Econimic Cycles And Electoral Dynamics In The Czech Republic And Slovakia (1992-2023)

Lukáš Cíbik; Marian Lebiedzik; Martin Švikruha

doi:10.34135/sjps.260102

Authors

Lukáš Cíbik Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius in Trnava
Marian Lebiedzik School of Business Administration in Karvina, Silesian University in Opava
Martin Švikruha Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius in Trnava

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.34135/sjps.260102

Keywords:

economic voting, electoral accountability, political business cycles, Electoral behaviour, Czech Republic, Slovakia

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between economic cycles and electoral dynamics in the Czech Republic and Slovak during 1992–2023. It explores the extent to which simple synthetic macroeconomic indicators capture mechanisms of democratic accountability, particularly the rewarding and punishing of governments by voters, while also explaining government continuity or change and levels of electoral mobilization in post-transformation parliamentary democracies. The study contributes to the literature by providing a long-term comparative analysis of the Czech Republic and Slovakia and by comparing the explanatory performance of two established composite macroeconomic indicators within a common analytical framework. The main objective is to compare the explanatory value of two indicators: the Misery Index (MI = inflation + unemployment) developed by Okun (1973) and the Voter Opportunity Index (VOI = inflation − 3 × real GDP growth). Methodologically, the study employs a quantitative comparative research design based on time series of macroeconomic variables and electoral data, including both regular and early elections, complemented by descriptive analysis, correlation analysis, and exploratory regression models. The findings indicate that the Misery Index better reflects long-term socio-economic pressure, whereas the Voter Opportunity Index appears to be more sensitive to short-term cyclical deterioration associated with higher voter turnout and a greater likelihood of government change. These relationships should be interpreted as probabilistic rather than causal, reflecting the interaction between macroeconomic conditions and broader institutional and political factors. Overall, the results confirm a systematic but not deterministic relationship between economic development and electoral dynamics and highlight the usefulness of combining complementary macroeconomic indicators in the analysis of economic voting in post-transformation parliamentary democracies.

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