slovakia - it may identify more general trends of political partisanship in the region and beyond in times of intensely polarized politics.

Keywords: Political parties, Political identities, Positive and negative party identification, Type of Partisans

INTRODUCTION

Love and hate are usually two sides of the same coin. And like other objects, political parties can be loved or hated and perceived as closed or very distant. The relationship between citizens and political parties cannot be neglected when studying the social and political dynamics of modern representative democracies because it is essential for understanding political processes. Political parties are a kind of “transmission belt” between

¹ Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia, e-mail: olga.gyarfasova@uniba.sk, ORCID-ID: 0000-0003-0016-7866.

² FOCUS Agency, Bratislava, e-mail: martin.slosiarik@focus-research.sk, ORCID-ID: 0009-0001-6979-8992.

citizens and politics: they represent citizens' values, opinions, and interests, and they design, promote, and implement public policies.

The public's attitude towards political parties and the degree of identification with them can take a wide variety of forms. Uncritical emotional attachment, either to the party itself, or - more often - to its leader, is as problematic as the rejection and negative evaluation of parties and/or politics in general. Both extremes prevent rational evaluation of the performance of political parties and weaken responsibility and accountability. On the other hand, partisanship, or identification with a party, is crucial for voters' decision-making and thus also for the stability and predictability of the democratic system as such.

In most academic writing the concept of party identification follows the classic work by Angus Campbell and his colleagues *The American Voter* (Campbell et al., 1960), which deals primarily with voting behavior. Campbell and the so-called Michigan School saw partisanship as an essential factor in voters' electoral decision-making. Party identification was originally defined as the sense of personal attachment which the individual feels towards the party of their choice and also as "the individual's affective orientation to an important group-object in his environment" (Campbell et al., 1960, pp. 121-122). The concept clearly refers to social psychological identification and understands this as a type of social identity. Campbell rejected the social structural variables identified as an explanatory category by Paul Lazarsfeld and the Columbia School in the 1940s (Lazarsfeld et al., 1968). The social psychological approach of the Michigan School emphasized individual perception and subjective identification and claimed that it is not the social structure that determines how people live (and vote), but it is how people perceive the social structure that can form and shape their "living spaces" (Campbell et al., 1960).

In line with this tradition Russell J. Dalton postulates that party identification is a long-term, affective attachment to one's preferred political party and these party identities are a potent cue in guiding the attitudes and behavior of the average person. Furthermore, partisans tend to repeatedly support their preferred party, even when the candidates and the issues change. Party ties mobilize people to vote to support their party, or even to work for the party during the campaign (Dalton, 2016, p. 1).

Though party identification could have positive and/or negative forms, the positive one attracted more academic attention and was broadly used as explanatory variable in voter choice or electoral participation in general.

The approach of the Michigan School de facto introduced into political science research what has become one of its central topics today: emotions

and affective ties and affect-based partisan identities. Campbell and his team said many decades ago that it is not rational choice, nor objectively understood social structure, but party identification and party identity that creates enthusiasm for politics, maintains system stability and motivates political engagement. On the other hand, the absence of stable and permanent party identities creates space for undemocratic groups that can intensify the degree of polarization in public discourse and destabilize democratic institutions (Huddy, Banker, Davies, 2018).

Since its introduction in the 1950s and 60s the concept of party identification has been widely disputed and still poses theoretical and methodological challenges. Currently, a wide range of literature demonstrates the importance of partisanship as a central element of democratic politics (Dalton, Weldon, 2007; Goren, 2005; Green 2004; Green, Palmquist, Schickler, 2002; Iyengar et al., 2012; Dalton, 2016; Huddy, Banker, Davies 2018; Ward, Tavits, 2019; Elliot, 2023 and other). At the same time the concept is heavily contested, and we agree with Elliot (2024, p. 584) that “there is a fundamental plurality in the ways that individuals experience psychological attachment to political parties, and this plurality has important consequences for its empirical study and its value for democracy”.

The following article deals with various perspectives of the relationship of citizens to political parties and focuses on a more detailed analysis of the concept of party identification, positive and negative, the factors determining different types of partisanship and the implications this has. The main goal is to identify the degree of (positive and negative) party identification in Slovakia and to undertake an empirical study of four types of party affiliation. Our results provide evidence that positive party identification has been on the decline within the last 10-15 years, and that recently the number of apathetic partisans is on the rise. Both phenomena are closely interlinked with the process of partisan de-alignment followed by high voting volatility.

We proceed by reviewing the academic literature on political partisanship, including the debate around its operationalization and research. Subsequently, we introduce the Slovak case study, emphasizing why negative partisanship is important for understanding political processes in Slovakia. We then turn to our research objectives and research design. We utilize data from a special ad hoc representative survey conducted in spring 2022 on a sample of almost 3,000 respondents which mapped both positive and negative political partisanship. A similar survey was repeated in fall 2024 on a smaller sample and under completely different political circumstances. Finally, we present, interpret, and discuss the findings.

1 CRITICAL LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1 “Unmoved mover” or “running tally”?

Within academia there is a long-running debate about the nature and functioning of partisanship. On the one hand, the traditional conceptualization sees partisan identity as the exogenous and most stable of all political predispositions: it is seen as the “unmoved mover” of political behavior. On the other hand, the revisionist conceptualization holds that partisanship is unstable and responsive to party performance and policy agreement. In this view it is a “running tally”, meaning that it is evaluative and changeable, and that there is a volatile orientation towards parties (Fiorina, 1976, 1981; Johnston, 2006; Oscarsson, Holmberg 2020).

According to the traditionalist view, party identification as a stable trait arises in early adolescence through political socialization in the family. It is seen “as exogenous predispositions, an ‘unmoved mover’ that affects attitudes and behaviour but is at the same time not affected by those variables” (Oscarsson, Holmberg, 2020, p. 2). In later years, with the dominance of rational choice theory, the affective and expressive components were toned down in favour of the instrumental and cognitive components of party identification. The revisionists theorized that party identification is more volatile than originally assumed.

The most influential reconceptualization of the role of party identification in shaping citizen choice was presented by Morris Fiorina. He described party identification as a “running tally” or an evaluation that was continually updated, being affected by political events and parties’ issue positions, but with considerable elasticity (Fiorina, 1976). This questions the traditional assumption that party identification is a fundamental position which, according to Fiorina, cannot be understood as identity. Instead of such an assumption, it is necessary to look at the concept as the sum of the evaluation of parties according to their actions in the past.

The revisionist model approaches identification with a political party as a constructed decision that voters make based on the information they receive. Thus, the revisionist conception assumes that party loyalty is updated in response to a number of short-term stimuli, and also that citizens modify their party identity as required by experience and the current evaluation of a number of factors (Fiorina, 1981). Fiorina in his later work accepted some arguments of the traditionalist point of view but in principle adhered to his initial concept and stated: “Party ID may move slowly, but it moves” (Fiorina, 2003, p. 7).

In any case, there is now little doubt that party identification – moving or unmoving - cannot be overlooked. Research shows that party identification is the most stable political predisposition in voter behavior (Dalton, 2016). Moreover, according to several theorists, it is so significant that it prevails over all other motives (Thomassen, Rosema, 2009). On the other hand, the growing volatility of voting behavior is evidence that the tie changes over time, even in the case of strong identification.

In addition to the element of identity, party identification is also defined by the time horizon. From the very beginning, party identification was conceptualized as a permanent orientation. This is the reason why the Michigan School often refers to party identification as long-term loyalty to a party, which should persist in the minds of citizens for a long time (Blais, Nadeau, Gidengil, Nevitte, 2001).

Dalton argues that partisanship is an extremely stable predisposition with real political consequences or also “A primary value of partisanship is as a heuristic that cues political choices” (Dalton, 2020, p. 75). Similarly, Donald Green, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler (2002) explicitly defined partisanship as an individual’s central identity, able to last longer than individual political campaigns, and which significantly shapes voters’ perceptions. As the authors state, if people feel a sense of belonging to a certain social group, they absorb the doctrinal positions that that group defends. However, party identification occurs, once it emerges in early adulthood, it often persists. It does not come and go with electoral cycles but forms a fundamental component of how individuals perceive politics (Green, Palmquist, Schickler, 2002). For this reason, party identification has become a central element in modern research on voting behavior (Oscarsson, Holmberg, 2020).

1.2 “Unmoved mover” or “running tally”?

Most academic literature focuses on the positive aspects of political partisanship, above all in its effects on voting. Of course, that is not the whole story. Oscarsson and Holmberg note that political partisanship “is best to be considered to be at the same time beneficial as well as detrimental to democratic citizens and democratic system”. (2020, p. 3) They claim that the “Janus face of emotional attachments to political parties is that they can work as helpers and blinders to individual citizens, and they can bolster or undermine processes of democratic representation and electoral accountability” (ibid). So, when analyzing the phenomenon, we should have this “warning” in mind.

Oscarsson and Holmberg designed a simple two-dimensional categorization. Combining partisanship as good or bad and macro vs. micro level, they construct four theoretical types, where each of them covers several phenomena:

Table 1: Partisanship for good and for worse

<p>Partisanship a good thing: A. Macro-level: mass-elite linkage; political mobilization; interest representation; political stability</p>
<p>B. Micro-level: heuristics; making sense of the political world; attitude formation/consistency; political literacy/civic skills</p>
<p>Partisanship is a bad thing: C. Micro-level: misperception; denialism; fact avoidance; motivated reasoning</p>
<p>D. Macro-level: system polarization; overheated public discourse; misrepresentation; failure of accountability</p>

Source: Oscarsson – Holmberg, 2020, p.3.

The “bad sides” of partisanship have consequences at both macro and micro level. As mentioned in the introduction, uncritical partisanship could at the individual level lead to a misperception of a party’s positioning or performance, and suppressing the cognitive components of evaluation in favor of emotional affective perception might be harmful for democratic competition.

The negative consequences at the macro level are above all polarization and overheated public discourse – a phenomenon which has recently been on the rise.

At the individual level, the downside of a strong attachment to one party is that it “can develop into strong negative feelings toward the out-party and its partisans, thus fostering political tribalism and non-constructive public discourse” (Oscarsson – Holmberg, 2020, p. 4). This type is close to what Rose and Mishler (1998) identified as negative partisanship.

The debate around the effects of partisanship has intensified within recent years due to the rise of affective polarization and the negative consequences of affect-based partisan identities on the quality of democracy (e.g. Achen, Bartles, 2016 ; Ward, Tavits, 2019; Wagner, 2021). Achen and Bartels argue that for most people, partisanship is not an ideological proximity, but a

reflection of where people like me belong (Achen, Bartels, 2016, p. 266). In other words: ideology is more often a consequence of party identification than its cause (ibid.).

1.3 “Unmoved mover” or “running tally”?

Based on long-term data from national election studies and international CSES research, we can conclude that party identification is generally declining, but not disappearing (Holmberg, Oscarsson 2020). For example, in the USA, where comparable data have been available since 1952, the proportion of those who answer positively to the question of whether they are close to a party had fallen from 74% to 63% by 2016. Another example is Sweden, where there was a drop from 65% at the beginning of the 1960s to 24% in 2018 (Holmberg, Oscarsson, 2020, pp.16-17). The Swedish example is probably closer to Western European multiparty democracies, where there has been a significant loosening of socio-structural ties to political parties, but also a reduction in affective identification (although the aim of this study is not to investigate what is the cause and what is the effect). American society is a different case due to several circumstances: a system of two strong political parties and a strong, generation-long identification with their positions, which are often completely opposite.

Holmberg and Oscarsson conclude that there has been a decrease in the strength of party identification across most established democracies over the decades, and they see this as a negative trend because it has made governing less predictable and short-sighted. However, their conclusion is “down, but not out”. In their opinion the factors behind the change have to do with polarization and the number of effective political parties (Holmberg, Oscarsson, 2020, pp. 26-27).

1.4 Negative political partisanship

The interest in negative party identification is much lower than the interest in positive identification, although its importance for voting behavior has been empirically confirmed many times (Caruana, McGregor, Stephenson, 2015; Mayer 2017; Medeiros, Noël 2014; McGregor, Caruana, and Stephenson, 2015; Rose, Mishler, 1998).

Negative partisanship is also relevant when applying the revisionist model. From this point of view, party identification reflects positive and negative retrospective evaluations of the activities of political parties. It

admits the possibility of both stability and change of party identification. While a positive evaluation of a particular party can influence the voter to form a positive relationship with it, it is also possible that a predominantly negative evaluation of a party can give the voter an incentive to form negative ties (McGregor, Caruana, Stephenson, 2015).

In the early stages of research into party identification, academics hypothesized that positive and negative evaluations are two opposite ends of a bipolar continuum where individuals divide political parties into us versus them groups (Medeiros, Noël, 2014). Such differentiation occurs in two basic ways. The first is preferring the group to which one belongs and the second is not having a feeling of belonging to other groups (Brewer, Brown, 1998). In the first case group members have a tendency to exaggerate the favorable characteristics of the group to which they belong. In the second case, they exaggerate the negative characteristics of opposing groups, and the individual's own group is considered superior to the competing group (Green, 2004). From this perspective, negative party identification would be the simple opposite of positive party identification. However, current research deviates from this traditional notion in certain cases and declares that these two phenomena do not have to occur simultaneously. Even though negative and positive party identification can coexist and have a certain influence on each other, positive party identification does not necessarily presuppose the existence of negative party identification and vice versa (McGregor, Caruana, Stephenson, 2015). In other words, positive and negative partisanship do not have to go hand in hand and condition each other or even co-exist at the same time. Even Dalton, who is in principle very positive about partisanship and sees it as very valuable concept, points out that "there are times and conditions where partisanship can act as blinkers or blinders to reasoned political choices. At these times the negative aspects of PID may exceed the positive" (Dalton, 2020, p. 85).

The concept of negative political partisanship was extensively developed by Richard Rose and William Mishler (1998) in connection with research in post-Communist countries in the first decade after the fall of totalitarian regimes. Strong negative identification was related to the rejection of the previous regime and its main political force, the Communist Party, and support for the formation of a pluralistic party democracy. Negative partisanship is described as "the identification of a party that an individual would never vote for" (Rose, Mishler, 1998, p. 222). Based on empirical surveys Rose and Mishler pointed out that work with negative identification is essential for understanding political developments in post-Communist

countries. Introducing negative partisanship, they combine and create four types of partisanship: open, closed, apathetic and negative (ibid.) Paradoxically, this concept which was so typical in the post-Communist context is now becoming more prominent in mature democracies with the rise of right-wing populism (Bankert, 2020, p. 92).

Rose and Mishler, by combining two dimensions of party identification, created four different types of partisanship depending on whether people declare positive or negative party identification, both or neither (1998). Negative partisans can name a party that they perceive as distant, a party they would never vote for, but they have no positive party identification: they do not have a party that is close to them (Table 2). The authors argued that “the predominance of negative partisans in post-Communist countries makes party competition today relatively unstable, for while most voters identify a single point – a party that they will not support – they have no stable commitment to a party they would vote for” (Rose, Mishler 1998, p. 223). This results in high volatility between elections. Closed partisans have both a party that is distant from them and a party that is close to them. They take party competition seriously and live in a world of “Us” versus “Them”. Open partisans are positively committed to a political party but do not identify a party that they would never vote for. According to Rose and Mishler, it is this group that contributes to the stability of a party system and the stability of democracy by reducing hostility towards other parties and thus being more open to accepting a democratic alternation of power. Apathetic electors are those who show no identification, either positive or negative. According to a survey conducted in 1995 the representation of this type of voter was only 3% in Romania, 9% in Poland, 19% in Hungary and 40% in Slovenia (ibid., p. 224). On average the most frequent type of voter in the post-Communist states surveyed was “negative partisanship (52%). The authors hypothesized that (as Václav Havel observed) during the Communist era what took place was not indoctrination but rather alienation from party politics (ibid., p. 220).

Table 2: Types of partisanship

	Positive party identification (Positive PID)		
	YES	YES	NO
Negative party identification (Negative PID)		Closed partisanship	Negative partisanship
	NO	Open partisans	Apathetic partisans

Source: Rose – Mishler, 1998, p. 223.

This four-type typology has been applied and empirically explored as part of the Polish Electoral Studies. Marta Żerkowska-Balas (2022) in her study goes beyond separate analysis of positive and negative party identification and following Rose and Mishler’s (1998) four-fold typology she looked at the interplay of the two variables to provide a better insight into ambivalent political partisanship. The author concludes that in Poland there are not only positive and negative partisans, but these two types or variables can appear in various combinations. The situation is very dynamic, which should primarily be attributed to changes in the level and dynamics of political competition. Her findings are in contrast to previous research which found that negative partisans are not prone to developing positive identity but are more disposed to becoming apathetic partisans (and vice versa). She points out that “The increasing number of positive partisans and decreasing number of negative ones should reduce electoral volatility and improve the quality of political accountability, which is still a problem in post-communist democracies” (Żerkowska-Balas, 2022, p. 18).

2 SLOVAKIA’S POLITICAL CONTEXT OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION

In spring 2022, when the first survey was conducted, a center-right coalition lead by the movement Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO) had clearly won the 2020 parliamentary election and was in government. The country was slowly recovering after the COVID 19 pandemic. The leader of OĽaNO, Igor Matovič, had initially been appointed Prime Minister, but after a year he agreed to step aside and allow a cabinet reshuffle because his chaotic governing and aggressive political style was heavily criticized. However, the situation did not calm down very much and

in summer 2022 one of the coalition parties left the government, which then “survived” as a minority cabinet without the confidence of parliament until spring 2023, when it was recalled by the president and replaced by a technocratic interim government. The government faced huge external and internal challenges: first the COVID pandemic, then high inflation, energy crises, and the war of aggression of Russia against Ukraine, Slovakia’s neighbor, which brought tens of thousands of war refugees to the country. Moreover, the governing coalition suffered from intra-coalition conflicts and animosities.

During the 3.5 years of the government led by the OĽaNO movement the opposition strengthened its popularity. The largest opposition party, Direction-Social Democracy (Smer-SD) split in 2020, and the breakaway Voice-Social-Democracy (Hlas-SD) initially had higher support but later this decreased slightly, and Smer-SD got stronger. The early election held in 2023 took place in a very tense atmosphere. The winner was Smer-SD, followed by a newcomer to the Slovak parliament, Progressive Slovakia (PS). Five other parties reached the 5% threshold for obtaining parliamentary seats under Slovakia’s system of proportional representation. The new government was formed shortly after the election by three parties: Smer-SD, Hlas-SD and the Slovak National Party (SNS). It held a narrow majority of 79 of the 150 seats in parliament. The leader of the strongest party, Smer-SD’s Robert Fico, took the office of Slovak prime minister for the fourth time. The two largest parties in parliament, Smer-SD and the opposition PS, represent the two main competing blocs and are the major political rivals. Smer-SD, while claiming to be a social democratic party, is in reality a populist right-wing nationalist party. It promotes a “sovereign Slovak foreign policy” and is reminiscent of Viktor Orbán’s government in Hungary in its stance towards the EU, Ukraine, and Russia. On the other hand, Progressive Slovakia stands for a markedly pro-European, liberal, and progressive agenda. The radicalization and polarization between the coalition and opposition gradually increased. By fall 2024, when our second survey was conducted, the two main political parties – Smer-SD representing the governing coalition and the opposition party PS – had reached similar levels of potential electoral support.

All in all, the structure of political competition changed significantly between spring 2022 and fall 2024. The 2023 election produced not only the alternation of power but also clear representatives of the two antagonistic camps who were relatively balanced in terms of their electoral support: Smer-SD on the coalition side and PS for the opposition.

3 METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

As stated in the literature empirical measurement of political identification is a methodological challenge, particularly if using standardized questionnaire-based surveys. Previous research on party identification is accompanied by a general consensus according to which party identification includes three basic components of investigation: a) whether people identify with any parties, b) which parties they are, and c) how strong influence party identification has on voting behavior. However, there is no precise agreement about how the concept of party identification should be operationalized and measured. International political science research applies several approaches. Indicators can be derived from voting intention or directly from voter choice. If we assume that there is a strong correlation between voting decisions and identification, we can consider the intention to vote for a party as a positive identification, and vice versa: a firm decision not to vote for a party is negative identification.

The CSES (Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems) – a global comparative project about electoral behavior – consistently applies the party identification indicator (PI or PID)³, as it is used in national election studies in the USA and many Western European countries. This method also captures the intensity of attachment, measuring weaker and stronger identification. In addition, the CSES project applies a like-dislike scale, and based on this indicator a kind of “mental map” of relationships related to the perception of political parties can be created identifying the vectors of closeness vs. distance (cf. Gyárfášová 2018). However, for both indicators, it is important to note that the CSES is a post-election survey, and it is plausible to assume that the election results themselves and reflections on one’s own vote-choice in a given election can influence them. Without exception, in all countries included in the CSES research, party identification and voter choice were strongly correlated.

More sophisticated methods of measuring party identification are presented by Alexa Bankert (2020, pp. 89-101), focusing more on party identity and the degree of identification measured by a battery of attitude questions measured on a no/disagree scale, such as “When I talk about this

³ The wording of the CSES questions is as follows: “Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular party?” If the response is NO, the next question is: “Do you feel yourself a little closer to one of the political parties than the others?” If YES, an open-ended question follows: “Which party do you feel closest to?” And finally: “Do you feel very close to this party, somewhat close, or not very close?” (<https://cses.org/collect-data/>).

party I say we instead of them, I have a lot in common with other supporters of this ...” Questions formulated in this way indicate belonging to some group, that is, a collective identity defined by common proximity to a political party. Opposing statements then indicate a negative party identity.

Even though identification with a political party, political partisanship and party attachment are central concepts in political science research, in Slovakia there are practically no systematic studies focused on these issues, not to speak about analysis of the linkage between positive and negative partisanship, types of partisanship, and their origins and affects. Our study aims to empirically test the distribution of the four-type model on the Slovak data. Furthermore, we address some of the gaps in the literature and examine the following research questions:

- What are the trends in party identification since 2010?
- What is the distribution of positive and negative partisanship?
- What political parties are voters more likely to identify with positively or negatively?
- What is the distribution of the four types of partisanship?
- What are the roots of different types of partisanship: are they embedded in the socio-demographic structure or political attitudes (left-right, liberal-conservative, pro-EU – anti-EU)?
- What is the dynamic of closed partisanship?

For the purposes of this analysis, we use data from the CSES modules 2010, 2012, 2016, and 2024, as well as the two ad hoc representative surveys, which contain two pairs of questions - one on positive identification and the other on negative partisanship - which are applied to construct the four-type model of partisanship. Additional questions on ideological orientation, electoral preferences and demographic questions are used as independent variables for further analysis.

The CSES surveys were conducted on representative samples of the adult inhabitants of Slovakia eligible to participate in the general election. In all four fieldwork surveys there was probability sampling⁴.

To illustrate the trends in party identification we utilized the CSES data and operationalized party identification as the positive response to the question: “Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular party?” If YES, an open-ended question followed: Which party do you feel closest to?

⁴ Data files and all details about the fieldwork of surveys are available in Slovak Archive of Social Data (<https://sasd.sav.sk/sk/>).

The ad hoc surveys on representative samples were designed to capture the four types of partisanship and to measure positive as well negative party identification. We operationalized them as declared closeness, positive feelings for a party on the one hand and distance or negative feelings to a party on the other hand. We applied a binary alternative “yes” or “no”, or I don’t know. In follow-up questions both surveys asked, “Which party do you feel closest to?”, which were open-ended questions (with just one option) coded by authors of this paper.

The first ad hoc representative survey was conducted in April-May 2022, on a sample of almost 3,000 respondents (N=2 909) using quota sampling. We repeated the same questions in another survey in September 2024, also on a representative quota sample, about a year after the 2023 general election. Both surveys were conducted by the FOCUS agency. Between spring 2022 and fall 2024 the political constellation had changed completely, which was also reflected in our results.

4 RESULTS

4.1 How does party identification evolve over time?

Studies of partisanship are relatively rare in Slovakia, and if there are any, they use different indicators, so it is difficult to follow trends over time. Reflections on the relationship between the public and political parties in Slovakia can go in several directions. One of them is trust in political parties in general, as institutions.

The results are evident: in the long term, across different political constellations and across different social environments, political parties are the least trusted institutions in Slovakia. For example, in fall 2003, only 12% of respondents trusted political parties in general (Gyárfášová 2004). Twenty years later - in 2023 - according to the DEKK Institute slightly more, but still only 25%, of the population expressed trust in political parties (Trends [dis]trust ..., 2023), which is the lowest among all institutions, even taking into account that vertical trust in general is low.

Measured by declared closeness to a political party, CSES data show that the share of those who identify with a political party has decreased by 33 percentage points since 2010 when measured within CSES surveys. However, we see that the share of partisans it is not directly proportional to electoral participation (cf. McAllister, 2020). On the contrary: the data for four general elections show the opposite trend. The explanation for this

is that it is becoming more and more common for voters to declare “the party I am voting for is the lesser evil” as the reason for their vote choice (Gyárfášová, Hlatky, Slosiarik, 2024, p. 135). Another background factor, which can be a cause or a consequence, is high volatility. The findings for the 2023 parliamentary election showed that aggregate as well as individual volatility increased between the 2020 and 2023 elections. This relates to both intra- as well as inter-bloc volatility. Intra-bloc volatility continued to be high, especially in the civic-right bloc of Slovak politics. And, compared to elections since 2010 as a whole, intra-bloc volatility increased substantially within the nationalist-left bloc. This was probably a result of Smer-SD’s radicalization on sociocultural and foreign policy issues, which attracted former voters of the radical right. When it comes to inter-bloc volatility, the volatility study showed that voters are also increasingly willing to switch between the civic right and the nationalist left in response to poor government performance. In fact, the movement of voters from the civic right to the nationalist left – largely in response to the inefficiency and mismanagement of the OĽaNO-led governments –in 2023 resulted in the highest level of inter-bloc volatility since 2010. A similar pattern occurred in 2020 when voters who had been disappointed by political corruption and scandals changed from Smer-SD and its coalition partners to opposition parties. Since coalition building largely follows the structure of the two blocs, punishment of the incumbents seems to be the primary factor underpinning inter-bloc volatility (Gyárfášová, Hlatky, Slosiarik, 2024, pp. 129-134).

Table 3: Are you close to any political party? (% of YES responses) and turnout (% of eligible voters)

	Declared closeness to a political party	Turnout in the respective election
2010	66.2	58.8
2016	43.8	59.8
2020	42.3	65.8
2023/2024	33.3	68.6

Source: CSES Slovakia; Statistical Office of the SR.

Those who expressed closeness to a party subsequently indicated which party it was. The findings for all years (and elections) are clear: it is

predominantly the party that the voter chose in the past parliamentary election. Strong partisan biases reflect electoral competition and outcomes. Since the question was always asked after the election, the findings may reflect the choice recalled by the voter, and for each of the parliamentary elections surveyed the party that most voters declared they were close to was usually the one which won the election. One exception is the 2020 election when OĽaNO won by large margin, but immediately after the new government was formed it very quickly became less popular.

4.2 Four types of partisanship

The basic distribution shows that negative party identification prevails: 62.7 percent of respondents in 2022 and 52.3 percent in 2024 said there was a political party from which they felt distant (Table 4). Even though Rose and Mishler’s argument was related to the early years of post-Communist transformation, given the distance most people felt from the communist party/ies representing the previous regime, a widespread feeling of distance from political parties still exists even 30+ years after the regime change. At the same time more than 68.3 percent (2022) and 64.4 percent (2024) of the public do not identify any party as close to them.

Table 4: Distribution of four types of partisanship

	Do you think you are close to any political party; do you have positive feelings for any party?		And is any political party distant from you, do you have negative feelings towards any party?	
	2022	2024	2022	2024
YES	31.7	32.2	62.7	52.3
NO	68.3	64.4	37.2	39.9

Source: FOCUS 2022, 2024.

Comparing the two measurements we see a slight decrease in the relative number of negative partisans (from 63% to 52%) (Table 4). This decline may appear inconsistent but could be explained by the great unpopularity of the former government, since not only the voters of the then opposition, but also many government coalition voters, distanced themselves from OĽaNO.

After the 2023 elections, these strong negative feelings, especially towards OĽaNO (later renamed Slovakia), partially disappeared.

In 2022 the public expressed closeness to the opposition parties Smer-SD and its splinter Hlas-SD. Smer-SD, due to its broad electorate, stayed at the top of the ranking even as a governing party in 2024. The clear front-runner among opposition parties was now Progressive Slovakia: around the time of the 2023 election and afterwards the liberal party became the political home of a large part of those who expressed positive political identification for an opposition party. The dynamics between Smer-SD and Hlas-SD reflects the combining of voters since both parties describe themselves as social democrats and are like connected vessels. In spring 2022 the level of their popularity was about the same, but in the run-up to the 2023 elections Smer-SD caught up and had clearly overtaken Hlas-SD by 2024.

Table 5: Which party do you feel closest to? (open-ended question, only parties which were named by at least 2% of respondents)

	2022	2024
Direction- Social Democracy (Smer-SD)	20.0	27.6
Voice- Social Democracy (Hlas-SD)	18.2	12.1
Republic (Republika)	11.2	7.7
Progressive Slovakia (PS)	9.9	23.1
Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO)	9.3	3.5
Freedom and Solidarity (SaS)	8.8	5.7
Christian Democratic Movement (KDH)	5.1	5.7
People’s Party – Our Slovakia (ĽSNS)	3.5	3.5
We are a Family (Sme Rodina)	3.0	3.0
Alliance (Magyar Szövetség - Maďarská aliancia)	2.5	3.9
Slovak National Party (SNS)	2.0	3.4

Source: FOCUS 2022, 2024.

The ranking of parties perceived as distant changed even more: once OĽaNO was no longer a governing party it lost its relevance and the party most often seen as the most distant is Smer-SD, followed by its main opponent, PS. The main actors have changed, but the findings clearly

show that the pattern of political competition is stable, and preferences concentrate on the main actors representing the two conflicting sides of the political landscape.

Table 6: *Which party do you feel most distant to? (open-ended question, only parties which were named by at least 2% of respondents)*

	2022	2024
OLaNO	36.0	11.0
Smer-SD	29.7	40.3
ĽSNS	18.2	1.7
PS	3.4	28.3
SaS	2.8	3.1
Republika	2.6	3.5
SNS	0	6.6

Source: FOCUS 2022, 2024.

The combination of questions – closeness and distance - makes it possible to compile a four-type scheme as introduced by Rose and Mishler. We also could compare 2022 and 2024 (Table 7).

Table 7: Four types of partisans (in %)

	2022	2024
Closed partisans	27.3	27.9
Open partisans	4.4	4.3
Negative partisans	35.5	24.4
Apathetic partisans	32.8	43.5
N=	2.909	1.017

Source: FOCUS 2022, 2024.

The findings indicate that in 2022 negative partisanship (respondents

who do not have any positive affiliation but do have a negative one) was the most common type with almost 36%. This type declined in 2024, which might be due to the fact that both the voters of the coalition as well as the opposition parties' voters still feel close to the party they voted for in the previous year's election.

In 2024 the largest group were apathetic partisans, who do not feel either close or distant to any party. They constituted roughly 44 percent of respondents, which was an increase of more than 10 percentage points since 2022. Apathetic partisans are usually not interested in politics, they are permanently alienated from it and represent the core of non-voters. This means that, using Hirshman's typology (1970), they opt for the exit strategy instead of voice or loyalty. However, democracy needs active, participating citizens, and without them it is hollowed and vulnerable. Thirty-five years after the regime change it is hard to speculate about the legacy of the previous regime, but we assume that partisan apathy is not a result of Communist indoctrination having caused anti-party resentment (cf. Rose, Mishler, 1998) but rather a reflection of frustration and dissatisfaction with the quality of democracy and the performance of democratically-elected political parties. More recent studies apply the term "apartisans": individuals who lack any positive or negative partisanships (Meléndez, 2022).

Closed partisanship means that positive and negative identification goes hand-in-hand. In both years this type stayed at about the same level: 27-28 percent. But we see a shift in what political parties feed the positive and negative poles.

The smallest group are the open partisans. They have a positive identification without feeling a negative distance from any particular party. Open partisans who are positively committed to a political party and do not identify a party that they would never vote for represent a very marginal group.

The four types of partisans differ in their social and demographic profile. Closed partisans are more likely to be found among older people (65+), and we also see a quite significant gender gap: men are more likely to be found among closed partisans, they also have clearer positions on the left-right and liberal-conservative dimensions, and they more frequently disagree with the statement "there is no party to vote for". Negative partisans are more evenly distributed across social groups and ideological orientations. And finally, apathetic partisans are more likely to be found among women than men, and among the unemployed and women at home, young people, and those with a centrist or ambivalent ideological orientation.

The different kinds of partisans are characterized more by their political

preferences measured as voting intention and trust towards party leaders than by demographics and ideological orientations. Closed partisans are above all supporters of the non-parliamentary radical right party Republika, then supporters of Smer-SD (particularly those who trust deputy chair Ľuboš Blaha), and voters of Progressive Slovakia (PS). To a lesser extent, before the last elections, this group included supporters of the then ruling party OĽaNO and then extra-parliamentary Progressive Slovakia.

Negative partisans are more likely to be undecided voters, but otherwise it is a category which is relatively evenly distributed across different social groups. The same could be said about apathetic partisans, most of whom are the non-voters.

Table 8: Four types of partisans vs. voting intentions, 2022/2024 (in %)

	Closed partisanship		Negative partisanship		Open partisans		Apathetic partisans	
	2022	2024	2022	2024	2022	2024	2022	2024
Slovakia (average)	27	28	36	24	4	4	33	44
Smer-SD	49	50	25	12	6	9	20	29
PS	46	48	40	21	2	6	12	26
OĽaNO	42	42	28	27	6	0	25	36
HLAS-SD	42	31	25	13	7	11	27	45
KDH	40	42	34	27	6	0	20	31
SaS	35	43	44	32	3	5	18	19
SNS	21	47	31	17	14	0	33	37
Republika	53	42	26	28	4	2	17	28
Undecided	6	6	51	36	2	1	42	59
Non-voters	3	3	36	28	2	1	59	68

Source: FOCUS 2022, 2024.

In 2024 we see a completely different pattern. 60% of Smer-SD adherents see PS as the party they feel to be distant, and 79% of PS supporters have the same opinion about Smer-SD. The antagonism between the two parties grew enormously from 2022 onwards. So we could conclude that the main

trend is not so much an increase in closed partisanship in general but rather changes in the parties against whom antagonism is directed. In 2024 the adherents of Smer-SD and PS made up half of all closed partisans.

It is remarkable that in addition to the main dividing line - coalition vs. opposition and its main representatives (OĽaNO vs. Smer-SD in 2022 and Smer-SD vs. PS in 2024) - we see a “moving third pole”. In 2022, PS voters, who were at that point adherents of an opposition party without seats in parliament⁵, felt distant from the main governing party OĽaNO but also from the radical right-wing opposition parties ĽSNS/Republika. In 2024 Republika voters perceived themselves as distant from PS movement, but the opposite was not true. The negative perceptions of Smer-SD voters were fueled not only by PS but to an even greater extent by OĽaNO, and also by the other main opposition parties - SaS and KDĽ. In 2024 OĽaNO supporters' views of Smer-SD represent the strongest rejection of all and is a clear example of closed partisanship. Hlas-SD voters are an interesting case. In 2022 they clearly distinguished themselves against the main government party OĽaNO and to a lesser extent against the extreme right-wing ĽSNS. In 2024, with the party in government, they distance themselves from PS, but less radically than Smer-SD supporters.

All in all, the conflict lines between OĽaNO vs. Smer-SD in 2022 and Smer-SD vs. OĽaNO as well as Smer-SD vs. PS in 2024 represent the greatest antagonisms at the level of voters' perceptions.

⁵ Progressive Slovakia/Spolu (as a coalition) missed the 7 percent threshold in 2020 election and did not enter parliament but one MP elected for another party later switched to PS.

Table 9: Which parties are declared as distant

Party (supporters)	Distant Parties in 2022	Distant Parties in 2024
Smer-SD	OĽaNO (79%), PS (6%)	PS (60%), OĽaNO/Slovensko (21%)
PS	OĽaNO (50%); LSNS (25%); Smer (1%)	Smer (79%); SNS (8%), Republika (5%)
OĽaNO /Slovensko	Smer (78%), LSNS (15%)	Smer (94%)
Hlas-SD	OĽaNO (65%), LSNS (14%)	PS (44%); OĽaNO (14%); Republika (11%)
Republika	OĽaNO (72%), PS (11%)	PS (53%), Smer 18%
SaS	Smer (50%), LSNS (31%)	Smer (61%), SNS (18%)
KDH	Smer (52%), LSNS (23%), OĽaNO (14%)	Smer (44%), SNS (22%), OĽaNO (13%), PS (13%)

Source: FOCUS 2022, 2024.

LIMITATIONS

While this study provides valuable insights into party identification and partisanship in Slovakia, several limitations must be acknowledged.

The most relevant one is related to the availability of data. In Slovakia we not only lack a specifically designed survey which would provide more indicators covering the phenomenon analysed but also regular surveys covering at least the key variables mapping closeness and distance towards political parties. In order to conduct deeper analysis it would be necessary to have trend data which would cover all crucial moments of political developments in the country.

Secondly, the study works with standardized questions used in a quantitative survey, analysing party identity in depth, and complementary qualitative research would be very beneficial. Alternative or additional explanations would be available. Furthermore, comparison with other countries with similar development cannot be conducted.

CONCLUSION

This study analysed political partisanship in Slovakia from different angles. Above all we provided evidence that in a longer time perspective, positive identification with political parties in general declined significantly. Whereas in 2010 about two thirds of citizens felt close to a political party, it was only about one third in 2024. At the same time, this has not had any effect on the level of turnout in parliamentary elections. On the contrary, while party identification decreased, turnout increased. Based on other surveys and analyses we could hypothesize that voter choice is becoming less determined by positive party identification, with people very often voting for the lesser evil, or indulging in negative voting, triggered by voting “against” and not “for” a political party. Another closely-related phenomenon is high volatility since there are no stable alignments – sociostructural and/ or emotional – which could work as stabilizers of electoral behavior. Another explanation – which would need further research – is connected to rising polarization vs. mobilization. Petra Guasti and Aleš Michal, on the basis of their empirical analysis of the relationship between polarization and mobilization within Central Europe, point to the clash of populist and non-populist forces in society, which sets in motion complex dynamics of mobilization. They argue that “The rise of populist movements in CEE has intensified political polarization and created a complex mobilization dynamic both for democracy and for autocracy” (Guasti, Michal 2025, p. 6). In other words: polarization may not strengthen party identification but may increase voting mobilization.

Secondly, we focus on positive and negative partisanship in 2022 and 2024. It is a relatively short time span but marked by very turbulent political developments. We saw some changes in the portion of those who declared that there was a political party distant from them, with a decrease from 63% to 52%. This decline in negative partisanship may appear illogical but it could be explained by the high unpopularity of the 2020-2023 governments, when not only the voters of the then opposition, but also of the coalition, distanced themselves from the main coalition party OĽaNO. After the 2023 elections, this negative emphasis lost relevance for a substantial part of the public.

Thirdly, we applied the four categories of partisanship designed by Rose and Mishler in the earlier years of post-communist transformation as these also reveal the mode of political partisanship in the later period. We find that apathetic and negative partisans are the two most widespread groups.

This information complements the findings about negative partisanship. Low trust in political parties and a decline in party alignment together with massive de-alignment, and sometimes brief and very fluid re-alignment, complete the broader picture of Slovaks' relationship to political parties. After almost four decades since the first democratic "founding" election, there is still no stability in the political landscape. There are many short-lived parties, and this is a barrier to establishing more stable relationships and alignments to a political party.

Finally, we took a closer look on closed partisans because this type embodies the deep polarization which is symptomatic for the contemporary pattern of political competition. Survey results for 2022 and 2024 show that polarization is stable but the parties concerned are changing according to the structure of political competition. Furthermore, as in earlier studies from the previous decade, we find that a certain "tripolarity" of political identity occurs, which means that in addition to the main dividing line corresponding to the coalition-opposition divide, some additional conflict lines exist, such as attitudes towards radical-right parties. Still, looking back on the 2024 political constellation from a 2025 perspective, we could argue that the logic of polarization may reduce the dividing line just to cover the main conflict, and the "third" pole will depend on the ad hoc political context and unexpected alliances. An example of the latter is the September 2025 Constitutional Amendment, which passed because opposition MPs from the Christian Democratic Movement and OĽaNO/Slovakia voted with the parties of the government coalition.

This analysis of political partisanship in Slovakia illustrates that positive and negative partisanship are independent concepts. They cannot be viewed just as the opposite poles of the same scale but are a distinct qualitative phenomenon. More in-depth research would be necessary to uncover how voters' affective ties to parties shape political identities and in-group vs. out-group relations. Going back to the theoretical debates around political partisanship, we could say that Slovakia is closer to a running tally than to an unmoved mover, but retrospective assessment may not be based on cognitive evaluation, but rather the emotional affect and the search for the lesser evil. Furthermore, we should not overlook apathetic partisans, who neither love nor hate but - as a consequence of alienation from politics - simply ignore political parties. This does not mean that they cannot support a party in an election based on a short-term, emotionally charged decision, and new parties above all could successfully address voters who do not have any previous party identification.

Recently, in a time of rising affective polarization, the personalization of party politics, and the growing relevance of emotions as a determinant of political behavior, the importance of understanding political partisanship is growing. Ideas about alternative political identifications emerge and come with new concepts that better reflect political reality. For example, Carlos Meléndez, using the case of Latin America, has developed the category of post-partisan political identities (Meléndez, 2022). Future more in-depth studies will be needed to determine how these current trends determine political partisanship in Slovakia. Additionally, in spite of declining partisanship political parties remain the key players and mediators of representative democracy. Future research should focus more on the link between partisanship (positive as well as negative) and electoral behaviour. Another important focus is on the mechanisms of how voters, and citizens in general, can hold parties accountable based on their rational evaluation of public policies and not just on uncritical partisan identification. Also, the challenge of party – voter alignment would deserve more academic consideration in the future. And finally, many European societies face similar problems, so that analyzing party identification in a broader comparative framework can bring inspiring results and a deeper understanding of current trends.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would like to thank to anonymous reviewers for their constructive suggestions and to Dr. Karen Henderson for her precise proof-reading of the manuscript. Olĝa Gyárfášová would also like to acknowledge support provided by the project ‘Nationalism, populism, and social networks’ funded by the APVV grant 22-0242.

REFERENCES

- Achen, C. H. and Bartels, L. (2016). *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400882731>
- Bankert, A. (2020). The origins and effect of negative partisanship. In: Oscarsson, H. and Holmberg, S., ed. *Research Handbook on Political Partisanship*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, Pages 89-101. <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788111997.00012>tegit voting in multiparty plurality elections. *Electoral Studies*, 20(3). Pages: 343-352. DOI: 10.1016/S0261-3794(00)00017-2
- Brewer, M.B. and Brown, R.J. (1998). Intergroup Relations. In: Gilbert, D.T., Fiske, S.T. and Lindzey, G., Eds., *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, McGraw-Hill, New York, Pages: 554-594.
- Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., and Stokes, D. E. (1960). *The American Voter*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Caruana, N. J., Mcgregor, M., and StephENSON, L. B. (2014). The Power of the Dark Side: Negative Partisanship and Political Behaviour in Canada. In: *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 48(4), Pages 771-789. DOI:10.1017/S0008423914000882
- CSES Slovakia. Data from 2010, 2012, 2020, 2023/24. Available at: <https://sasd.sav.sk/sk/>
- Dalton, R.J. (2016). Party Identification and Its Implications. In: *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. [Online]. Retrieved from <https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-72>.
- Dalton, R. J. (2020). The blinders of partisanship. In: Oscarsson, H. and Holmberg, S., ed. *Research Handbook on Political Partisanship*, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788111997.00011>
- Dalton, R., and Weldon, S. (2007). Partisanship and Party System Institutionalization. In: *Party Politics*, 13(2), Pages: 179-196. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068807073856>
- Elliott, K. J. (2024). What Is It Like to Be a Partisan? Measures of Partisanship and Its Value for Democracy. *Perspectives on Politics* 22(3), Pages: 584-598. doi:10.1017/S153759272300289X
- Fiorina, M.P. (1976). Voting decision: Instrumental and Expressive Aspects. In: *Journal of Politics*, 38 (2), Pages: 390-413.

- Fiorina, M. P. (1981). *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2129541>
- Fiorina, M.P. (2003). *Parties and partisanship. A Forty Year Retrospective 2003*. Stanford University. Online <https://web.stanford.edu/~mfiorina/PARTIES%20AND%20PARTISANSHIP.pdf>
- Goren, P. (2005). Party Identification and Core Political Values [Online]. *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(4), Pages: 881-896. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00161.x>
- Green, S. (2004). Social Identity Theory and Party Identification [Online]. In: *Social Science Quarterly*, 85(1), Pages: 136-153. Retrieved from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42955932>. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0038-4941.2004.08501010.x>
- Green, D., Palmquist, B. and Schickler, E. (2002). *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Guasti, P. and Michal, A. (2025). Polarization and Democracy in Central Europe. *Politics and Governance*, Volume 13: Illiberal Politics in Europe, Article 9560. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.9560>
- Gyárfášová, O. (2004). Politické strany v spoločnosti - ich vnímanie a hlavné trendy volebného správania. In: Gyárfášová, O. and Mesežnikov, G. (ed.): *Vláda strán na Slovensku: skúsenosti a perspektívy*. Bratislava: Inštitút pre verejné otázky, Pages: 116-121.
- Gyárfášová, O. (2018). The fourth generation: From anti-establishment to anti-system parties, In: *New Perspectives* 26 (1), Pages: 109-133. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2336825X1802600111>
- Gyárfášová, O., Hlatky, R. and Slosiarik, M. (2024). Mobile Voters: Patterns of Electoral Volatility in Slovakia. In: *Czech Journal of Political Science*, 31 (2), pages: 64–89. <https://doi.org/10.5817/PC2024-2-119>
- Hirschman, A. O. (1970). *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Harvard University Press.
- Holmberg, S. and Oscarsson, H. (2020). Party identification: down but not out. and its evolution over time. In: H. Oscarsson & S. Holmberg, *Research Handbook on Political Partisanship*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, Pages: 14-29. <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788111997.00006>
- Huddy, L., BaNKERT, A. and Davies, C. (2018). Expressive Versus Instrumental Partisanship in Multiparty European Systems, In: *Political Psychology Advances*, 39(1), Pages: 173-199. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12482>

- Iyengar, S., Sood, G., and Lelkes, Y., 2012. Affect, not ideology: a social identity perspective on polarization. In: *Public Opinion Quarterly* 76 (3), Pages: 405–431. <https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfs038>
- Johnston, R. (2006). Party Identification: Unmoved Mover or Sum of Preferences? In: *Annual Review of Political Science*, 9 (1), Pages: 329–351. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.062404.170523>
- Lazarsfeld, P., Berelson, B. and Gaudet, H. (1968): *The People's Choice. How the voter makes up his mind in a presidential campaign.* New York. Columbia University Press. <https://doi.org/10.7312/laza93930>
- Mayer, S. M. (2017). How negative partisanship affects voting behavior in Europe: Evidence from an analysis of 17 European multi-party systems with proportional voting [Online]. *Research & Politics*. Retrieved from <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2053168016686636>
- Mcallister, I. (2020). Partisanship and political participation. In: Oscarsson O., Holmberg, S. ed., *Research Handbook on Political Partisanship.* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, Pages 266-280. <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788111997.00028>
- Mcgregor, R. M., Caruana, N. J. and Stephenson, L. B. (2015). Negative Partisanship in a Multi-party System: The Case of Canada [Online]. In: *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 25(3), Pages: 300-316. Retrieved from <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17457289.2014.997239>
- Medeiros, M. and Noël, A. (2014). The Forgotten Side of Partisanship: Negative Party Identification in Four Anglo-American Democracies [Online]. In: *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(7), Pages: 1022-1046. Retrieved from <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414013488560>
- Meléndez, C. (2022). *The Post-Partisans: Anti-Partisans, Anti-Establishment Identifiers, and Apartisans in Latin America.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Series: *Elements in Politics and Society in Latin America.* DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108694308>
- Oscarsson, O. and Holmberg, S. (2020). Introduction to the Research Handbook on Political Partisanship. In: Oscarsson O., Holmberg, S. ed., *Research Handbook on Political Partisanship.* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, Pages 1-13. <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788111997>
- Rose, R. and Mishler, W. (1998). Negative and positive party identification in post-communist countries. In: *Electoral Studies* 17 (2), Pages 217–234. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0261-3794\(98\)00016-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0261-3794(98)00016-X)

- Rosema, M. and Mayer, S.J. (2020). Measuring party attachment with survey questionnaires. In: Oscarsson, O. and Holmberg, S. ed., *Research Handbook on Political Partisanship*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, Pages 123-140. <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788111997.00015>
- Thomassen, J. and Rosema, M. (2009). Party identification revisited [Online]. In J. Bartle & P. Bellucci, *Political Parties and Partisanship: Social Identity and Individual Attitudes* (pp. 42-9). London: Routledge.
- TRENDS [dis]trust 2023. DEKK Institute, September 2023. <https://share.google/LPL1z8gbaFe5vbiUF>
- Wagner, M. (2021). Affective polarization in multiparty systems. In: *Electoral Studies*, 69 (2), Article Number: 102199. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102199>
- Ward, D.G. and Tavits, M. (2019). How partisan affect shapes citizens' perception of the political world. In: *Electoral Studies*, 60 (4): 102045, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2019.04.009>.
- Żerkowska-Balas, M. (2022). Of Love and Hate. Origins and Effects of Positive and Negative Party Identification in Poland. In: *Polish Sociological Review* 217 (1), Pages: 3-22, <https://doi.org/10.26412/psr217.01>.